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Introduction 
For t h e  pas t  two  decades,  major industrial c e n t e r s  have been declining stea.dily. 
Increasingly, once thriving and growing c i t ies  f a c e  a growing fiscal crisis. Cit ies like 
Cleveland, New York, Boston, Balt imore and Detroi t  have had t o  c o m e  t o  t e rms  with 
a shrinking revenue base, in p a r t  a result  of t h e  flight of manufacturing, and a rising 
l e v e l  of s o c i a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  as a result  of unemployment r a t e s  2 and 3 t imes  t h e  
national average.  These cities have begun a p r o g r a m  of r e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  which 
h o p e f u l l y  wi l l  r a i s e  e m p l o y m e n t  l e v e l s ,  i n c r e a s e  t h e  t a x  base, and upgrade their  
economic well being. Rising revenues would provide t h e  necessary funds t o  maintain 
t h e  social  services and municipal functions vi ta l  t o  t h e  l i fe  of t h e  ci t ies.  This has, 
however, resulted in increased c o n f l i c t  be t w e e n  g r o u p s  w i t h i n  c i t i e s  ( c o m m u n i t y ,  
labor, industry, local  government) over t h e  forms and e x t e n t  of t h e  economic benefits  
anc! social cos t s  of this reindustrialization. Researchers  and s t u d e n t s  of c o m m u n i t y  
p o l i t i c s  h a v e  g r a p p l e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  of a d e q u a t e l y  understanding t h e  conflict  
between social groups with di f ferent  goals, and of developing a model of power and 
t h e  decision making process within t h e  community. 
Treat ises  on power and politics have t rad i t iona l ly  a d o p t e d  o n e  of t w o  views:  
a )  s o c i e t y  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a n d  p o l i t i c s  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i s  a n  a m a l g a m  of c o n s e n s u a l  
ar rangements  which result in shifting alliances so t h a t  no part icular g r o u p  wi l l  e v e r  
dominate  t o  t h e  det r iment  of o the rs  for  any e x t e ~ d e d  period of t i m e  and b) society 
is controlled by a n  e l i t e  s t r a t u m  which acts t o  preserve a p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s  e n s u r i n g  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  p r i m a c y  of t h a t  s t ra tum.  l 'hese two traditions, 
generally labeled pluralist and s t ra t i f ica t ion theories respectively,  a t t e m p t  t o  o u t  l i n e  
in  b r o a d  s t r o k e s  a n s w e r s  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n s  f a c i n g  a n y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
community politics: what do we mean by power and how is i t  distr ibuted in society? 
Common t o  both these  traditions, however, is t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r e a l m  o v e r  
which c o m m u n i t y  p o w e r  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  ult imately played c u t  is t h e  distribution and 
consumption of col lect ive  o r  public goods. Production re la t ions  a r e  t a k e n  a s  g i v e n  
a n d  t h e s e  a p p r o a c h e s  on ly  a t t e m p t  t o  unravel social  process. A third approach t o  
community politics is rooted in t h e  idea t h a t  t h e  social  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of p r o d u c t i o n  
itself defines and l imits t h e  range of possible outcomes.  This approach, radical  power 
analysis, e n t e r s  t h e  discussion with t h e  s a m e  set of questions t o  answer. However, i t  
i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f fe ren t  from t h e  f i rs t  two in its underlying assumptions concerning 
individuals and t h e  s t ruc tu re  of society. 
Before are can  undertake a n  analysis of community  power, we must discuss wha t  
is mean t  by power and ask a ser ies  of questions concerning t h e  nature  of community 
p o l i t i c s .  F i r s t ,  how a r e  c o n f l i c t s  r e s o l v e d  in  a p o l i t i c a l  arena? If t h e  unit  of 
analysis is smal l  enough, say t h e  board of d i rectors  of a major corporation, then w e  
c a n  a s s u m e  t h a t  s o m e  f o r m  of m a j o r i t y  op in ion  w i t h  equal  weights t o  a l l  board 
members  (or any o ther  weighting scheme) will de te rmine  t h e  outcome. As we move 
up t h e  s p e c t r u m  of p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a s ,  w e  f ind  t h a t  individuals or  groups begin t o  
emerge  which present  a p a r t i c u l a r  pos i t ion  o r  r e p r e s e n t  a s p e c i f i c  c o n s t i t u e n c y .  
Resolution of conflict ,  we assume, occurs according t o  some calculus of voicing and 
persuading in favor of one or  another outcome until a sufficient  level of consensus is 
r e a c h e d ,  h o w e v e r  s u f f i c i e n t  h a s  c o m e  t o  b e  d e f i n e d  within t h e  part icular arena.  
Fur thermore,  w e  initially make t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e r e  will be  no conflict  if t h e r e  
is no  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  opinion between members of or  representatives in our poli t ical  
a r e n a .  C a n  w e  b e  s u r e ,  however :  t h a t  a )  a l l  v i e w s  a r e  e x p r e s s e d  wi th in  t h e  
" l e g i t i m a t e "  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  and b) all  views represent  positions consistent  with t h e  
goals, s t a ted  or  otherwise,  of t h e  par t ies  in t h e  a rena?  To hold or  have power, then,  
comes  t o  mean someone (or 2 group) has  t h e  abil i ty t o  a f f e c t  t h e  outcome in such a 
way as t o  b e  most  consistent  with their  original position. 
Th is  l e a d s  t o  t h e  second question, what do we mean by power? We speak of 
someone or  something having power, o r  being powerful. We understand what  is mean t  
w h e n  o n e  g r o u p  o r  a n o t h e r  is power less .  Fo l lowing  t h e  logic of t h e  preceeding 
discussion it would b e  reasonable t o  argue t h a t  a ,  person or  a group has  power when 
t h e y  a f f e c t  t h e  o u t c o m e  of c o n f l i c t  in t h e i r  f a v o r  w i t h  s o m e  regularity; and a 
measure  of t h a t  power becomes t h e  reliability o r  f requency w i t h  which  t h i s  c o m e s  
about.  Parsons offers  as a definition of power t h e  abil i ty t o  "mobilize commitments  
o r  obligations for  e f fec t ive  collective act ion (cited in Lukes, 1974:28)11 t o  promote  t h e  
view t h a t  power expresses t h e  relationship of ac to rs  t o  t h e  distribution of collective 
goods in society. In his analysis of collective act ion,  Tilly defines t h e  power of a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  o r  g r o u p  as " t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which  t h e  o u t c o m e s  of t h e  popula t ion ' s  
in teract ion w i t h  o t h e r  p o p u l a t i o n s  f a v o r  its i n t e r e s t s  o v e r  t h o s e  of t h e  o t h e r s ;  
aquisition of power is an  increase in t h e  favorability of such outcomes,  loss of power 
a decline in thei r  favorability (1978:55)." More than a relationship t o  t h e  distribution 
of collective benefits ,  power relations re f l ec t  t h e  abil i ty of one group t o  benefit  at 
t h e  expense of another.  
Power,  then,  must be  understood a s  t h e  abil i ty t o  a f f e c t  a n  outcome which is in 
t h e  in teres ts  of t h e  g r o u p  w h o s e  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  b e i n g  m o b i l i z e d .  P o w e r  c a n  b e  
i n f e r r e d  as w e l l  a s  exhibited; one can both exercise  power and have power (Polsby, 
1968)  o r  s p e a k  of p o w e r  t o  a n d  p o w e r  o v e r  ( T h e r b o r n ,  1978).  I m p l i c i t l y  a n d  
explicitly, an understanding of power requires t h a t  in teres ts  be clearly defined, or  at 
leas t  easily determined. The l as t  question t o  be  addressed, then,  i s  how a r e  we t o  
d e f i n e  a n d  m e a s u r e  i n t e r e s t s ?  Without some measure we cannot  be  sure  t h a t  anv 
p a r t i c u l a r  g r o u p  is in f a c t  a c t i n g  t o  p r o m o t e  its i n t e r e s t s ,  o r  if a n  o u t c o m e  
represents  t h e  ascendence of one s e t  of in teres ts  over another.  
To summarize ,  any a n a l y s i s  of c o m m u n i t y  p o l i t i c s  m u s t  g r a p p l e  w i t h  t h r e e  
important  problems. The f i rs t ,  t h e  arena of poli t ical  conflict ,  raises t h e  question of 
enfranchisement and t h e  identification of issues, i.e., who g e t s  t o  decide about which 
questions. Clearly if we allow t h a t  some questions never g e t  raised, then we never 
s e e  a ltpowerl' re la ted outcome of conflict. The second questions t h e  context  within 
which  w e  d e f i n e  t h e  e x e r c i s e  of power .  Power can b e  e i the r  a static, post  hoc, 
phenomenon which is only apparent  a s  a n  ou tcome of conf l ic t  ( a  group must have had 
more power if t h e  outcome is in i t s  favor) o r  a dynamic process by which one group 
c o n t i ~ u o u s l y  and increasingly controls t h e  abil i ty t o  secure  fu tu re  o u t c o m e s  in t h e i r  
interests.  Finally, t h e  last  points t o  t h e  importance of identifying in teres ts  in some 
meaningful and concre te  manner relat ive t o  power if we a r e  t o  m a k e  s e n s e  of a n y  
m e a s u r e  o f  power .  More specifically, can people or  groups have in teres ts  of which 
they a r e  unaware for  any reason, or  a r e  in te res t s  t o  b e  seen a s  t h e  manifest  root of 
political behavior t o  b e  revealed by actions in t h e  poli t ical  arena? 
The res t  of th is  paper will a t t e m p t  t o  o u t l i n e  t h e  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  c o m m u n i t y  
politics initially outlined above with reference t o  these  th ree  areas ,  and t o  match t h e  
distribution of benef i ts  and cos t s  in a redevelopment project  in t h e  Ci ty  of Detroit ,  
i 
t o  ascer ta in  which approach t o  t h e  study of community  poli t ics can  best  explain t h e  
outcomes of poli t ical  conflict .  This analysis will proceed in four stages: a theoret ica l  
framework for  t h e  analysis; a review of t h e  De t ro i t  project  and its placement within 
t h e  theoret ica l  framework; a chronological examination of t h e  decision making process 
as r e p o r t e d  in  t h e  p r e s s ;  a n  a n a l y s i s  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  distribution of benefits  and 
costs. The conclusion p r e s e n t s  a b r ie f  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  of t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  perspectives,  some qualifications and implications, and an  agenda for  t h e  
fur ther  study of community politics. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Steven Lukes provides a convenient f ramework for  t h e  study of power relat icns 
which will be used throughout t h e  paper. Parceling t h e  t h r e e  m a j o r  t r e n d s  in  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  of p o w e r  i n t o  w h a t  h e  c a l l s  " l ibera l" ,  " r e f o r m i s t "  and  "radical", Lukes 
proceeds t o  discuss each  of these  views in regard t o  how each identifies instances of 
p o w e r .  P o w e r ,  h e  c o n c l u d e s ,  is a z e r o  s u m  ( o r  re la t ional  concept)  by which "A I 
exercises  power over  B when A a f f e c t s  B in a m a n n e r  c o n t r a r y  t o  B's i n t e r e s t s  
(1 975 :34).11 P l u r a l i s t  (liberal) views of power, bes t  exemplified by Dahl and Polsby, 
define (or identify) power only in cases of o v e r t  conf l ic t  while strat if ication or  ant i -  
p l u r a l i s t  ( r e f o r m )  v iews ,  as r e p r e s e n t e d  by Bachrach and Baratz,  may also include 
i n s t a n c e s  in  which  d i s c o n t e n t  is s u p p r e s s e d  f r o m  e n t e r i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a .  
R e j e c t i n g  w h a t  h e  cal ls  one and two dimensional views of power, Lukes goes on t o  
e l a b o r a t e  on  h i s  " rad ica l "  ( t h r e e  d i m e n s i o n a l )  v i e w .  F o r  Lukes ,  p o w e r  is a l s o  
exercised in those  instances in which "real" o r  object ive  in teres ts  a r e  denied, even if 
t h e  par t ic ipants  fa i l  t o  recognize t h o s e  i n t e r e s t s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  p o w e r  n e e d  n o t  
r e f l e c t  o v e r t  o r  s u p p r e s s e d  c o n f l i c t .  Fur thermore,  Lukes maintains t h a t  views of 
power a r e  a function of t h e  di f ferent  social  va lues  of t h e  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  of p o w e r .  
E a c h  u n d e r l y i n g  d e f i n i t i o n  (o r  v iew)  of p o w e r  w i l l  r e s u l t  in d i f f e r e n t  empirical  
evidence col lected and conclusions reached concerning t h e  nature  and impact  of power 
relationships in t h e  community. 
What  f o l l o w s  is  a b r i e f  o u t l i n e  o f  e a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  dimensions  (pluralist,  
reformis t  and radical) with specific a t t en t ion  t o  the i r  t r e a t m e n t  of a rena  of conflict ,  
i n t e r e s t  a n d  power. This section presents a summary of how each "view" of power 
t r i e s  t o  answer t h e  questions: what  do w e  mean by in te res t s  and whose in teres ts  will 
prevail  (i.e., who has power)? It ends by addressing t h e  problem of t h e  measurement  
of power, and offers  a basis for power analysis. 
The Liberal  View 
T h e  p l u r a l i s t  a n a l y s i s  of c o m m u n i t y  p o l i t i c s  a n d  p o w e r  is r o o t e d  in  t h e  
assumption t h a t  people will act or, thei r  in te res t s  and par t ic ipate  in poli t ical  process 
t o  see t h a t  these  in teres ts  a r e  promoted. Cen t ra l  t o  this position is t h e  notion t h a t  
each  individual can  and does  act t o  p romote  t h e s e  i n t e r e s t s ,  a n d  s o c i e t y  i s  l i t t l e  
m o r e  t h a n  a n  p a r t i c u l a r  a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t s  a r r a y e d  in s h i f t i n g  a l l i ances .  
Pluralism is informed by neoclassical liberalism's concerns for t h e  individual's f reedom 
w i t h i n  t h e  body p o l i t i c .  This  mi l l i an ,  u t i l i t a r i a n  v i e w  holds t h a t  society is t h e  
limiting fac to r  of s e l f  i n t e r e s t ,  a n d  t h a t  a c t i o n s  a r e  se l f  e v i d e n t  i n d i c a t o r s  of 
interests.  The concept  of in teres t  itself i s  res t r ic ted t o  a subjective understanding of 
one's social and political environment (polsby, 1980). No action t o  a f f e c t  a n  outcome 
is  by d e f i n i t i o n  a n  i n d i c a t o r  of a l a c k  of i n t e r e s t  in t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  outcome.  
Therefore,  if one does not  v o t e  in a n  e l e c t i o n ,  o n e  c a n n o t  r e a l l y  c a r e  a b o u t  t h e  
o u t c o m e  of t h e  e l e c t i o n ;  if o n e  d o e s  n o t  s p e a k  o u t  for o r  sgains t  a program o r  
proposed. project  within t h e  community t h e n  it c a n  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  no  i n t e r e s t  is 
served ' o r  harmed by t h e  proposed course  of action within t h e  community. 
This view of in te res t  has two  immedia te  theoret ica l  consequences .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
analysis of power will necessarily be  a static analysis focusing on outcomes.  A shif t  
in outcome must indicate a s h i f t  in  t h e  d o m i n a n t  a l l i a n c e s  which  c o m p r i s e d  t h e  
community's leadership. Similarly, maintanance of t h e  s t a tus  quo indicates a system 
which clearly represents t h e  dominant will ( interest)  of t h e  majority of people. This 
c a n n o t  b e  o t h e r w i s e  or  e l se  another ou tcome will emerge.  Second, in teres t  and by 
extension power, can  only be  identified under a conflict  situation. Wi thou t  c o n f l i c t  
the re  cannot  b e  t h e  e x e r c i s e  of p o w e r  by o n e  g r o u p  o r  ind iv idua l  o v e r  a n o t h e r .  
C o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  is t h e  p r o c e s s  by which c o n t e n d i n g  i n t e r e s t s  r e c o n c i l e  and  
real locate  di f ferences  so t h a t  t h e  consensus emerging r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h  
the  g rea tes t  power. Power is simply defined a s  t h e  abil i ty of A t o  g e t  B t o  act in a 
manner s/he or  they would not  otherwise if it were  no t  f o r  t h e  presence of A in t h e  
conflict. 
In a c r i t i c i s m  of w h a t  Nelson Polsby c a l l s  t h e  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  a p p r o a c h  t o  
community politics, he  argues  t h a t  i t  leads t o  t h e  "formulation of vague, ambiguous, 
u n r e a l i s  t i c  a n d  unprovable assert ions about community power (1 980:112)." Rejecting 
t h e  categor ical  n o t i o n  t h a t  s o m e  g r o u p  n e c e s s a r i l y  d o m i n a t e s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l ,  a n d  
t h e r e b y  s o c i a l  and economic l i fe  of t h e  community,  Polsby deta i ls  a pluralist model 
of conflict ing and transitory in te res t s  coming together  t o  address  one s e t  of issues o r  
a n o t h e r .  T h e s e  a l l i ances  shi f t ,  and subsequent outcomes vary, as individuals act in 
concer t  on behalf of identifiable interests.  How else,  he  asks, do we make any sense 
of l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  s e t t i n g  o r d i n a n c e s  which negat ively  a f f e c t  bankers or local  
businessmen if these  s a m e  men a r e  pa r t  of some power e l i t e  who rule over t h e  r e s t  
of t h e  community? Clearly, h e  replies, the re  must not b e  any consistent  cen te r  of 
power bu t  r a the r  only all iances of immediate  convenience formed around t h e  various 
problems a t  hand. 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  p l u r a l i s t  a n a l y s t s  a sk  Who has  it? as t h e  cen t ra l  question in an  
inquiry of p o w e r  in  a c o m m u n i t y .  The i r  c o n c l u s i o n  is t h a t  p o w e r  i s  d i s p e r s e d  
throughout society,  and t h a t  leaders representing and ar t icula t ing mass in teres ts  form 
shifting coalitions and all iances which stabilize community l e a d e r s h i p  a n d  g u a r a n t e e  
t h a t  o u t c o m e s  r e f l e c t  t h e  wi l l  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  a t  a n y  given moment.  Pluralist 
analysis a t t e m p t s  t o  discover pa t t e rns  within s o m e  a l r e a d y  d e f i n e d  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  
w i t h o u t  q u e s t i o n i n g  how g r o u p s  c o m e  t o  be  included in t h e  arena,  o r  if the re  a r e  
groups excluded f rom t h e  political process. Fur thermore,  issues a r e  narrowly defined 
as l i m i t e d  t o  t h o s e  r a i s e d  w i t h i n  t h e  arena.  Since part icipation indicates specific 
in te res t s  (and conversely nonparticipaticn noninterest), decisions made on issues re f l ec t  
t h e  in teres ts  of everyone in society e f fec ted  by those  issues. The majority is ab le  t o  
a f f e c t  compliance by t h e  minority, i.e., it c a n  e x e r c i s e  p o w e r .  Any o u t c o m e ,  by 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  b e c o m e s  a good f o r  t h e  majori ty of t h e  a f fec ted  population within t h e  
, community. 
The Reformist  View 
For  s t ra t i f ica t ion theorists, society is dominated by a n  e l i t e  s t ra tum whose aim 
i s  t o  p e r p e t u a t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  of t h a t  s t r a t u m  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y .  T h e  
individual's subjective notion of in teres t  is confined t o  t h e  general  in teres ts  of thei r  
par t icular  c lass  or s t ra tum.  Conflict  within a society t a k e s  t w o  fo rms :  i n t e r g r o u p  
c o n f l i c t  which  r e s o l v e s  the  question of how much t h e  ruling s t ra tum benefits  from 
the i r  rule; and intragroup conflict  which de te rmines  t h e  question of which c o a l i t i o n  
within t h e  ruling e l i t e  maintain e f fec t ive  control  over t h e  state. Governments serve 
t h e  in teres ts  of th is  ruling e l i t e  ra ther  than  t h e  col lect ive  in teres ts  of t h e  majority. 
Ind iv idua l  a c t i o n  f r o m  a r e f o r m i s t  p e r s p e c t i v e  is  d e t e r m i n e d  by subjective 
perceptions of in teres t .  The individual  c a n  a r t i c u l a t e  "wants",  a q u a s i  o b j e c t i v e  
n o t i o n  of i n t e r e s t  ( B a c h r a c h  and  B a r a t z ,  1962). W a n t s  e n a b l e  t h e  individual t o  
project  f u t u r e  in teres ts  and t o  recognize some set of in te res t s  which serve  t h e  end of 
maintaining s t r a t u m  rule. These quasi objective wants, however, ref lect  a subjective 
notion of in teres ts ,  a lbei t  at some fu tu re  moment.  They a r e  not  deferred objective 
i n t e r e s t s .  T h e  ind iv idua l  s t i l l  i s  s e e n  as a n  a t o m i s t i c  component within society 
constrained only by a semi-conscious recognition of c lass  in teres t .  Ac t ions  a r e  se l f  
oriented,  but  t h e  focus has shifted t o  a weberian analysis of t h e  role of an  individual 
within t h e  e l i t e  s t ructures  o r  organizations and t h e  importance of these  organizations 
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  o u t c o m e s .  Weber ,  as G i d d e n s  p o i n t s  o u t ,  used "the 'political' a s  a 
framework for  understanding t h e  'economic' (1 973:47)." Economic impacts  of political 
decisions a r e  by necessity mediated by t h e  c lass  in te res t s  of t h e  political ac tors ,  but  
those  in te res t s  a r e  subjective. 
S t r a t i f i c a t i o n  t h e o r y ,  h o w e v e r ,  s t i l l  l i m i t s  i t s  abi l i ty  t o  analyze community 
power and decision making by hedging on t h e  concep t  of o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s .  T h e  
a n a l y s i s  of p o w e r  is a c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  investigation in to  t h e  changes f rom one 
si tuation t o  t h e  next. The question of power has  shifted f rom Who has it? t o  Who 
k e e p s  it? In a d d i t i o n ,  p o w e r  a.nd i n t e r e s t s  a r e  s t i l l  identified primarily through 
conf l ic t  situations. Shifting coalitions .within t h e  e l i t e  s t ra tum ref lect  conflict  among 
l e g i t i m a t e  c o n t e n d e r s .  An a d d i t i o n a l  c o n c e r n  f o r  s t ra t i f ica t ion theoriests  is the  
identif ication of benef i ts  (Deutsch, 1968; Bachrach and Baratz ,  1970). P o w e r  wi th in  
t h e  community is held by s ta tus  quo defenders t o  pe rpe tua te  thei r  advantage over t h e  
community at large. 
The creat ion of nonissues becomes just 2s important  as t h e  resolution of issues. 
Pluralists  argue t h a t  resolution of issue confronta t ions  a r e  i n d i c a t o r s  of c o m m u n i t y  
p o w e r .  F o r  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s t s ,  however, con t ro l  over  t h e  agenda reveals a s  much if 
not more  about t h e  nature  of power relat ions within t h e  community. What does not  
g e t  discussed is a s  important a s  what does. If A exercises  power over B by effect ing 
compliance with an  issue, then A also has  power over  B by effect ing agreement  over 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on  i s s u e  d e f i n i t i o n  (i.e., c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  agenda) .  Nondecis ions  
concerning nonissues a r e  equally a s  important  as decisions concerning issues. 
T o  s u m m a r i z e ,  t h e n ,  p l u r a l i s t  analysis of power relat ions within a community 
focuses on t h e  political relationships which then  de te rmine  t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  
l i f e  of t h e  c o m m u n i t y  (and  by e x t e n s i o n  t h e  socie ty  at  large). They predict  t h a t  
e lec to ra l  competi t ion and adminis t ra t ive  f ragmentat ion will result  in shifting coalitions 
a n d  u n p a t t e r n e d  b iases .  B u t ,  as Gamson  points ou t ,  "(p)luralist theory is (only) a 
por t ra i t  of t h e  inside of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  (1975:141)." F o r  b o t h  p l u r a l i s t  a n d  
s t ra t i f ica t ion theorists ,  power is defined as t h e  abil i ty t o  real ize  a part icular outcome 
even if t h e  other  par ty  (or part ies)  resist.  Power must  by necess i ty  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  
according t o  some notion of a consensus cf  in teres ts .  To b e  otherwise for pluralists 
would require t h e  abandonment of t h e  idea t h a t  al l iances c a n  b e  forged and reforged 
according t o  shi f ts  in collective interests.  St ra t i f ica t ion theorists ,  on t h e  other  hand, 
cling t o  one form or  a n o t h e r  of a s y s t e m  of p o w e r  m a n d a t e d  by t h e  i d e n t i f i e d  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  a n  u p p e r  s t r a t a  o r  c l a s s .  T h e  key t o  economic relat ions is political 
control ,  and power will not  b e  transfered unless t h a t  s t ra tum looses its position vis-a- 
vis society at large. -
The Radical  View 
R a d i c a l  p o w e r  a n a l y s i s ,  Lukes' (1974) third dimension of power, states t h a t  A 
has power in relat ion t o  B if A can  l imit  t h e  part icipation of B within t h e  poli t ical  
a r e n a .  F o r  example ,  owners of t h e  means of production never confer  with workers 
ar.ound d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o r  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
i n v e s t m e n t .  T o  state t h a t  a si tuation in which workers and owners do not conflict  
over outcomes means the re  is no power relationship between t h e m  is t o  miss t h e  very 
nature  of t h a t  power. Connolly offers  a definition of in teres t  whereby a given policy 
can be  viewed as in A's in te res t  if A would choose t h a t  po l i cy  f o r  h i m  o r  h e r s e l f  
o v e r  s o m e  a l t e r n a t i v e  po l icy  w e r e  A t o  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e  effect of bo th  policies 
(1972:472). For example,  a marxist  analysis of a given community first  of al l  focuses 
on its mode(s) of production, i t s  system(s) of relat ions and t h e  forces  of production, 
t o  ascer ta in  t h e  meaning of power (Therborn, 1978). 
To a rgue  solely for  Connolly's definition of in te res t  r a i ses  t h e  poss ib i l i ty  t h a t  
a l ternat ive  policies a r e  not  within t h e  range of conceivable a l ternat ives  t o  a worker. 
Piven and C l o ~ : a r d  (1979) point ou t  t h a t  be fore  p ro tes t  movements  c a n  m a t e r i a l i z e ,  
t h o s e  p e r s o n s  o r  g r o u p s  m o u n t i n g  t h e  p ro tes t  must  f i rs t  c o m e  t o  realize t h a t  t h e  
objects  of thei r  p ro tes t  a r e  a t ta inable  or  within t h e  grasp of possible outcomes. To 
say this another  way, t h a t  workers usually do not  engage in conflict  over workplace 
or  investment  decisions cannot  be  construed to imply t h a t  workers have no in teres ts  
concerning t h e  consequences of these  decisions. Power,  therefore ,  can b e  present in 
e i t h e r  c o n f l i c t u a l  o r  c o n s e n s u a l  s i t u a t i o n s  a n d  it c a n  b e  e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  b o t h  
par t ic ipants  and nonparticipants in t h e  poli t ical  process. 
Ra ther  than being limited t o  t h e  subjective understanding of in teres t  a s  manifest  
by a c t i o n ,  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  of power relat ions re jec t s  t h e  a tomist ic  presentation of 
individuals in society and incorporates t h e  view t h a t  t h e  individual is integrated in to  
s o c i e t y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  his  o r  h e r  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  m e a n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  Actions, 
therefore ,  could e i the r  re f l ec t  objective c lass  in te res t s  o r  not depending on t h e  level  
of c l a s s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  -- what Marx distinguishes when he  wri tes  about a class for 
itself as opposed t o  a c lass  & itself. Lukes' t h r e e  d i m e n s i o n a l  v iew,  fo l lowing  a 
marxist  analysis of in teres t  (cf., Balbus, 1971; Connolly, 1972), explicitly includes t h e  
notion of objective interests,  and hence of fa lse  consciousness. People have in teres ts  
which  a r e  c o l l e c t i v e l y  shaped, even if they a r e  unaware of them. The analysis of 
power, t h e n ,  is a d y n a m i c  a n a l y s i s  f o c u s i n g  o n  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c h a n g i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  
ref lect ing changes in outcomes as a social  process, and with social  consequences. 
A radical  analysis of power in community relat ions d i f fe r s  f rom t h e  pluralist and 
s ta t i f ica t ion analysis in i t s  focus on production ra the r  than consumption as t h e  locus 
of poli t ical  action. Both earl ier  views argue t h a t  t h e  end of political ac t iv i ty  is t h e  
a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  po l i cy  preferences  and poli t ical  favors for t h e  sake of consumption 
advantages.  Attr ibution of behavior or motivation on t h e  p a r t  of individuals  a n d / o r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  c e n t e r s  a r o u n d  p o w e r  a n d  g r e e d .  T h a t  decis ions  a r e  made t o  t h e  
benef i t  of some over  t h e  res t  is not denied, but  t h a t  these  decisions a r e  based upon 
t h e  ra t ional  and over t  policies of some is under examination.  These decisions a r e  a 
result  of c i rcumstances  arising o u t  of relations t o  t h e  means  of production at various 
a n d  s p e c i f i c  h i s t o r i c a l  j u n c t u r e s  (Gordon, 19771, and local  governments a r e  acting,  
with o r  without a c lear  design, t o  fac i l i t a t e  cap i ta l  accumulation (Harvey, 1978). 
Power in community politics becomes transformed f rom a mechanical  search for  
Who has  it? or  Who keeps it? into  a heurist ic device  f o r  t h e  understanding of social  
relations. The cen t ra l  question asked is How is  i t  defined? t o  see what we can  learn 
about  super and subordinate positions in society. Power  is not  something necessarily 
manifes t  in conf l i c t  si tuations t o  be  parcelled o u t  or  competed for but a construction 
for t h e  purpose of understanding political outcomes within s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t s .  
Power is not  distributed across  society nor held by shift ing alliances but is t h e  result  
of a z e r o  sum g a m e  in which one group gains i t  at t h e  expense of another.  Like t h e  
s t ra t i f ica t ion theorists ,  radical  analysts of community poli t ics begin with t h e  premise 
of a dominant c lass  interest .  In contras t ,  however, they do not  require t h a t  in teres ts  
b e  p e r c e i v e d  by a p a r t i c u l a r  class,  or  t h a t  ac t ions  and outcomes re f l ec t  conscious 
agendas. 
Framework for  Analysis 
T h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of p o w e r  h o l d e r s  has  been shown above t o  depend on two  
important  preconditions. First ,  d i f ferent  approaches  t o  c o m m u n i t y  p o l i t i c s  s p e c i f y  
d i f fe ren t  a renas  of political action.  Identifying conf l ic t  and power relationships will 
depend upon t h e  set of issues which define t h e  si tuation t o  b e  evaluated. The o ther  
p r e c o n d i t i o n  c e n t e r s  a r o u n d  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t s .  Power has no meaning, 
contend pluralists, if t h e  object  of t h a t  power has not  had a n  in te res t  which has been 
s e t  aside a s  a resul t  of some interaction.  An analyst  of community  power who limits 
t h e  identif ication of in te res t s  t o  t h e  subjective expression of par t ic ipants  in political 
si tuations may c o m e  t o  di f ferent  conclusions regarding t h e  exercise  of power than t h e  
analyst  who defines both a set of objective and subjective interests.  A quick review 
and  s u m m a r y  of e a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  v iews '  notion of a rena  of poli t ical  action and 
definition of in teres ts ,  and subsequent c r i t e r i a  for determining power follows below. 
ARENA: L i b e r a l  a n a l y s i s  focuses solely on t h e  "legitimate" a renas  of political 
discourse, i.e. t h e  locally e lec ted  representatives of t h e  community,  however large we 
m a y  c h o o s e  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  c o m m u n i t y .  I t  i s  a s s u m e d  t h a t  e a c h  member of t h e  
community is adequately enfranchised, and t h a t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  c o m m u n i t y  
must always be  concerned with subsequent re-election. Consequently , pluralist theory 
maintains, t h e  act ions  of any representative must regularly conform t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
of the  consti tuency represented - in teres ts  defined simply as t h e  subjective definition 
of likes and dislikes on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  constituents. There fore ,  a q u e s t i o n  b e f o r e  
t h e  local  council hecomes an  "issue", t h a t  is c r e a t e s  some discord between different 
consti tuents,  on ly  if i n t e r e s t s  o f  t w o  p a r t i e s  (o r  g r o u p s )  a r e  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d .  
Representatives will evaluate  t h e  importance of t h e  question t o  thei r  consti tuents and 
e n t e r '  t h e  argument  fo r  o r  against  t h e  part icular issue. R e f o r m i s t s  a d d  t h a t  o f t e n  
e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t  is not  universal o r  t h a t  dessenting positions a r e  dispersed in such a 
fashion t h a t  thei r  unified voice is never heard. The poli t ical  a rena  st i l l  remains t h e  
" l e g i t i m a t e "  pol i t ica l  forum of t h e  community, but  now some of t h e  representatives 
of various (again subjective) in teres ts  in t h e  c o m m u n i t y  a r e  c o n s p i c u o u s l y  a b s e n t .  
Nonissues  a r i s e  when  s o m e t h i n g  of g e n e r a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  m e m b e r s  of t h e  
community (or g r e a t  importance t o  some) is not ar t icula ted in these  legi t imate  arenas 
of political action fo r  whatever  reason. Conflict  resolution st i l l  r e f l ec t s  power in the  
liberal sense. But t h e  reformist  maintains t h a t  even without o v e r t  c o n f l i c t ,  p o w e r  
may have been exercised. Here t h e  conf l ic t  is displaced if we can find evidence of 
a n  ar t icula ted in teres t  in t h e  community at l a rge  ( m o s t  o f t e n  in  t h e  p ress )  which  
essential ly ignored. Finally, t h e  radical  approach t o  an  analysis of community power 
shi f ts  t h e  concern f rom t h e  distribution and consumption of goods and services t o  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h o s e  g o o d s  a n d  s e r v i c e s  wi th in  t h e  c o m m u n i t y .  
Consequently, t h e  political arena becomes a l l  t h a t  e f f e c t s  t h e  community at large  and 
t h e  c r i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n  t o  b e  a s k e d  is how o n e  g r o u p  ( o w n e r s  of t h e  m e a n s  of 
production) manages t o  maintain control  over  t h e  ou tcome of political decisions. As 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  c h a n g e s  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  l i m i t i n g  t o  t h e  m o s t  
generalized,  more  si tuations qualify as "issues" in a n  analysis of power. 
INTERESTS : L i b e r a l  p o w e r  analysis proceeds  f rom the  simple assumption t h a t  
in te res t s  a r e  defined by t h e  subjective s t a t e m e n t s  and act ions  of t h e  individuals. By 
definition, a conf l ic t  of in teres t  must b e  a r t i cu la ted  if it is t o  exist  and power can 
only be  evaluated a s  a result  of conflict. This enables  pluralist theorists  t o  defend 
t h e i r  m o d e l  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  s i n c e  a l l  " in teres ted"  agents  (individuals or  
groups) will b e  involved in a l l  issues concerning them. Group behavior is l i t t le  more  
t h a n  t h e  s u m  of  t h e  a c t i o n s  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  compr i s ing  t h e  group, with some 
adjus tments  for  t h e  process of aggregation. Accepting t h e  basic underlying principles 
of s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  r e f o r m i s t s  add  only t h a t  par t ic ipants  in t h e  political arena do not  
necessarily act on thei r  immediate  subjective in te res t s  s ince  they can  a r t i cu la te  wants 
(i.e., project  fu tu re  interests). In teres ts  ' s t i l l  need t o  b e  ar t icula ted,  even if they a r e  
deferred t o  some la te r  period. The c r i t i ca l  d i f ference between radical  a n a l y s t s  a n d  
o t h e r s  i s  t h a t  a radical  analysis considers both subjective and objective in teres ts  in 
its determinat ion of power relations. Subjective in te res t s  a r e  used in t h e  same way 
as o ther  analyses of power - s t a t e m e n t s  by individuals o r  groups must be  considered 
on f a c e  value as some s t a t e m e n t  of i n t e r e s t .  Al lowing  f o r  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  r a i s e s  t h e  poss ib i l i ty  of f a l s e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  (i.e., a c t i n g  on subjective 
s t a t e m e n t s  of in teres t  may work a g a i n s t  t h e  " t r u e "  o r  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  
individual o r  group). By objective in teres ts  I mean t h a t  which enhances t h e  range of 
possible outcomes.  in t h e  present  or  at some fu tu re  point in t i m e  for  t h e  individual o r  
g r o u p  in  q u e s t i o n .  Under some si tuations subjective and objective in teres ts  can  be  
identical; however th is  is not  usually t h e  case. Subjective in teres ts  a r e  rooted in a 
r e s p o n s e  t o  i m m e d i a t e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  whereas objective in te res t s  usually require a 
more  ca re fu l  understanding of t h e  evolution and direction of a given social situation. 
T h e  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  s u b j e c t i v e .  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  p r o d u c t  of fa lse  
consciousness. Power a n a l y s i s  s h i f t s  f r o m  a static a n a l y s i s  of t h e  o u t c o m e s  of 
poli t ical  moments  t o  a dynamic analysis of t h e  process of ensuring an  widening range 
of probable outcomes. The measurement  of power, t h e n ,  t a k e s  o n  t h e  p r o b l e m  of 
a s s e r t a i n i n g  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  h a v e  b e e n  promoted even if t h e  
subjective in teres ts  of the-  poli t ical  par t ic ipants  s e e m  t o  h a v e  b e e n  a d v a n c e d  o v e r  
others.  
Measurement of Power 
T h e  l i b e r a l  t h e o r y  of c o m m u n i t y  p o l i t i c s  is a p o s t  h o c  a n a l y s i s  of power 
relationships. Power is most simply defined as t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  s w a y  a m a j o r i t y  o f  
s u p p o r t  ( c o n v i n c e  t h e  majority of representatives) in favor of one side of the  issue 
over another.  The obvious conclusion t o  be  reached is  t h a t  f o r  a n y  s i d e  t o  "win" 
(i.e., g e n e r a t e  a n  o u t c o m e  n o t  in t h e  in teres t  of at leas t  pa r t  of t h e  community), 
most  of t h e  community must e i the r  not  c a r e  (be uneffected) o r  e lse  see t h e  "winning" 
o u t c o m e  in its own i n t e r e s t  as wel l .  Power t akes  on very s t a t i c  qualities purely 
dependent upon t h e  form of t h e  outcome. To measure power, a n d  poss ibly  p r e d i c t  
t h e  ou tcome of a n  upcoming "issue", we need only look at t h e  s t a ted  in teres ts  of t h e  
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  invo lved  t o  see w h e r e  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  will place 
themselves on th is  issue. Within t h e  reformist  con tex t  of analysis, power is measured 
by t h e  abil i ty both t o  achieve a desired cbjective in coali t ion and t o  l imit  t h e  range 
of "issues" raised so t h a t  t h e  "form" of consensus in principle remains. Once again 
power is a s t a t i c  phenomenon reflecting t h e  na tu re  of a part icular outcome measured 
against  t h e  s t a t e d  positions of t h e  participants. Prediction similarly t a k e s  on  l i t t l e  
meaning s ince  th is  line of analysis would expec t  t h a t  unrepresented social groups will 
have l i t t le  influence on t h e  shape of t h e  o u t c o m e s  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  i ssue .  What  
reformis t  analysis adds, however, i s  t h e  ability t o  identify what  so r t s  of (subjectively 
defined) in teres ts  a r e  not  included in t h e  poli t ical  a r e n a  and recognize t h a t  c o n f l i c t  
may exis t  even under t h e  guise of harmony. 
But how a r e  we t o  m e a s u r e  p o w e r ?  C o l e m a n  (1973) o f f e r s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  
c a l c u l u s  w i t h  which t o  determine t h e  likely outcomes of conf l ic t  si tuations between 
some number of a c t o r s  (or groups) o v e r  a d e f i n e d  set of  i ssues .  S e t t i n g  up  t w o  
mat r i ces  which re f l ec t  t h e  distribution of in teres t  and control  (or influence) across  a l l  
issues for  each  ac to r ,  Coleman defines a set of operat ions  which yield predictions on 
t h e  outcomes.  This analysis is problematic for t w o  reasons. The f i r s t  concerns t h e  
assignment of in teres ts  in Coleman's scheme.  T h i s  e x p e c t s  t h a t  i n t e r e s t s  c a n  b e  
m e a s u r e d  by s o m e  c o m p a r a b l e  m e t r i c  f o r  a l l  p e r s o n s  at a l l  levels, requires t h a t  
in teres ts  once assigned do not  vary in t h e  course  of t h e  analysis, a n d  a s s u m e s  t h a t  
a l l  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  d e t e r m i n a b l e  a n d  distr ibutable across  each  issue for a l l  ac to r s  ( a  
ze ro  is a valid in te res t  entry). Both t h e  liberal and reformis t  views f i t  th is  method 
o f  a n a l y s i s  v e r y  wel l .  C o l e m a n ' s  a s s i g n m e n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  
a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  ind iv idua l ' s  s u b j e c t i v e ,  u t i l i t y  m a x i m i z i n g  b e h a v i o r .  T h e  o n l y  
di f ference between t h e  two  views i s  t h e  range of issues included in t h e  analysis. I t  
is more  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e v e l o p  a w e i g h t i n g  s c h e m e  which  would i n c o r p o r a t e  b o t h  
subjective and objective in teres ts  t o  re f l ec t  t h e  radical  view of power relationships. 
Allowing for  t h e  possibility t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  set of ob jec t ions  c a n  b e  a d e q u a t e l y  
a d d r e s s e d ,  t h e  second assumption made is s t i l l  more  problematic. Coleman requires 
t h a t  each  of t h e  actor 's  control  (influence) over  each  of t h e  i s sues  b e  d e f i n e d  a n d  
distr ibuted across  a l l  issues, thereby making a priori c la ims concerning t h e  ability t o  
a f f e c t  outcomes.  To do th is  gives up t h e  c h a s e  before  i t  begins. Once control  by 
e a c h  a c t o r  h a s  b e e n  d e t e r m i n e d ,  t h e n  C o l e m a n ' s  technique does l i t t l e  more than 
ca lcu la te  some leas t  cos t ,  g r e a t e s t  r e t u r n  m a t r i x  f o r  e a c h  a c t o r  (o r  group) .  T o  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  l ike ly  o u t c o m e  will simply b e  a m a t t e r  of measuring t h e  negotiated 
combinations possible t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  l ike ly  a l l i a n c e s  which  wi l l  e m e r g e  a n d  t h e  
issues which will b e  supported. Since both  l iberal  and reformis t  analysis is predicated 
on a s t a t i c  view of power (as  evidenced by t h e  outcome), th is  objection will not  be  
s i g n i f i c a n t .  A r a d i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  would r e q u i r e  a d i f f e r e n t  calculus t o  
determine t h e  control  matrix.  While th is  is not  impossible, i t  s t i l l  would n o t  a l l o w  
for  a dynamic view of power in which power is defined as a process of maximizing 
objective interest .  
A more  satisfying approach t o  this problem is offered by Dunleavy (1976) when 
h e  develops what he  cal ls  a n  issue cen te red  approach t o  t h e  study of power. Af te r  
p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r  p r o b l e m  in a n y  a n a l y s i s  of p o w e r ,  ( in  spi te  of t h e  
theoret ica l  d i f ferences  between approaches) is m e t h o d o l o g i c a l ,  Dunleavy  o f f e r s  a n  
interesting model based on t h e  change in t h e  relationship between two  par t ies  (ei ther 
individuals or  groups) f rom input t o  output  as a n  issue a f fec t ing  them b o t h  r u n s  i t s  
course. He states t h a t  A has power over  B if t h e  t ra jectory  of t h e  issue results  in 
A increasing its power vis-a-vis B. What makes  th is  analysis e s p e c i a l l y  i n v i t i n g  i s  
t h a t  Dunleavy is  concerned with a number of f a c e t s  of power and the  relationship of 
t h e  a c t o r s  throughout t h e  process. Diagramatically, Dunleavy uses t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
t h e  Edgeworth Box diagram where  t h e  ver t ica l  axis measures  degree  of power and the  
horizontal  t h e  pa th  of t h e  issue ( i t  d i f fers  f rom t h e  Edgeworth Box in t h a t  while t h e  
ver t ica l  axis reverses fo r  each  par ty ,  t h e  horizontal axis does  not). 
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If t h e  p a t h  i s  hor izon ta l ,  then power is not  exercised -- however, only if t h e  
input side is exact ly  in t h e  middle can  we say t h a t  t h e  two  par t ies  have equal power 
(Figures la and Ib). In addition, Dunleavy develops t h e  notion of "gates" inside t h e  
box t o  represent  res t r ic ted possibilities for  one or  t h e  o ther  of t h e  p a r t i e s .  T h e s e  
g a t e s  m a y  b e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  n o t  a f u n c t i o n  of e i the r  par ty  and y e t  
nonetheless e f f e c t  t h e  possible outcomes (e.g., i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b i a s e s  which  r e g u l a r l y  
f a v o r  o n e  g r o u p  over  another). If t h e  g a t e  is s i tuated c lose  t o  t h e  input line then 
\ 
t h e  unfavorably a f fec ted  par ty  might never under take t o  make  t h e  ques t ion  a t  hand  
a n  issue. In th is  manner, Dunleavy accounts  f o r  nonissues as a function of res t r ic ted 
outcomes (Figures  I c  a n d  Id ) .  F i n a l l y ,  Dunleavy  a t t e m p t s  t o  g r a p p l e  w i t h  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  d y n a m i c  p r o c e s s  b y  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  of s u c c e s s i v e  i s sue  
confrontations between two  parties. Each issue o u t c o m e  b e c o m e s  a f a c t o r  in  t h e  
nex t  round's input which necessarily means t h a t  t h e  distribution of power measured by 
t h e  outcome a f f e c t s  t h e  distribution at t h e  next  input (and thereby t h e  likelihood of 
increasingly favorable outcomes for  t h e  more powerful). 
The outcome of any power relationship within t h e  con tex t  of any issue will have 
f o u r  e f f e c t s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  ~ u n l e a v ~ :  (i) d i r e c t l y  on  t h e  relationship between t h e  
a c t o r s  for  t h e  inpu t  p o s i t i o n  on  t h e  n e x t  i s s u e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  i s sues  which a r e  
c o n s e c u t i v e  a n d / o r  sequential) ;  (ii) on t h e  power resources available t o  each of t h e  
a c t o r s  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  outcome of fu tu re  issues; ( i i i)  o n  r e l a t e d  i s s u e s  which e f f e c t  
a )  Equal and balanced 
input and power 
b) Equal input but A 
e x e r t s  power on outcome 
c )  Issue neutra l  g a t e  
l imi ts  possible outcomes 
in A's favor  
d) Issue centered g a t e  
c r e a t e s  nonissue f o r  B 
Figure 1. Diagramat ic  Representation of Dunleavyts Issue Centered 
Approach t o  Power Analysis. 
what  Dunleavy re fe r s  t o  as "mobilizational bias" in favor  of one outcome o r  another  
( o r  o n e  a c t o r  o r  a n o t h e r ) ;  ( iv) i n t e r i s s u e  l i n k a g e s  f o r  e x o g e n o u s  i s s u e s  which  
nonetheless a r e  cen t ra l  t o  subsequent even t s  (1976:433). Using th is  schema, Dunleavy 
p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  inc lus ion  of b o t h  e n d o g e n o u s  a n d  e x o g e n o u s  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  
outcomes,  and links ou tcomes  of a n y  i s s u e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  p r i o r  o u t c o m e s  o f  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  s a m e  o r  i n t e r c o n n e c t e d  a c t o r s  in the  political a rena  
(Figure 2). Poli t ical  process becomes a ser ies  of even t s  each  more  o r  less e f fec t ing  
t h e  shape of t h e  outcomes. Power,  then,  can  be  evaluated according t o  t h e  abil i ty 
of any part icular ac to r  t o  shape t h e  course of e v e n t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  m a x i m i z e  t h e i r  
range of favorable outcomes over t ime.  
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F u r t h e r m o r e ,  by introducing exogenous fac to rs  within the  model, e i ther  through 
gates ,  t h e  mobilization of biases or  interissue linkages and feedback, Dunleavy allows 
fo r  t h e  examination of t h e  a rena  in a more  c r i t i ca l  light. Liberal and reform models 
of poli t ical  interaction look in and o u t  of t h e  a rena  t o  d e t e c t  ac to rs  and outcomes. 
T h e  a r e n a  i s  m e r e l y  t h e  s h a p e  of t h e  box around which t h e  ac to rs  perform thei r  
poli t ical  tricks. Implicit in Dunleavy's analysis is t h e  possibility t h a t  t h e  a r e n a  c a n  
b e  m o r e  t h a n  a "neu t ra l "  t e r r a i n  over  which t o  engage in political struggle. The 
a rena  itself c a n  limit t h e  outcome if i t  c a n  b e  shown t h a t  t h e  arena is a const ruct  
o f  a n y  "side" in  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e .  G a t e s  a n d  f e e d b a c k  m e c h a n i s m s  m a y  
s t ructura l ly  constrain t h e  pa th  an  issue t akes  over  its l i fe  while both a c t o r s  engage in 
some facade  of collective bes t  e f f o r t  for  t h e  in te res t  of t h e  majority (majori ty and 
minority presupposes e v e r y o n e  c a n  t a k e  o n e  o r  a n o t h e r  s i d e  on  a n  issue).  Any 
a n a l y s i s  of p o w e r ,  t h e r e f  o r e ,  m u s t  a l s o  examine insti tutional and ideological roles 
taken on by local  government (as  t h e  a rena  of community power conflicts) t o  see if 
(ii) I 
A < rn l' 
Figure 2. Linkages and feedback mechanism in Dunleavy's approach 
t o  power analysis 
local  government  c r e a t e s  roadblocks and hurdles for  s o m e  a n d  n o t  o t h e r s  o v e r  t h e  
course  of a n  issue (or sequence of issues). 
There  a r e  some problems with Dunleavy's model which should at l eas t  be  raised 
at th is  point. First ,  l i t t le  a t tent ion is given t o  t h e  question of se lec t ion  of i ssues .  
Even in t h e  discussion of t h e  dynamic a s p e c t  of t h e  model, Dunleavy fails  t o  evaluate  
t h e  importance of t h e  selection of t h e  rea lm of political discourse, only t h e  impact  
o f  h i s  m o d e l  on s u c c e s s i v e  i s s u e s  as they a r e  raised. Crenson (1971) develops a n  
in teres t ing "issueness" sca le  in which he  a r rays  t h e  a c t o r s  in t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  by 
t h e  n u m b e r  t h a t  recognize a var ie ty  of issues. One can  t r y  t o  use this scale  over 
t h e  e n t i r e  range of possible issues and a c t o r s  (in and ou t  of t h e  political arena) and 
then apply Dunleavy's feedback scheme t o  asce r ta in  t h e  e f f e c t  of multiple issues on 
a n  analysis of power. The second problem is t h e  dyadic na.ture of t h e  'model which 
l i m i t s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  predict  power relationships in a more  complex world. We a r e  
forced t o  uti l ize t h e  most aggregated form of t h e  conflict  relationship] ( the  two  most 
g e n e r a l i z e d  s i d e s  of an  issues, e.g., propertied versus nonpropertied interests).. This 
results  in t h e  loss of important i n f l u e n c e s  upon d i r e c t  a c t o r s  s o  t h a t  w e  c a n  n o  
l o n g e r  a s k  if s o m e  other  party ul t imately  d i rec t s  the  course of even t s  even though 
two  par t i e s  (factions, groups) a r e  at odds in t h e  community. With these  problems in 
m i n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  Dunleavy's approach o f fe r s  t h e  g rea tes t  flexibility and sensitivity t o  
questions of dynamic processes and sequential  e f f e c t s  of power relationships. 
F o r  t h e  r e s t  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  p o w e r  will be  defined as t h e  abil i ty t o  a f f e c t  
ou tcomes  (cf., White, 1972 on "s igt l i f icant"  a f f e c t i n g )  in one ' s  f a v o r  a n d  wi l l  b e  
m e a s u r e d  by t h e  l o g i c  of t h e  t h r e e  s e p a r a t e  a p p r o a c h e s  (l iberal ,  reformist ,  and 
radical) mentioned throughout. The task of t h e  l a s t  pa r t  of t h e  paper is t o  compare  
t h e s e  d e f i n i t i o n s  of a r e n a ,  i n t e r e s t  a n d  p o w e r  f o r  t h e  p r o b l e m  at hand for  t h e  
purpose of d e t e r m i n i n g  which ,  if a n y ,  g e n e r a l  a p p r o a c h  b e s t  e x p l a i n s  t h e  f i n a l  
outcome. 
The Problem 
In t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  of 1980, General  Motors Corporation approached t h e  City of 
Detroi t  about  t h e  possibility of finding a site fo r  a 3 million square foot  plant  which 
would b e  u s e d  t o  r e p l a c e  i t s  aging Cadil lac and Fisher Body Plants  in the  Detroi t  
area.  A t  s t ake  was a proposed "6150 jobs which would have otherwise been lost t o  
t h e  D e t r o i t  a r e a  . . . (and)  a p o t e n t i a l  $15,000,000 in new property t ax  revenues 
(Detroit ,  1980e:II-41." In addition, Detroi t  f aced  t h e  prospect  t h a t  t h e  loss of t h e  old 
a n d  n e w  G e n e r a l  M o t o r s  f a c i l i t i e s  would a c c e l e r a t e  an  already ongoing process of 
deterioration of i t s  manufacturing infrastructure.  The support  services c r e a t e d  around 
a u t o m o b i l e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  (e.g., a u  t o m o t i c e  d e s i g n ,  s a l e s  functions, machine tool 
manufacture  and m e t a l  bending operations, trucking and r a i l  s e r v i c e s )  w e r e  a v i t a l  
p a r t  o f  t h e  revenue  base of Detroit.  The loss of t h e  General  Motors plants mean t  
more  than just t h e  loss of 6,000 jobs, it signaled a p o s s i b l e  e n d  t o  t h e  h o p e  t h a t  
Detroi t  could ever  recover  as a viable c e n t e r  of manufacturing and employment. 
To t h a t  end, t h e  Detroi t  Community Economic Development Depar tment  (CEDD) 
undertook a search for a n  appropriate site which would sa t is fy  General  Motor's needs 
and which would insure t h e  construction of t h e  new plant  in D e t r o i t .  Th i s  p r o c e s s  
q u i c k l y  ra i sed  t h e  question of what price Detroi t ,  o r  more specifically a community 
within Detroit ,  must pay for  t h e  plant. Given t i m e  const ra ints  imposed by G e n e r a l  
Motors, t h e  c i t y  se lected a site in and around t h e  neighborhood called Poletown and 
proposed using i t s  eminent  domain powers t o  p r e p a r e  o v e r  4 6 0  a c r e s  f o r  t h e  n e w  
p l a n t .  To s e c u r e  t h e  site, D e t r o i t  had  t o  m o v e  3438 residents, 1362 households, 
143 insti tutions or  businesses (including 16 c h u r c h e s ,  a h o s p i t a l  a n d  2 schools )  a n d  
demolish 1176 buildings (Detroit  News, 10/16/80:Al). In i t s  application t o  the  Federal  
Highway  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  (1981),  t h e  c i t y  
identif ies 669 single family homes, 343 two family s t ructures ,  9 th ree  o r  four family 
s t ructures ,  114 commercia l  buildings and 41 o ther  buildings s l a ted  for  demolition. But 
how did this decision c o m e  about,  and whose in teres ts ,  however they may be  defined, 
were  cen t ra l  t o  t h e  outcome? 
T h e  P o l e t o w n  Neighborhood C o u n c i l ,  f o r m e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  in teres ts  of the  
Poletown community,  sued t h e  c i ty  on t h e  grounds t h a t  it v i o l a t e d  t h e i r  r i g h t s  by 
taking property from them t o  give t o  General  Motors. In response, t h e  c i ty  argued 
t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  good of t h e  c i ty  a t  l a r g e  m u s t  t a k e  p r e c e d e n c e  o v e r  p a r t i c u l a r  
in te res t s  of any given community. The choice  of Poletown represents  t h e  option with 
t h e  lowest  cos t  t o  Detroi t  given t h e  potent ia l  benef i ts  of t h e  GM Plant  on t h a t  site. 
If s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  theor is ts  a r e  cor rec t ,  then t h e  in te res t s  of t h e  Poletown community 
m a t t e r e d  l i t t l e  agains t  t h e  overall  desires of t h e  General  Motors Corporation as p a r t  
of a ruling e l i t e  in Detroi t  (cf., Ewen, 1978). The act ions  of General  Motors would 
l imit  t h e  possible range of actions so as t o  s e r v e  t h e i r  o w n  n e e d s  a n d  p e r p e t u a t e  
the i r  domination over  Detroi t  Ci ty  politics. On t h e  o ther  hand, pluralists can  and do 
argue t h a t  t h e  given outcome represents t h e  concerns  of t h e  d o m i n a n t  c o a l i t i o n  of 
in teres ts ,  and by definition serves most of t h e  people in t h e  bes t  way. Had this not 
been true,  they a r g u e ,  a n o t h e r  o u t c o m e  would s u r e l y  d o m i n a t e  t h e  p r e c e e d i n g s .  
Finally, a radical  analysis would raise t h e  question of whether  t h e  process surrounding 
t h e  plant  location issue was a p r o d u c t  of t h e  l o c u s  of c o n c e r n s  c e n t e r e d  a r o u n d  
p r o d u c t i o n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a n d  n o t  d u e  t o  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  machinations of political 
al l iances or  e l i t e  interests.  
When i n d i r e c t l y  a s k e d  t o  judge t h e  m e r i t  o f  t h e  pluralist claims, the  S t a t e  
Supreme Court  concurred with t h e  notion t h a t  t h e  public in te res t  a t  l a r g e  w a s  m e t  
by t h e  taking of Poletown, in spite of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  General  Motors also benefited. 
. . . This case raises a question of paramount importance t o .  t h e  f u t u r e  
welfare  of th is  state and its residents: Can a municipality use t h e  power 
of eminent  domain g ran ted  t o  i t  . . . t o  condemn property fo r  transfer t o  
a pr ivate  corporation to build a plant t o  promote  industry and commerce,  
thereby adding jobs and t axes  t o  t h e  economic base  of t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  
a n d  state? . . . In t h e  i n s t a n t  case t h e  benefit  t o  be  received by t h e  
m u n i c i p a l i t y  invok ing  t h e  p o w e r  of e m i n e n t  d o m a i n  is a c l e a r  a n d  
significant one  and is suff ic ient  t o  satisfy this c o u r t  t h a t  such a project  
was  a n  i n t e n d e d  o b j e c t  . . . e v e n  t h o u g h  a p r i v a t e  p a r t y  wi l l  a l s o ,  
u l t i m a t e l y ,  r e c e i v e  a b e n e f i t  as an  incident there to .  . . . We hold this 
project  is warranted on t h e  basis t h a t  its significance f o r  t h e  p e o p l e  of 
Detroi t  and t h e  state has  been demonstrated (The Supreme Court  of t h e  
S t a t e  of Michigan, 1981). 
B u t  t h e  case w a s  n o t  wi thou t  its dissenting opinions. In t h e  mind of Jus t ice  
Fitzgerald,  public in te res t  c a n n o t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  b e  a b y p r o d u c t  of pub l ic  p o l i c y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  if t h e  policy is  d i rected t o  benef i t  pr ivate  part ies.  There  is l i t t l e  doubt 
t h a t  t h e  state can and should act on behalf of t h e  economic well-being of individuals 
( k e e p i n g  in mind t h a t  corpora t ions  a t t a i n  a legal  "life" with r ights therein). What 
Jus t ice  Fitzgerald finds problematic is t h e  use of public policy di rected at one group 
of p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s  fo r  t h e  benef i t  of another  pr ivate  interest .  His concerns echo 
s t ra t i f ica t ion theorist  views t h a t  t h e  public in teres t  is secondary t o  those  of t h e  e l i t e  
ruling s t ra tum.  The s t a t e ,  h e  maintains, should not  be  t h e  tool  of private in teres ts  
for  thei r  specific gain. Governmental  agencies  have used eminent  domain t o  t ransfer  
p r o p e r t y  f r o m  o n e  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t  t o  a n o t h e r  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  benefit ,  a s  in t h e  
acquisition of land fo r  t h e  building of rai l  lines. 
. . . However, in t h e  present  case t h e  t ransfer  of t h e  property t o  General  
Motors a f t e r  condemnation cannot  be  considered incidental  t o  t h e  taking. 
I t  i s  on ly  t h r o u g h  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  a n d  use of t h e  property by General  
M o t o r s  t h a t  t h e  "publ ic  purpose"  of p r o m o t i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  c a n  b e  
a c h i e v e d .  Thus ,  it is t h e  e c o n o m i c  b e n e f i t s  of t h e  project  t h a t  a r e  
incidental t o  t h e  pr ivate  use of t h e  p roper ty .  . . . While o u r  d e c i s i o n s  
h a v e  s o m e t i m e s  used  t h e  phrase "public purpose" . . . t h e  result of our 
decisions has  been t o  l imit  t h e  e m i n e n t  d o m a i n  p o w e r  t o  s i t u a t i o n s  in  
which d i rec t  governmental  use is t o  be  made of t h e  land or  in which t h e  
pr ivate  recipient will use it t o  se rve  t h e  p u b l i c  . . . (and)  it is  w o r t h  
n o t i n g  ( t h e  c a s e s  c i t e d )  a r e  d i s t ingu i shed  in t h a t  in  each i t  was t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  u n i t  t h a t  s e l e c t e d  t h e  s i t e  in question for  commercia l  or  
industrial development. By contras t ,  t h e  project  before  us w a s  i n i t i a t e d  
by G e n e r a l  M o t o r s  C o r p o r a t i o n ' s  so l i c i t a t ion  of t h e  c i t y  for i t s  a id  in 
locating a fac to ry  site. . . . The decision t h a t  t h e  prospect  of i n c r e a s e d  
employment,  t a x  revenue, and general  economic st imulation makes taking 
of pr ivate  property f o r  t r a n s f e r  t o  a n o t h e r  p r i v a t e  p a r t y  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
'lpublicl' t o  author ize  t h e  use of the  power of eminent  domain means t h a t  
t h e r e  is virtually no l imi t  t o  t h e  u s e  of c o n d e m n a t i o n  t o  a i d  p r i v a t e  
businesses (Fitzgerald,  1981). 
Public in teres t ,  loosely defined, becomes a c a t c h  a l l  phrase for  t h e  in teres ts  of 
t h e  dominant groups in society, if s t ra t i f ica t ion theor is ts  a r e  correct .  I t  is incumbent 
upon a n y  s t u d e n t  o f  c o m m u n i t y  p o w e r  t o  e x a m i n e  w h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  in teres ts  a r e  
benefited,  and how we define " p ~ b l i c ' ~ .  Acting in t h e  "public interest" may be  l i t t le  
m o r e  t h a n  l i c e n s e  f o r  a d o m i n a n t  g r o u p  t o  p u r s u e  its own in te res t .  The s a m e  
objection is raised by Jus t i ce  Ryan in h i s  d i s s e n t i n g  op in ion  t o  t h e  ru l ing  by t h e  
Court. 
. . . This  is m o r e  t h a n  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  b a d  l a w  -- i t  is, in t h e  last  
analysis, good-faith but  unwarranted judicial imprimatur upon governmental  
a c t i o n  t a k e n  u n d e r  t h e  policy of the  end justifying t h e  means. . . . To 
m e e t  ( o v e r s e a s )  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  d o m e s t i c  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  a r e  f ind ing  i t  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s t r u c t  n e w  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  in order t o  build 
redesigned, lighter and more  economical  cars.  Tha t  means  new factor ies  
a n d  n e w  f a c t o r y  l o c a t i o n s .  . . . For  those  reasons and others,  General  
Motors concluded t h a t  it would . . . build a new plant. Needless t o  say, 
t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  consideration governing t h e  location of t h e  new facil i ty 
was t h e  corporation's enlightened self-interest  as a private,  profit-making 
e n t e r p r i s e .  . . . The evidence then is t h a t  what  General  Motors wanted,  
General  Motors got. The corporation conceived t h e  p r o j e c t ,  d e t e r m i n e d  
t h e  cost ,  al located t h e  financial  burdens, se lected t h e  s i te ,  established the  
m o d e  o f  f i n a n c i n g ,  i m p o s e d  s p e c i f i c  d e a d l i n e s  f o r  c l e a r a n c e  of t h e  
p r o p e r t y  a n d  t a k i n g  t i t l e ,  a n d  e v e n  d e m a n d e d  1 2  y e a r s  of t a x  
concess ions .  . . . ( T ) h r e e  c o m m o n  e l e m e n t s  a p p e a r  . . . t h a t  g o  f a r  
t o w a r d  e x p l i c a t i n g  and justifying t h e  use of eminent  domain for  pr ivate  
corporations: 1) p u b l i c  n e c e s s i t y  of t h e  e x t r e m e  s o r t ,  2)  c o n t i n u i n g  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  pub l ic ,  and 3) selection of land according t o  f a c t s  
o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  . . . T h e  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  
l and  . . . ( in  t h i s  i n s t a n c e )  is n o t  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a n y  of the' th ree  
significant e lements  present  . . . (which) justify, in a p r inc ip led  m a n n e r ,  
t h e  use of eminent  domain fo r  private corporations.  . . . Eminent domain 
is a n  a t t r i b u t e  of sovereignty. When i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n s  a r e  f o r c e d  t o  
suffer  g r e a t  social  dislocation t o  permit  p r iva te  corporations t o  const ruct  
plants where they deem i t  most profi table,  one is l e f t  t o  wonder who t h e  
sovereign is (Ryan, 1981). 
These arguments,  pro  and con, apparently share  a common understanding of what 
is mean t  as public and private.  All par t ies  t o  t h e  dispute seem t o  b e  defined within 
a l l  these  proceedings, and a l l  a r e  i m p l i c i t l y  o r  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n s c i o u s  a c t o r s  in  t h e  
drama.  Finally, t h e  problem at hand contains a number of specif ic  issues which ar ise  
at regular in tervals  and t h e  resolution of which determined t h e  direction and nature  
of t h e  subsequent outcome. Power is defined as t h e  abil i ty of one set of in teres ts  
(in th is  case C M  a n d / o r  t h e  C i t y  o f  D e t r o i t )  t o  p r e v a i l  o v e r  a l l  o t h e r s .  What  
remains  is t o  outl ine t h e  ac to rs  in t h e  d rama and t h e  issues facing them, and then t o  
compare  t h e  distribution of benef i ts  and cos t s  according t o  o n e  o r  a n o t h e r  r u l e  of 
equitable practice.  
Issues, Actors  and Interes t  
From t h e  vantage point of a pluralist view of society,  we need look no fur ther  
than t h e  inside of t h e  Detroi t  Ci ty  Council t o  find a l l  t h e  a c t o r  and t h e  issues. As 
t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  d e c i s i o n  s t a t e d ,  t h e  overal l  question was, and continues t o  be, 
what is in t h e  bes t  in te res t  of Detroi t  as a whole? To t h a t  end, t h e  Ci ty  Council 
( e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of various pa r t s  of t h e  c i ty)  in cooperation with t h e  mayor 
(elected by t h e  c i t y  as a whole) should and will c o m e  t o  a decision. That  decision, 
t h e  s tory  goes, represents  t h e  g r e a t e s t  good for  t h e  most  people. Reformists argue 
t h a t  of ten,  and usually, ac to r s  and their  i n t e r e s t s  f a i l  t o  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  on  t h e s e  
councils, and issues of importance t o  them fail  t o  be  placed on t h e  political agenda. 
Consequently, t h e  outcome will not  represent  t h e  bes t  in te res t s  of t h e  m a j o r i t y  b u t  
r a the r  t h e  bes t  in te res t s  of those who g e t  t o  make  t h e  decisions for the  community 
at large. A l ist  of issues and ac to rs  p r e s e n t e d  by a r e f o r m i s t  wi l l  t h e r e f o r e  b e  
larger than a l is t  prepared by a pluralist. Finally, a radical  analyst  may change t h e  
en t i re  orientation of t h e  investigation charging t h a t  t h e  issues  a n d  a c t o r s ,  h o w e v e r  
d e f i n e d ,  a r e  l i m i t e d  by t h e  r e l a t i o n s  of a n d  t o  t h e  m e a n s  of production in the  
community. While reformists argue t h a t  some issues a r e  excluded f rom t h e  political 
a rena ,  radicals argue t h a t  o thers  a r e  beyond t h a t  arena.  
We can  easily identify t h e  issues requiring Ci ty  Council ac t ion by reviewing t h e  
preceeding as repor ted in t h e  local  press (see Appendix A). Once the  plans t o  close 
t h e  Fisher and Cadil lac plants were  announced, and GM's desire t o  replace them with 
a n e w  f a c i l i t y  w a s  m a d e  known,  t h e  only questions facing the  Ci ty  Council were: 
where th is  proposed plant was t o  b e  si tuated; what  fo rm,  under what t e r m s  and f rom 
what sources was t h e  project  going t o  be  financed; wha t  special  t ax  aba tements  were 
t o  be  made  available t o  GM (allowed by Michigan Public A c t  198). The f i rs t  invblved 
r u l i n g  t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  p r o j e c t  w a s  a n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t h e  Ci ty  of Detroi t  enabling 
special  legislation (Michigan Public Ac t  87) permit t ing t h e  acquisition of pr ivate  land 
by t h e  C i t y ' s  Community  and Economic Development Depar tment  (CEDD) for public 
purposes. In addition, t h e  c i ty  had t o  review and s e l e c t  a p a r t i c u l a r  s i t e  f o r  t h e  
plant and have t h a t  decision approved by Ci ty  Council. The second issue concerned 
t h e  use of Urban D e v e l o p m e n t  A c t i o n  G r a n t s  (UDAGs)  f r o m  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  of 
Housing a n d  U r b a n  Development (HUD) and g r a n t s  f rom t h e  Economic Development 
Administration (EDA) within t h e  Depar tment  of C o m m e r c e  for  s i t e  preparation costs. 
T h e s e  monies ,  already granted and earmarked f o r  specif ic  communities, and were  t o  
be  redirected fo r  t h e  proposed project. In addition, f u t u r e  UDAGs a n d  EDA g r a n t s  
w e r e  t o  b e  mortgaged as loan repayment guarantees .  C i ty  Council had t o  evaluate  
a n d  a p p r o v e  b o t h  of t h e s e  d ivers ions .  T h e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  a l s o  had  t o  a p p r o v e  
applications t o  HUD for  loans and t o  t h e  S t a t e  fo r  g r a n t s  t o  help defray t h e  cost  of 
t h e  project ,  and t o  approve t h e  plans for  t h e  preparat ion of t h e  site selected.  The 
las t  issue involved t h e  granting of a t a x  aba tement  t o  GM for new plant construction. 
Under Michigan l a w  (Mich igan  P u b l i c  A c t  198),  a m u n i c i p a l i t y  c a n  g r a n t  t h e s e  
a b a t e m e n t s  in order t o  encourage new manufacturing facil i t ies in thei r  a rea ,  and can 
v e t o  or  block t h e  granting of a b a t e m e n t s  if a plant  leaves  for  another  community in 
t h e  S t a t e .  A b a t e m e n t s  r e q u i r e  s e p a r a t e  a c t i o n  by t h e  Council and amount  t o  a 
sizable sum so it is separated f rom t h e  o ther  financial considerations of t h e  Council. 
In addition t o  t h e  th ree  issues outlined, a reformis t  analysis would include two  
more issues. First ,  they argue t h a t  t h e  Ci ty  Council's ac t ions  w e r e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  
approval, acquisition and preparation of t h e  s i t e  f o r  t h e  construction of a CM plant,  
y e t  t h e  Council never involved itself (aside f rom concerns vo iced  a t  v a r i o u s  t i m e s )  
w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  when ,  w h a t  k ind a n d  u n d e r  w h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  was t h e  plant 
actually t o  be  built. From t h e  benef i t  of hindsight we see t h a t  t h e  plant st i l l  is not  
operational. All of t h e  Council's ac t ions  focused solely on preparing and turning over , 
a suitable site for  a plant t o  GM, and did not  include a c t u a l  construction t imetables  
o r  e v e n  a c o n c r e t e  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  bu i ld  a p l a n t .  An analysis f rom a reformist  
perspective views t h e  course of events  as one manipulated by CM t o  m a x i m i z e  t h e  
t e r m s  under which they could, if they chose to ,  build a plant in t h e  Detroi t  area.  
Next they expand t h e  issue list t o  include t h e  decision t o  close two  operational 
plants (and not even operating at peak capacity) and t o  replace  them with a newer, 
more  productive' plant. GM states clearly (as  will b e  shown la ter)  t h a t  cur ren t  rules 
and t a x  laws make i t  economically unreasonable t o  renovate  and maintain t h e  existing 
plants. Building a new plant  is much cheaper  fo r  CM and so  t h e y  m a d e  w h a t  w a s  
for  them an  optimal decision. I t  is precisely th is  decision which l imits a l l  t h e  other  
act ions  which follow. Detroi t  and t h e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  m u s t  act c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  
knowledge t h a t  two  plants will close. A new one is t o  b e  buil t  only if t h e  c i t y  can  
o f fe r  "favorable" terms. The c i ty  t r ies  t o  do wha t  is bes t  f o r  D e t r o i t  as a whole  
a f t e r  t h e  o p t i o n s  a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  a range of outcomes which a r e  best  for CM as a 
corpora te  en t i ty  (i.e., p roduc t ion  d e c i s i o n s  c o n s t r a i n  c o n s u m p t i o n  decis ions) .  T o  
s u m m a r i z e ,  t h e  i s s u e s  i n  t h i s  p r o b l e m  a r e :  I) p l a n t  c l o s i n g s  a n d  n e w  p l a n t  
const ruct ion;  11) s i t e  s e l e c t i o n  a n d  a p p r o v a l ;  111) f u n d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a n d  s i t e  
preparation; IV) t a x  abatements ;  V) plant construction.  
A radical  analysis accep t s  t h e  range of issues defined above, as long as t h e  f i r s t  
i s s u e  is i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  r o l e  t h e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  and  t h e  D e t r o i t  Ci ty  
government have regarding t h e  provision of an  environment suitable for  r e p r o d u c t i o n  
of p r o d u c t i v e  relationships. Any analysis of power which remains fixed on an issue 
by issue process loses sight of t h e  dynamic which e f f e c t s  t h e  f o r m  a s  w e l l  as t h e  
fact o f  t h e  i s sue .  R e f o r m i s t s  a r e  concerned t h a t  issues affect ing vast  portions of 
unrepresented populations in t h e  community will b e  ignored by t a c i t  a g r e e m e n t  ( v i a  
t h e  exercise  of "power") among t h e  decision makers. Radicals a r e  concerned t h a t  a 
quest  fo r  nonissues may end in simply filling t h e  box w i t h  m a r b l e s  a n d  n o t  a s k i n g  
why t h e  box is so small. As Dunleavy pointed ou t ,  e a c h  issue ou t some will have a 
bearing on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  a c t o r s  f o r  t h e  n e x t  i s sue  when  o n e  u s e s  a 
f e e d b a c k  approach t o  analyzing power f rom a n  issue cen te red  perspective. Radicals 
define power as not  something one  has, necessarily, bu t  t h e  way  in which o n e  c a n  
a f f e c t  t h e  unfo ld ing  o f  e v e n t s  t o  p r o m o t e  options and  constrain outcomes. I t  is 
therefore  not  enough t o  expand t h e  issue list f rom t h r e e  t o  five, reflecting important 
c o n c e r n s  o f  t h e  c i t y  as a whole. Rather ,  what  is important  in an  analysis of the  
Cen t ra l  Industrial Park project  is t o  evaluate  t h e  sequence of events  (of t h e  issues as 
they arise) in relat ion t o  its bearing on t h e  in te res t s  of t h e  actors.  
The  overriding concerns  for  t h e  problem at hand are:  what  o p t i o n s  a r e  in t h e  
b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  Ci ty  of Detroit ,  how a r e  t h e s e  determined and how a r e  these  
implemeted? Since t h e  problem for  Detroi t  is t h e  location and cost  t o  t h e  c i ty  of a 
new GM plant, we need t o  list a l l  par t ies  which can  b e  identified having a n  in teres t  
in t h e  outcome of t h a t  decision. Aside f rom t h e  c i t y  as a whole, we can  say t h a t  
e a c h  ne ighborhood  w i t h i n  t h e  c i t y  is concerned with a set of potent ia l  d i rec t  and 
i n d i r e c t  c o s t s  t o  b e a r .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h a t  f u n d s  m a y  now b e  u n a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
c o m m u n i t y  d e v e l o p m e n t  if t h e  c i t y  diver ts  monies t o  t h e  project ,  what will b e  t h e  
a f f e c t  on t h e  community chosen as t h e  s i t e  of t h e  project ,  how is t h e  overall f iscal  
h e a l t h  o f  t h e  c i t y  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  project  so t h a t  t h e  level  of services in general  
may be  jeapordized fo r  t h e  t i m e  being? Similarly, e a c h  community has  t o  weigh t h e  
c o s t s  a g a i n s t  p o t e n t i a l  benefits .  Will t h e r e  be  more  jobs for t h e  c i t y  as a whole, 
will these  jobs specifically help members  of t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  wi l l  o v e r a l l  t a x e s  b e  
lower because this plant  is somewhere in t h e  c i ty ,  will t h e  project  s top  t h e  economic 
e r o s i o n  of t h e  c i t y  a n d  t u r n  it a r o u n d ?  C l e a r l y  n o t  a l l  c o m m u n i t i e s  a n d  
n e i g h b o r h o o d s  n e e d  b e  v e r y  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  m o r e  t h a n  t h e  b r o a d e r  q u e s t i o n s  
a f fec t ing  t h e  c i ty  as a whole. Size cons t ra in t s  a n d  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  s u c h  as 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  u l t i m a t e l y  r e s t r i c t  t h e  n u m b e r  of poss ib le  
communities under serious consideration. The c i ty  ult imately se lected nine potent ia l  
s i t e s  (see  Appendix B). Grouping a l l  o the r  communities no t  directly a f fec ted  by t h e  
location of t h e  plant into one  ac to r ,  w e  the re fore  expec t ,  a priori, t o  have at l eas t  
t e n  d i f fe ren t  ac to rs  represented in t h e  discussion abou t  where t o  place  t h e  plant and 
at what cos t  t o  whom. Only t h e  nine potent ia l  s i t e s  would a c t u a l l y  b e  c o n c e r n e d  
w i t h  t h e  w i d e s t  r a n g e  of c o s t s  w h i l e  a l l  look a t  a l l  t h e  b e n e f i t s .  S i n c e  t h e  
communities e lected t h e  members  of t h e  Ci ty  Council and t h e  Mayor, and since any 
special  in te res t  l ike organized labor o r  business groups ca r ry  no special  weight in t h e  
e lec to ra l  process, liberal theor is ts  argue t h a t  a l l  in te res t s  for  a l l  c o n c e r n e d  wi l l  b e  
ref lected in t h e  outcome. 
A l i b e r a l  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  process, therefore ,  identif ies t h e  City Council as t h e  
a rena  of political conflict ,  its members  representa t ives  of a l l  t h e  in te res ted  p a r t i e s ,  
and in te res t  defined as some measure of ne t  overall  benef i t  t o  t h e  c i t y  as a whole. 
E a c h  g r o u p  wi l l  h a v e  a d i f f e r e n t  c a l c u l u s  fo r  determining i t s  parochial  c la ims of 
benef i ts  and costs,  but  t h e  Ci ty  Council will ul t imately weigh each against  t h e  o thers  
t o  arr ive  at some overall  benefit  and c o s t  analysis. Implicit in t h e  l iberal  analysis i s  
t h a t  t h e  Ci ty  Council, representing these  various consti tuencies,  has  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
t o  discuss various options, pros and cons, regarding site selection. As is shown below, 
t h a t  assumption is f a r thes t  f rom t h e  truth.  Having identif ied a c t o r s  and interests,  w e  
c a n  evaluate  e a c h  of t h e  t h r e e  issues above t o  assess t h e  na tu re  of t h e  outcomes. 
The reformis t  analysis continues one s t e p  f u r t h e r  -- t h e  c i t y ' s  bus iness  e l i t e  
h a v e  a s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  in  t h e  o u t c o m e .  On o n e  hand  t h e y  a r e  concerned with 
maintaining a favorable c l i m a t e  for  business. On t h e  o ther  they want t o  make sure  
no act ion taken by t h e  c i t y  will adversely e f f e c t  the i r  potent ia l  for  profitability. To 
t h e  list above they would add both GM and a l l  o the r  businesses as two  more a c t o r s  
i n t e r e s t e d  in  t h e  o u t c o m e .  In addition t o  business in teres ts ,  organized labor must 
surely be  concerned by any decision regarding production a n d  e m p l o y m e n t  l e v e l s  in  
t h e  D e t r o i t  a r e a .  T h e r e f o r e ,  th i s  approach looks beyond t h e  confines of t h e  Ci ty  
Council t o  t h e  mechanisms of Ci ty  government in general  (including t h e  Ci ty  Council) 
as t h e  poli t ical  a rena  in which t o  find t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  influence of these  additional 
a c t o r s  (e.g., t h e  Detroi t  Economic Growth Corporation "floating1' m o n e y  t o  t h e  c i t y  
for  preliminary studies, Detroi t  News, 16 O c t  1980:Bl). Their  analysis of community 
power would evaluate  th is  e x p a n d e d  l i s t  o f  a c t o r s  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  f o u r  i s s u e s  
indentif ied above. 
Secondly, t h e  option of whether t o  build a new plant  o r  renovate  the  two  older 
Clark and Fisher plants remains squarely in GM's control. A reformis t  analysis would 
p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  r a n g e  of options, t h a t  is t h e  agenda f o r  ac t ion facing t h e  Ci ty  
Council, has  been res t r ic ted by t h e  action of GM. Any discussion of possible act ion 
by t h e  c i t y  remains confined t o  a react ive  response t o  GM's behavior. The c i ty  has  
tac i t ly  been coerced t o  ignore t h e  obvious a l t e rna t ives  which might d ic ta te  production 
and employment  levels t o  GM as condition f o r  t h e  approval of t h e  project  (this might 
include ex i t  cos t s  following t h e  examples of some c i t i e s  trying t o  ha l t  t h e  flight of 
manufacturing). 
The radical  analysis of power approaches t h e  problem differently;  a broader view 
of in te res t  and t h e  centra l i ty  of production relationships between t h e  v a r i o u s  a c t o r s  
a r e  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  analysis. Since in te res t  c a n  b e  both  subjective (what is t h e  best  
thing f o r  each a c t o r  at t h e  moment) & object ive  (what  is t h e  bes t  thing for each  
a c t o r  s o  t h a t  t h e  possibility of fu ture  options a r e  maximized), a n  analysis of power is 
not limited t o  who g e t s  what now, but who has  m o l d e d  t h e  p r o c e s s  t o  r e p e a t e d l y  
p r o d u c e  f a v o r a b l e  o u t c o m e s .  T h e  s u b j e c t i v e  in te res t s  of t h e  community must b e  
examined in relat ion t o  t h e  objective in te re r s t s  of t h e  workers who live there. I t  is 
pointed o u t  above t h a t  a radical  view asks how t h e  pr ivate  decisions of GM selects  
and l imi ts  t h e  ensuing issues faced by both t h e  Ci ty  Counc i l  a n d  c i t y  g o v e r n m e n t .  
R e d e f i n i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  production relations, a 
radical  analysis of power evaluates t h e  o u t c o m e s  of e a c h  i s s u e  in r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
objective in teres ts  served by those outcomes. 
Perhaps  more  importantly, by limiting t h e  analysis t o  a n  issue by issue account,  
t h e s e  o t h e r  a p p r o a c h e s  limit t h e  range of a c t o r s  in t h a t  analysis. A focus on t h e  
issue, within a defined arena,  misses t h e  possibility t h a t  t h e  a rena  itself is an  a c t o r  
in t h e  events.  Both of t h e  f i rs t  two  approaches d o  no t  view t h e  City Council or  c i t y  
government  as more  than t h e  representative of t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  of v a r i o u s  
s e c t o r s  o f  s o c i e t y .  B u t  a radical  analysis proceeds under t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  
form of t h e  arena,  t h e  state itself, plays a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  in  t h e  r e p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  r e l a t i o n s .  This  p a p e r  will no t  a t t e m p t  t o  discuss theories of the  state 
f rom a radical  p e r s p e c t i v e  ( f o r  e x a m p l e s  of t h i s  d i scuss ion ,  see C a s t e l l s ,  1977 ;  
Gordon, 1977; Harvey, 1978a; 0' Connor, 1973; Poulantzas ,  1978; Therborn, 1978, 1980; 
Tilly, 1978), nor will it engage in questions of state behavior a n d  t h e  c r i s i s  in  t h e  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  p r o d u c t i o n  relat ions (e.g., Castells ,  1980; Przeworski and 
Wallerstein, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1979; Martin, 1983; Wolfe, 1977). But t h e  role 
played by both t h e  Ci ty  Council in approving various act ions  and t h e  depar tments  of 
c i t y  g o v e r n m e n t  in p rov id ing  s e l e c t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  (e.g., C o u n c i l m a n  C o c k r e l ' s  
complaints regarding t h e  relationship between t h e  Council and t h e  CEDD throughout, 
Detroi t  News, 28 May 1981:BDW2) must b e  examined. I t  is diff icult  t o  a r t i cu la te  a 
p o s i t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  s u b j e c t i v e  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  fo r  t h e  official  state bodies without 
detailing theor ies  of t h e  state. Instrumental, s t ruc tu ra l  and functional theories of t h e  
s t a t e  a l l  p r e s e n t  a c c o u n t s  of p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s  as a g e n t s  a c t i n g  consc ious ly  o r  
unconsciously on behalf of one group or another .  T h e  s c o p e  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  only  
requires t h a t  t h e  Ci ty  Council and t h e  c i ty  government ,  exemplified by the  CEDD, be  
considered more  than just an  arena,  and t h a t  a n  analysis of power t a k e  into account  
t h e  dynamic interaction between various const i tuencies  (e.g., labor and capital) within 
t h e  con tex t  of th is  less than neutral  poli t ical  forum. 
A Chronological Account of the  Process 
H a v i n g  o u t l i n e d  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n s  a n d  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f r o m  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
perspective,  i t  is necessary t o  examine t h e  even t s  as they unfold t o  s e e  which model 
of power is most consistent  with t h e  decision t o  r a z e  Poletown in preparation for  a 
GM assembly plant. A pluralist explanation of community politics looks t o  t h e  Ci ty  
Council as t h e  locus of a l l  decisions a f fec t ing  t h e  Ci ty  of Detroit.  By examining t h e  
chronology of events,  pluralists would e x p e c t  t h a t  e a c h  q u e s t i o n  of c o n c e r n  t o  t h e  
p e o p l e  of t h e  c i t y  would b e  discussed in t h e  Ci ty  Council. Any subsequent action 
would necessarily ref lect  t h e  g r e a t e s t  good f o r  t h e  g r e a t e s t  number of people. Issues 
e m e r g e  as they become important ,  and the i r  resolution represents  a consensus position 
of in te res t s  on t h e  Council. If a question of power i s  r a i s e d ,  it is m e r e l y  in  t h e  
c o n t e x t  of t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  m a j o r i t y  t o  e n f o r c e  its d e c i s i o n s  on t h e  minority 
position ( o r  pos i t ions ) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a r e f o r m i s t  a n a l y s i s  would p o i n t  o u t  a )  h o w  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t s  f a i l e d  t o  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  Council, b) which issues were  
turned in to  nonissues by t h e  Council (or more  part icularly some fact ion on or  off t h e  
Council), and c) what ac to r  o r  group of a c t o r s  constrained t h e  decisions of the  Ci ty  
Council. Power is ref lected by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  decisions and outcomes conform t o  t h e  
needs  and in teres ts  of GM as t h e  representa t ive  of t h e  dominant class. The radical  
analysis views each  outcome as t h e  bas is  f o r  p o s i t i o n s  of d o m i n a n c e  on  t h e  n e x t  
issue, and  power as a cumulative process whereby t h e  possible resolution t o  a given 
issue was constrained by t h e  resolution of t h e  p r e v i o u s  issue .  P o w e r  r e f l e c t s  t h e  
a b i l i t y  o f  GM t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  appara tus  of the  c i ty  t o  maintain t h e  
broadest  possible range of f u t u r e  action.  Through a reconstruction of t h e  events  a s  
t h e y  a r e  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  loca l  press, each  of these  scenarios can be  challenged o r  
substantiated.  
Any a n a l y s i s  d e p e n d e n t  upon newspaper reporting is vulnerable t o  problems of 
incomplete information,  perceptual  in terpreta t ion of t h e  repor ters  writing t h e  a r t i c les  
a n d  b i a s e s  o f  t h e  p a p e r  i t s e l f  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  kind of m a t e r i a l  i t s  ed i to r s  deem 
newsworthy or  t h e  point of view they would like t o  promote. The a n a l y s i s  h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  CIP decision making process as it 
unfolds in t h e  press, and t o  paint  t h e  problem with a n  historical  b r u s h  us ing c o l o r s  
u n a v a i l a b l e  i n  b e n e f i t  c o s t  calculations. Fi rs t ,  a n  outl ine of t h e  a c t o r s  mentioned, 
and t h e  issues raised, is presented t o  define t h e  boundaries of t h e  analysis. Then, a 
c r i t i c a l  r e v i e w  of  t h e  t iming of act ions  by t h e  Ci ty  Council on t h e  main issues in 
relation t o  behavior by t h e  a c t o r s  concerned as r e p o r t e d  by t h e  p r e s s  p r e s e n t s  a n  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  d y n a m i c s  o f  p o w e r  r e l a t i o n s .  Using Dunleavy ' s  i s s u e  c e n t e r e d  
approach t o  power, it is poss ible  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  a c t o r s  a n d  i s sues ,  a n d  c h a r t  t h e  
o u t c o m e  of t h e  even t s  t o  understand which groups have what kind of power. What 
follows is a review of 128 newspaper ar t ic les  which a p p e a r e d  in t h e  D e t r o i t  N e w s  
over approximately one year  covering t h e  period f rom t i m e  t h e  plant closing and site 
search is first  announced (24 June  1980) t o  t h e  point  t h a t  GM m a k e s  i t s  s t a t e m e n t  
delaying promises made  during t h e  course  of even t s  (3 Nov 1981). 
Actors and Issues 
The newspaper coverage addresses each of t h e  f ive issues identified earl ier  in a 
sequential  fashion reflecting changing concerns as one  question is resolved and another  
comes  t o  t h e  fore. What is striking in t h e  review of t h e  process is t h a t  of ten many 
of t h e  issues a r e  t r e a t e d  by some of t h e  a c t o r s  as if they have already been resolved 
even though t h e  Ci ty  Council had ye t  t o  officially decide  on t h e  outcome (recall  t h a t  
issues where defined as those  act ions  t o  which t h e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  h a d  t o  g i v e  f i n a l  
approval - or  should have - regarding t h e  CIP), o r  fo r  which some legi t imate  appeal  
was  s t i l l  pending. One example  of this is t h e  demolition of t h e  majori ty of t h e  site 
while t h e  community was st i l l  trying t o  question both  t h e  ou tcome and t h e  process of 
t h e  selection.  A cour t  order was  required t o  ha l t  t h e  demolition until t h e  issue was  
resolved. Another striking observation ar is ing f r o m  a p r e s s  r e v i e w  is t h e  l i m i t e d  
n u m b e r  o f  a c t o r s  m e n t i o n e d  in  t h e  p ress  in relat ion t o  a l l  t h e  possible concerned 
groups. Other  communities in t h e  c i ty  identif ied as possible sites by t h e  CEDD make  
n o  a p p e a r a n c e  a t  a l l ,  while t h e  United Auto Workers, representing t h e  in teres ts  of 
a u t o  workers specifically and labor in general ,  a r e  reported only twice  in t h e  press. 
F i n a l l y ,  it 'is c l e a r  from reading t h e  paper t h a t  t h e  offices of Ci ty  government a r e  
more  than  just f u n c t i o n a r i e s  c o m m i t e d  t o  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  p o l i c i e s  of t h e  C i t y  
Council as they decide  on t h e  collective bes t  in te res t s  for  t h e  ci ty.  Almost half of 
a l l  r e f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  p a p e r  in r e g a r d  t o  a n y  of t h e  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e  e i t h e r  a 
representa t ive  of Mayor Young (or t h e  mayor himself), o r  t h e  CEDD and i t s  d i rector ,  
E m m e t  Moten. If t h e  Ci ty  Council and c i t y  g o v e r n m e n t  a r e  t o  b e  v i e w e d  as a n  
a rena  of poli t ical  conflict ,  then clearly t h e  a r e n a  (a t  leas t  t h e  c i t y  government pa r t )  
itself had a c lea r  position vis-a-vis t h e  form of t h e  final outcome. In most respects,  
e i the r  t h e  CEDD or  o ther  Ci ty  officials  a c t e d  as a n  in teres ted par ty ,  although is was 
never c l e a r  wha t  t h e  in teres t  was. On f a c e  value, t h a t  in te res t  w a s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
well being of t h e  people of Detroit.  
T a b l e  1 p r e s e n t s  a l i s t  of  a c t o r s  i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  p r e s s  coverage and t h e  
number of t imes  t h e y  a p p e a r  a r o u n d  o n e  o f  t h e  f i v e  issues .  T h e  e d i t o r i a l  a n d  
c o m m e n t a r i e s  o f  t h e  newspaper  were  also presented t o  t r y  t o  uncover any obvious 
bias in reporting. Most of these  comments  cen te red  on t h e  necessity fo r  t h e  c i t y  t o  
m a i n t a i n ,  e n s u r e  o r  o t h e r w i s e  guaran tee  whatever  was necessary t o  keep t h e  plant  
(and by extension, t h e  jobs) in t h e  c i t y .  N o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  a l m o s t  a l l  t h e  i t e m s  
mentioning t h e  Poletown Neighborhood C o u n c i l  o c c u r  a r o u n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of site 
selection.  The one exception,  some of t h e  residents argue l a te r  on t h a t  if GM is t o  
receive a t a x  a b a t e m e n t  t o  encourage them t o  build, t h e  people in P o l e t o w n  shou ld  
receive  similar guarantees  -- e i the r  in t h e  fo rm of a reduction, o r  at leas t  a promise 
t h a t  thei r  property t axes  will n o t  g o  up  as t h e y  a r e  f o r c e d  i n t o  m o r e  e x p e n s i v e  
homes. Also no t  surprising is t h e  preponderance of c i ta t ions  referring t o  GM around 
t h e  issue of t h e  plant closure. Af te r  all,  t h e  decision t o  c lose  t h e  Clark and Fisher 
p l a n t s  w a s  m a d e  unilaterally and t h e  paper was reporting t h e  company's ruminations 
about  remaining in t h e  Detroi t  a r e a  provided a n  adequate  s i t e  was forthcoming. 
Insert Table 1 about  here  
M o r e  s u r p r i s i n g  is t h a t  t h e  UAW w a s  on ly  r e p o r t e d  in  t h e  p a p e r  on  t w o  
o c c a s i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  appears  on t h e  day t h e  plant closing and t h e  prospective new 
plant was  reported. A UAW spokesperson s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  would b e  good  f o r  a u t o  
w o r k e r s  if GM b u i l t  i t s  plant  in Detroit .  The proposed plant  "could b e  one of t h e  
best ,  but  with automation,  one of t h e  worst  things (24 June  1980:Al)" t o  happen t o  
workers. The nex t  t i m e  anyone f rom t h e  UAW appears in t h e  news is t o  encourage 
t h e  Ci ty  Council t o  approve t h e  t a x  a b a t e m e n t  s t a t ing  t h a t  GM wil l  l e a v e  D e t r o i t  
a n d  t h e  e f f e c t  o n  a u t o  re la ted jobs will b e  devastating. Most of t h e  comments  o r  
references  by e i the r  an  e lement  of Ci ty  government,  t h e  Ci ty  Council o r  CEDD a r e  
limited t o  t h e  middle range of issues. This is also not  surprising since t h e  f i rs t  and 
las t  issues, as defined, a r e  beyond t h e  scope of Ci ty  Council action. Tables 2 and 3 
p r e s e n t s  t h e  d i s t r ibu t ion  of each actor ' s  comments  by issue, and t h e  distribution of 
t h e  issues raised or  otherwise mentioned by actor .  
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about  he re  
TABLE 1. The Number of Actors Cited* in Relation to  Issues 
ISSUES 
ACTOR - I I1 - I11 - IV - v - Total 
Ci ty  Council 1 3 7 8 - 19 
Ci ty  Officials 4 18 14 7 5 48 
Moten & CEDD 5 17 32 15 4 7 3 
PNC & Supporters - 57 - 1 - 5 8 
UAW 1 - - 1 - 2 
General Motors 28 7 6 9 3 5 3 
Editorials, etc. 4 2 1 1 - 8 
TOTAL 4 3 104 60 4 2 12 26 1 
- - 
"Detroit News from April 16, 1980 t o  November 3, 1981 (total  of 128 articles) 
TABLE 2. The Percentage Distribution of Actors by Issue 
ISSUES 
ACTOR - I - I1 I11 - Total - IV - v 
City Council 2.3 2.9 11.7 19.0 - 7.3 
City Officials 9.3 17.3 23.3 16.7 41.7 18.3 
Moten & CEDD- 11.6 16.3 53.3 35.7 33.3 28.0 
PNC & Supporters - 54.3 - 2.4 - 22.2 
UAW 2.3 - - 2.4 - 0.8 
General Motors 65.1 6.7 10.0 21.4 25.0 20.3 
Editorials, etc. 9.3 1.9 1.7 2.4 - 3.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NB: Totals may not add up due to rounding 
TABLE 3. The  Percen tage  Distribution of Issues by Actor  
ACTOR 
C i t y  Council 
C i t y  Officials  
Moten & CEDD 
PNC & Supporters 
UAW 






NB: Totals  may not add up due  to  rounding 
Process  
A l i s t i n g  o f  events,  actors1 part icipation o r  number of t imes  an  issue is raised 
suffers  f rom t h e  same s o r t  of a g g r e g a t i o n  p r o b l e m  e n c o u n t e r e d  e a r l i e r .  S i m p l e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  d o  n o t  g e n e r a t e  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of t h e  p rocess  which unfolded in 
c rea t ing  t h e  CIP. For example,  a lmost  a l l  t h e  act ion by Poletown residents occurred 
a f t e r  t h e i r  c o m m u n i t y  was se lected as t h e  site. Their  concerns centered around a 
rear  guard act ion trying t o  undo w h a t  t h e y  h a d  l i t t l e  s a y  in doing.  Appendix  A 
presents  a chronology of t h e  process as it was repor ted in a local  paper. The d a t e s  
se lected a r e  convenient points in t i m e  grouping a number of e v e n t s  o v e r  l o n g e r  o r  
shor ter  periods reflecting substantive progress towards  t h e  completion of t h e  project. 
A b e t t e r  f e e l  fo r  t h e  process can b e  achieved us ing t h i s  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t  t o  
t r a c e  t h e  course  of even t s  re la ted t o  each  of t h e  issues. 
The f i rs t  issue appears  only as a repor t  of something already decided. GM had 
u n i l a t e r a l l y  p lanned  t o  r e p l a c e  its o l d e r  f a c i l i t i e s ,  b u t  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  i t  was 
in teres ted,  even c o m m i t t e d ,  t o  r e m a i n i n g  in  t h e  D e t r o i t  a r e a .  A s i d e  f r o m  t h e  
o b v i o u s  b e n e f i t  of  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  if GM u s e d  w o r k e r s  f r o m  c u r r e n t  
production facil i t ies,  t h e  company pointed o u t  t h a t  De t ro i t  was i t s  sent imental  home, 
and f e l t  it needed t o  maintain a presence in t h e  bi r thplace  of t h e  Cadillac ( the  c a r  
p r o d u c e d  in  t h e  p l a n t s  be ing  p h a s e d  down a n d  p r o p o s e d  f o r  t h e  n e w  p l a n t ) .  
Nonetheless, GM would wait  until O c t  1s t  t o  review t h e  progress t h e  c i ty  made  in its 
search fo r  a suitable s i t e  for  a new plant before  commi t t ing  itself further.  In th is  
way, GM defined the  pa ramete rs  of t h e  problem and t h e  options available t o  t h e  c i ty  
- no site, no plant and presumably no jobs. Following Dunleavy ,  w e  see t h a t  t h e  
resolution of t h e  f i rs t  issue, production decisions made  a f fec t ing  the  c i ty  as a whole, 
was controlled solely by t h e  in ternal  accounting p r a c t i c e s  of GM. F r o m  a l i b e r a l  
p r o s p e c t i v e ,  t h i s  was o u t  of t h e  realm of "public" decision making. The only issue 
needing t o  be  addressed was t h e  nex t  one, selecting a site based on t h e  l eas t  overall  
c o s t  t o  t h e  c i ty ,  and which also satisfied GM1s needs, so t h a t  t h e  c i ty  could keep  t h e  
GM plant. Reformists a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  d e c i s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  
c r i t i c a l  p o i n t  o f  d e p a r t u r e  for  what  was t o  follow. The  agenda for  fu r the r  action 
was set by GM. Clearly, t o  use Dunleavy's image of a g a t e ,  t h e  result  of t h e  f i rs t  
i s sue  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  p l a c e d  a const ra ints  on t h e  second, l imiting t h e  range of future  
outcomes. 
On  J u n e  2 5 t h ,  t h e  d a y  a f t e r  t h e  initial pronouncement,  a number of potent ia l  
s i tes  a r e  mentioned in t h e  paper,  bu t  Poletown is already i d e n t i f i e d  as t h e  l e a d i n g  
site. How, if t h e  Ci ty  Council is t o  decide, with input f rom various Ci ty  agencies, 
can a community already emerge  as t h e  probable site only one  day a f t e r  t h e  "public" 
is made a w a r e  of GM's plans? By t h e  1st of July Poletown is identified as t h e  s i t e  
se lected by t h e  CEDD.  On t h e  1 6 t h  of t h a t  m o n t h  a g r o u p  of 1 4  m a j o r  l o c a l  
businesses, including most  banks and t h e  major automobile manufactures,  loan t h e  c i ty  
over $3 million t o  proceed with "feasibility studies" on s i t e  conversion. Within a f e w  
d a y s  t h e  C E D D  r e q u e s t s  t h a t  t h e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  a p p r o v e  t h e  diverting of monies 
granted f o r  o t h e r  p u r p o s e s  (CDBGs)  t o w a r d s  i n i t i a l  o u t l a y s  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  a n d  p r e p a r a t i o n  of t h e  s i t e .  Finally, at t h e  beginning of August, t h e  
CEDD receives t h e  approval f rom Ci ty  Council for  a n  application t o  HUD for  loans 
t o  c o v e r  c o s t s  of t h e  project  over  t h e  Councils own concerns  t h a t  a )  financing for 
t h e  e n t i r e  project  is not y e t  clearly identified and the re fore  risks t h e  monies already 
a l l o c a t e d ,  b) t h e  Counc i l  only received Moten's assurances regarding t h e  con ten t  of 
t h e  application at  t h e  t i m e  of t h e  approval and c) t h e  c i t y  had not  y e t  even received 
a c o m m i t m e n t  t h a t  GM i n t e n d e d  t o  build a plant in t h e  even t  a s i t e  is prepared 
(foreshadowing t h e  concerns  which emerge  as issue V). 
Within  t w o  m o n t h s  a f t e r  t h e  announcement, t h e  c i t y  commi t ted  large  sums of 
money originally earmarked for o the r  community projects ,  applied for m o r e  f u n d s  in  
t h e  form of g r a n t s  and loans from various agencies  (all with t h e  Council's re luctant  
approval) and considered a number of a l ternat ives  o t h e r  than providing a prepared s i t e  
(including assuming t h e  cos t  of plant  construction and  leasing t h e  plant back t o  GM), 
a l l  because  t h e  c i ty  had t o  make suitable progess by t h e  beginning of October when 
GM would make  its assessment and decide  on its n e x t  course  of action. Throughout, 
t h e  question of site selection has been lost  even though t h e  Ci ty  Council had y e t  t o  
e v e n  d i s c u s s  t h e  i s s u e  of c r i t e r i a  for  a s i t e  and appropr ia te  measures for  approval 
once a site was found. GM and t h e  c i ty  agencies involved a c t e d  as if t h e  decision 
w a s  a f o r g o n e  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  b e n e f i t  t o  D e t r o i t  w a s  a f o r g o n e  
c o n c l u s i o n ,  a n d  t h e  t h e  c i t y  had  no  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h a n  t o  f u n c t i o n  w i t h i n  
const ra ints  imposed by GM. 
Fur thermore,  while t h e  Council was st i l l  no t  ac t ing  on t h e  second issue, t h e  c i ty  
was already commit t ing money toward t h e  project. T h e  third issue was also rapidly 
b e c o m i n g  a m o o t  p o i n t  s ince  many of t h e  loans g ran ted  required as a precondition 
t h a t  t h e  c i ty  commi t  fu tu re  HUD and EDA gran t s  f o r  the i r  repayment.  On t h e  e v e  
of GM's review, Moten conceeds t o  t h e  Ci ty  Council t h a t  t h e  original cost  e s t imates  
have risen over  60% t o  nearly $200 million, and t h e  c i t y  would eventual  have t o  bear  
a " rea l "  c o s t  of o v e r  $300 mil l ion.  Keep ing  i n  mind  t h a t  t h e  ques t ion  of the  
selection of t h e  site is rapidly becoming another  nonissue, t h e  Ci ty  Council now found 
i t s e l f  i n  a p o s i t i o n  which required increasing approval  for  t h e  allocation of money 
towards a project  which a )  st i l l  has not  received a commitment  f r o m  GM r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  plant  t o  b e  constructed on t h e  site, b) s t i l l  has  no t  had i t s  cos t s  clearly mapped 
o u t  and c )  t h e  Council st i l l  had not actually approved in any form. 
O n  t h e  7 t h  of O c t o b e r ,  GM i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  w a n t  t a x  a b a t e m e n t  guarantees  
before  i t  is willing t o  undertake any project ,  and on t h e  11th  t h e  c i t y ' s  C E D D  a n d  
GM sign a n  agreement  calling for  t h e  t e r m s  and pr ice  under which GM will buy t h e  
site. Notably absent  in t h e  agreement  is any  commi tment  actual ly  t o  build a plant 
and put people t o  work. The agreement  states t h a t  any sa le  is contingent upon t h e  
c i ty  having c lea r  t i t l e  t o  a l l  t h e  property necessary for GM's site, t h a t  the  buildings 
on t h e  property were  razed,  a l l  necessary i m p r o v e m e n t s  t o  t h e  s i t e  w e r e  a l r e a d y  
made and finally t h a t  t h e  c i ty  would g ran t  GM a 12 year ,  50% t a x  aba tement  for  t h e  
new plant. Now four issues a r e  in t h e  works ,  n o n e  of t h e m  u n d e r  t h e  Counc i l ' s  
control: GM and t h e  CEDD a r e  ac t ing  as if t h e  site selection has  already m e t  with 
approval; t h e  City Council is increasingly being r e q u i r e d  t o  a p p r o v e  l o a n  o r  g r a n t  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  s e c u r i n g  t h e  necessary money for  in increasingly expensive project;  
t h e  c i ty  implicitly approved t h e  granting of a t a x  a b a t e m e n t  as a p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  
property t r ans fe r  before  t h e  issue ever  comes  up before  t h e  Council; GM consistently 
ignores any discussion re la ted t o  a commi tment  t o  build a plant  a f t e r  they t ake  over 
t h e  property from t h e  city.  
I t  becomes increasingly problematic t o  apply any s o r t  of conventional model of 
power analysis t o  th is  process. Clearly, t h e  major a c t o r s  a r e  becoming GM and t h e  
city's agencies and officials  (excluding t h e  Ci ty  Council). Even t h e  Council itself is 
beginning t o  apprecia te  t h e  degree  t o  which is is being ignored o r  bypassed, claiming 
they a r e  being forced into a position in which they a r e  t r e a t e d  like a rubber s t a m p  
(11 O c t  1980:Al). How a r e  w e  t o  a n a l y z e  p o w e r  r e l a t i o n s  u n d e r  a p l u r a l i s t  o r  
r e f o r m i s t  f r a m e w o r k  when GM is not  an  a c t o r  in t h e  process for  t h e  f i rs t  and t h e  
"state1' is not  a n  ac to r  for  e i ther?  As t h e  process  unfo lds ,  c o n v e n t i o n a l  v i e w s  of 
p o w e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  have a harder t i m e  reconciling the  a c t u a l  
events  t o  t h e  predicted outcomes.  
By t h e  end of October ,  t h e  City Council has approved divert ing $60.5 million in 
cur ren t  HUD gran t s  fo r  t h e  project  and  has commi t ted  $51.5 million in future  UDAG 
monies t o  repay addit ional loans. The l a t t e r  was done inspite of t h e  opposition of i t s  
own s t a f f  which  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  t h e  C E D D  f i r s t  b e  asked t o  account for  any 
a f f e c t  on those  communities losing g ran t  monies. Fur thermore,  t h e  c i ty  had st i l l  no t  - 
b e e n  a b l e  t o  s e c u r e  a l l  t h e  f u n d s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  project 's  completion. 
Finally, t h e  Council's s t a f f  recommended t h a t  any proposals f o r  a tax  break should be  
l inked  t o  g u a r a n t e e d  l e v e l s  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  -- at l e a s t  6 ,000  jobs c r e a t e d  a n d  
maintained fo r  t h e  life of t h e  t ax  a b a t e m e n t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  GM p r e d i c t e d  
fu tu re  automat ion may mean t h e  new plant's work fo rce  will b e  significantly t r immed 
(21 O c t  1980:BD4) and Mayor Young conceded t o  t h e  Ci ty  Council t h a t  a new plant  
will not  c r e a t e  new permanent  jobs, claims of "thousands of jobs" a r e  not  accura te ,  
and a n  original payback e s t i m a t e  of 15 years  presented t o  t h e  Ci ty  Council did no t  
t a k e  a t a x  a b a t e m e n t  i n t o  cons idera t ion  (22 O c t  1980:Al). Nonetheless, t h e  Ci ty  
Council ef fect ively  a f f i rms  t h e  forgone by approving t h e  site, s ta t ing  t h a t  the re  is a 
c lea r  and immediate  need f o r  t h e  ci ty.  This allowed t h e  CEDD t o  proceed according 
t o  Michigan Public A c t  8 7  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  "quick" t a k i n g  o f  l a n d  u n d e r  e m i n e n t  
domain powers, a process which normally would t a k e  years. The urgency is justified 
in pa r t  by a May 1, 1981 deadline GM had imposed for  t ransfer  of t i t l e  in order for  
i t  t o  b e  ab le  t o  build its plant  according t o  schedule. 
The res t  of t h e  t i m e  f rom t h e  b e g i n n i n g  of N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 8 0  t o  t h e  e n d  of 
March ,  1981  is  f i l l e d  w i t h  t h e  P o l e t o w n  Neighborhood  C o u n c i l  s u i t  t o  ha l t  t h e  
process. L i t t l e  is done on t h e  residents'  behalf as t h e  cour t s  move quickly t o  rule on 
t h e  q u e s t i o n .  J u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  r u l i n g  uphold ing  t h e  lower cour t  
decision t h a t  t h e  public need outweighed t h e  rights of t h e  community,  Mayor Young 
states t h a t  t h e  CIP is more  important t o  t h e  c i t y  than t h e  Renaissance Center ,  GM 
again makes  v e i l e d  t h r e a t s  a b o u t  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  of t h e  May 1st t i t l e  t r a n s f e r  
d e a d l i n e ,  a n d  C i t y  o f f i c i a l s  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  c i t y  wi l l  p o s s e s s  much "useless" 
property (all bu t  190 of 1700 lots on t h e  si te)  if t h e  C o u r t  s t o p s  t h e  C I P  p r o j e c t  
(11 Mar 1981:Al). The intervening period is filled with charges  and counter  charges  
between Young, Moten and t h e  Poletown N e i g h b o r h o o d  C o u n c i l  a n d  i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  
( m o s t  n o t a b l y  N a d a r )  a b o u t  u n r e a s o n a b l e  o b s t r u c t i o n  a n d  t h e  needs of the  ci ty.  
Clearly,  however, t h e  f i rs t  th ree  issues had been  decided by t h e  end of October,  with 
t h e  role  played by t h e  Ci ty  Council l t t l e  more  then a n  af ter- the-fact  approving body 
whose act ions  were  required by s ta tute .  
T h e  l a s t  m a i n  i s s u e  b e f o r e  t h e  Council was t h e  granting of a t a x  abatement .  
GM l e t  it b e  k n o w n  t h a t  t h e y  would b e  a s k i n g  f o r  a n  a b a t e m e n t  which would 
e f f e c t i v e l y  k e e p  t h e  t a x  on  t h e  n e w  p l a n t  equal t o  the i r  cur ren t  liability on t h e  
Clark and Fisher plants. Then, in t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  c i t y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s ,  GM 
agreed t o  a c c e p t  "only" the  more conventional (by this t ime)  50%, 12 year reduction 
(17 Mar 1981:Al). Furthermore,  t h e  company pointed ou t  t h a t  the re  a r e  s t i l l  m a n y  
c o m m u n i t i e s  which  would w e l c o m e  t h e  p l a n t  w i t h  o p e n  a r m s  a n d  t h a t  if a t a x  
a b a t e m e n t  were  not  granted they would have t o  reconsider and reevaluate thei r  plans 
t o  see if a plant  in t h a t  location was st i l l  economically viable. Moten argued before  
t h e  Ci ty  Council t h a t  GM was technically ent i t led  t o  t h e  aba tement  according t o  t h e  
l and  t r a n s f e r  a g r e e m e n t  which s t a t e d  t h a t  a n  a b a t e m e n t  w a s  a precondition t o  
transfer.  Unless t h e  Council wanted t o  keep  possession of t h e  si te,  they would have 
t o  g r a n t  t h e  t a x  b r e a k .  T h e  C o u n c i l ' s  s t a f f  a g a i n  r e c o m m e n d e d  a g a i n s t  a n  
aba tement ,  or at t h e  l eas t  requested any a b a t e m e n t  b e  t i e d  t o  e m p l o y m e n t  l eve l s .  
Finally, Young assured a l l  concerned t h a t  t h e  absence of any wri t ten  commi tment  t o  
build would in no way adversely a f f e c t  t h e  eventual  outcome. In fac t ,  GM was doing 
t h e  c i t y  a favor  in building the  plant in De t ro i t  (16 April 1980:Bl). 
The Council granted t h e  abatement ,  with t h e  only const ra int  on  GM t h a t  t h e y  
b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  c r e a t e  no  fewer than 3,000 jobs within 4 years. After  tha t  even t s  
move quickly. On May lst, t h e  p r e p a r d  site is sold  t o  GM f o r  t h e  a g r e e d  u p o n  
amount.  J u s t  prior t o  t h e  sale,  t h e  c i t y  announced t h a t  t h e  CIP had been designated 
as a "fax increment  financing distr ict" in which a l l  t ax  revenues a r e  r e m o v e d  f r o m  
t h e  general  fund and earmarked for  specif ic  purposes. In this case they a r e  al l  t o  g o  
t o  repayment  of over  $200 million t h e  c i t y  spen t  on t h e  project. Consequently t h e r e  
would b e  no d i rec t  revenue t o  t h e  Ci ty  of De t ro i t  fo r  between 15 and 20 years  (30 
April 1981:Bl). Af te r  having talked a l l  along abou t  i t s  $40 billion world wide cap i ta l  
expenditure program (with a t  leas t  $10 billion t o  b e  spent  in t h e  S t a t e  of Michigan), 
GM announces t h a t  t h e  changing economic c l i m a t e  requires i t  review al l  i t s  spending 
plans (17 May 1981:H1), although research and investment in robotics and automat ion 
will continue. In response t o  cri t icism t h a t  t h e  whole project  proceeded without GM's 
b ind ing  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  bui ld  a plant,  Young s ta ted  t h a t  "if we waited for a l l  t h e  
silly guarantees ,  nothing would g e t  built (31 May 1981:B8).I1 Yet,  in spi te  of Young's 
assurances,  t h e  papers repor t  on November 3rd t h a t  GM will delay completion of its 
plant for  at l eas t  a year,  hoping t o  g e t  it on line fo r  t h e  1985 production cars. 
T h e  e n t i r e  p r o c e s s  w a s  c o n s t r a i n e d  by t w o  GM deadlines -- an  October  1st 
review of progress and a May 1 s t  possession of t h e  site. In t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  n o  
c lea r  commi tment  t o  build made a l l  t h e  urgency a risky proposition. By s teadfas t ly  
maintaining control  over t h e  two  c r i t i ca l  issues, t h e  decision t o  close and t h e  decision 
t o  build, GM set t h e  s t age  fo r  a l l  t h a t  transpired between them. 
Summary 
L i t t l e  sense can be  made f rom t h e  course  even t s  when trying t o  f i t  i t  in to  t h e  
framework of a pluralist account  of decision making. The Ci ty  Council rarely a c t e d  
as more than  a post  hoc approval body for ac t ions  carr ied o u t  long before. Pluralists  
may a rgue  t h a t  in t h e  case of Detroit ,  t h e  c i t y  government and t h e  Mayor acts on 
behalf of a l l  t h e  people. And y e t ,  how c a n  w e  e x p l a i n  w h a t  on ly  a m o u n t s  t o  a 
stubborn determination t o  t rus t  t h a t  t h e  ou tcome will b e  in t h e  city's in teres ts  when 
t h e r e  is no careful  analysis of t h e  impac t  of t h e  various al ternatives.  The f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  Mayor  w a s  s e r i o u s l y  considering building t h e  plant as well indicates t h a t  l i t t l e  
thought was  given t o  t h e  final cos t  t o  t h e  c i ty ,  especially in light of t h e  Mayor's own 
pronouncements t h a t  t h e  whole project  was no t  likely t o  c r e a t e  new jobs. Clearly it 
is in t h e  city's in teres ts  t o  maintain both t h e  jobs and t h e  t a x  b a s e  t h e  GM p l a n t  
r e p r e s e n t s .  B u t  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  ways of warming t h e  house o ther  than se t t ing  it 
ablaze.  
T h e  r e f o r m i s t  n o t i o n  of c o n s t r a i n e d  a g e n d a  f o r m a t i o n  c l e a r l y  f i t s  w h a t  
transpired in Detroit.  T h e  c i t y  w a s  l i m i t e d  by i t s  a c c e p t a n c e  of GM's i m p l i c i t  
p o s i t i o n  t h a t  only t h e  company can  say what it will do with its existing plants and 
where i t  will build fu tu re  plants. All t h e  act ions  which followed reac ted  t o  t h e  need 
t o  p r o v i d e  a s i t e ,  and t h e  c o s t  and form of t h e  process became subjected t o  those  
needs. But t h e  reformist  account  fai ls  t o  explain t h e  role taken by Ci ty  government,  
and t h e  CEDD specifically, in advocating a course  of action.  The  c i ty  does not  have 
a tradit ional  in teres t  position t o  p r o m o t e  o r  m a i n t a i n .  How c a n  t h e  CEDD,  a n d  
M o t e n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  continue t o  act inspite of opposition t o  t h e  CIP, of ten forcing 
through a position or  course  of events,  without a l s o  h a v i n g  s o m e t h i n g  c o n c r e t e  t o  
g a i n ?  T h e  r e f o r m i s t  ana lys i s  does not  t a k e  in to  account  t h e  form of t h e  process. 
Theirs is simply a description of what  occurs,  not  a n  explanation of why it c a m e  t o  
pass in i t s  part icular form. 
In b o t h  of t h e s e  t w o  a p p r o a c h e s ,  e i t h e r  t h e  a r e n a  is unclear o r  t h e  a c t o r s  
cannot  b e  explained. Dunleavy's measure  of power has l imited meaning since i t  would 
b e  h a r d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  w h a t  f u r t h e r  e n d s  o f  t h e  c i t y  g o v e r n m e n t  a r e  served by 
controlling t h e  range of fu tu re  outcomes. Even r e e l e c t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  a p r o m i n a n t  
motivation for  th is  course  of action,  fo r  if i t  c a n  b e  shown t h a t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  o n  
the  c i t y  is negative, then e lec ted  officials  leave themselves vulnerable t o  a successful 
political c h a l l e n g e  a n d  a p p o i n t e e s  t o  r e p l a c e m e n t .  T o  m a k e  s e n s e  of a n  i s sue  
cen te red  approach t o  t h e  analysis of power, then we need t o  look more  carefully at 
t h e  role t h e  various a c t o r s  played in t h e  drama. 
A r a d i c a l  a n a l y s i s  p r o v i d e s  a b e t t e r  p l a t f o r m  from which t o  understand the  
o u t c o m e s  d e s c r i b e d  in  t h i s  a c c o u n t .  GM's m a i n  c o n c e r n  w a s  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  
production options, while t h e  c i t y  ac ted  in any way it f e l t  was  possible t o  p ro tec t  its 
base. The subjective in te res t s  of t h e  people of Detroi t  cen te red .  on t h e  idea  t h a t  t h e  
c i t y  c o u l d  n o t  "a f fo rd"  t o  lose t h e  GM plant. While this was in fact t rue ,  i t  also 
could not  af ford  t o  embark on t h e  path  choosen by t h e  Mayor and t h e  CEDD. P a r t  
of t h e  problem, as always, is information. But t h e  key is  in t h e  relationship between 
t h e  c i t y  government and GM. If t h e  City Council r e p r e s e n t e d  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c i t y ,  clearly GM and t h e  CEDD were  engaged in negotiat ions which 
excluded t h e  Council long before  t h e  June  24th announcement. How e l s e  c o u l d  t h e  
c i t y  h a v e  assembled  t h e  information regarding, f i rs t ,  t h e  available sites and second, 
t h e  desirability of Poletown specifically? 
If t h e  s e a r c h  i s  f o r  t h e  s o u r c e  of "power",  t h e n  w e  h a v e  t o  look t o  t h e  
relationships within society. Clearly t h e  only par ty  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e s e  e v e n t s  which 
maintained,  and even widened, its range of options was  GM. But  what  does it mean 
t h a t  GM has power? Is i t  in t h e  form of . the  P r e s i d e n t  o r  t h e  C h a i r m a n  of t h e  
Board  of t h e  C o m p a n y ,  o r  is it t h e  embodiment of a set of relationships within a 
society predicated on t h e  importance of property r e l a t i o n s h i p s  f i r s t  a n d  f o r e m o s t ?  
GM has  power because i t  controls  t h e  resources, and the  task of Ci ty  government is 
t o  provide a b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  n e e d s  of p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  t h e  p r o b l e m s  of t h e  
producers. If t h e  object ive  in te res t s  of t h e  people in t h e  c i t y  a r e  t o  have jobs and 
live reasonable and comfor table  lives, t h e  objective in te res t s  fo r  GM is t o  pe rpe tua te  
t h e  f o r m  of t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  relationships. T o  t h a t  end,  GM fur thered i t s  objective 
in teres ts ,  largely with t h e  help of Ci ty  government,  while t h e  various sectors  of t h e  
c i ty  saw the i r  in teres ts  fu r the r  eroded. 
T h e  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  h a s  shown t h a t  a p l u r a l i s t  a c c o u n t  of 
community poli t ics fa i ls  t o  mot ivate  an  understanding of t h e  even t s  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  
C e n t r a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P a r k  p ro jec t .  Their locus of poli t ical  decision making, the  Ci ty  
Council, is in r e a l i t y  l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  a r u b b e r  s t a m p  f o r  a c t i o n s  i n i t i a t e d  a n d  
d e c i d e d  upon  e l s e w h e r e  i n ' t h e  ci ty 's  adminis t ra t ive  s t ructure .  The reformist  view 
comes  closer t o  providing a n  understanding of t h e  even t s  around Poletown. But th is  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a p p e a r s  m o r e  as a p o s t  h o c  d e s c r i p t i o n  than a ca re fu l  analysis of 
power. If t h e  r e f o r m i s t  v i e w  h e l p s  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  f o r m  a n d  c o n t e n t  of p o w e r  
relationships in community politics, i t  s t i l l  fa i ls  t o  provide an  analysis of power a s  a 
process. This reconstruction points t o  t h e  need fo r  a n  analysis of community power 
based on a dynamic process of maximizing objective in te res t s  through t h e  relationship 
between t h e  local  government  and t h e  o w n e r s  of t h e  m e a n s  of p r o d u c t i o n ;  i s s u e s  
cannot  b e  analyzed one  at a t ime,  but need t o  b e  seen in t h e  con tex t  of a series of 
outcomes. The radical  p e r s p e c t i v e  p r o v i d e s  t h e  b e s t  f r a m e w o r k  f r o m  which t h e  
problem of community poli t ics c a n  begin t o  b e  addressed. 
A n  Inqu i ry  I n t o  B e n e f i t s  and Costs 
C r i t i c a l  f o r  a n d  under ly ing  t h e  p l u r a l i s t  model  of community politics is t h e  
assumption t h a t  t h e  project  generated benef i ts  fo r  t h e  community as a whole, and t o  
r e a l i z e  t h e s e  b e n e f i t s  s p e c i f i c  c o s t s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  project  had t o  b e  distributed. 
Reformis t  a n a l y s i s  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  as s t r o n g  a n  a s s u m p t i o n ,  b u t  would e x p e c t  
p o s i t i v e  n e t  b e n e f i t s  f o r  t h e  c i t y  a s  a whole if the re  is t o  b e  any action by t h e  
in teres ted part ies.  I t  is sufficient  t h a t  t h e  pa r t i e s  themselves have a n  expecta t ion of 
b e n e f i t s ,  b u t  t h e  a c t u a l  a c c r u a l  of b e n e f i t s  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  model of issue 
resolution presented by reform t h e o r i s t s .  T h e  r a d i c a l  a n a l y s i s  on ly  e x p e c t s  t h a t  
b e n e f i t s  wi l l  u l t i m a t e l y  flow t o  those  in con t ro l  of t h e  means of production. Any 
benef i t  calculation is a d i rec t  result  of a position improved upon o v e r  t i m e  by t h e  
p o w e r  h o l d e r .  T h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  a s e r i e s  o f  i s s u e s  improves t h e  possibilities for 
achieving those  benefits. This section will eva lua te  t h e  validity of t h e  b e n e f i t  a n d  
c o s t  c l a i m s  m a d e  in  evaluat ing t h e  worth and advisability of t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial 
Park project .  
Method of Analysis 
T o  ascer ta in  t h e  meri t  of t h e  proposed project ,  t h e  CEDD used a c rude  form of 
benefit-cost  analysis t o  compare  t h e  cos t  of t h e  project  with t h e  e x p e c t e d  r e v e n u e  
flow once t h e  plant is built (Detroit ,  1980e) and then made t h e  assessment t h a t  t h e  
project  was  wor thwi le  f o r  t h e  C i t y  o f  D e t r o i t .  B e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a l y s i s  o f  s o c i a l  
investment  projects usually a r e  applied when t h e r e  is public financing of some capi ta l  
project  which is t o  remain in t h e  public domain. Those projects  genera te  revenue fo r  
t h e  l o c a l i t y  u n d e r t a k i n g  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  a n d  these  revenues a r e  used t o  measure t h e  
re la t ive  mer i t  of  t h e  p r o j e c t .  Most  o f t e n ,  t h e r e  a r e  a n u m b e r  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  
available with l imited resources and t h e  analysis helps in t h e  process of selecting t h e  
bes t  project. Examples of th is  a r e  roadway expansion, wa te r  and sewage  t r e a t m e n t  
p r o j e c t s ,  p o r t  facil i ty development,  etc. whereby t h e  project  genera tes  tariffs ,  fees,  
tolls o r  o the r  charges  as a d i rec t  benefit .  In addition, t h e  project  will account  for  
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i n c r e a s e d  t a x  revenues both directly from t h e  income t a x  due  t o  a ne t  employment 
increase in t h e  community and indirectly f rom increased sa les  taxes ,  bus iness  t a x e s ,  
u s e  o f  f o r - f e e  se rv ices  (mass transit),  etc. The c o s t s  and benef i ts  of the  proposed 
project  a r e  summed over  t h e  l ife of t h e  project  and a calculation is made .  If t h e  
p r o j e c t  h a s  a f i n i t e  l i f e  (e.g., a w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t  w i t h  a known e f fec t ive  
utilization life), then t h e  project  is measured for  its n e t  social  benef i t  compared with 
o ther  projects  competing for  l imited public cap i ta l  expendi ture  funds. If t h e  project  
has a n  indeterminate  life, then a ser ies  of possible c r i t e r i a  c a n  b e  used ranging f rom 
arbitrari ly cu t t ing  off t h e  projected revenue flow at  some point in t i m e  t o  calculating 
n e t  average r a t e s  of return on t h e  project  (or similarly in te rna l  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  o n  
t h e  investment possibilities) and then comparing t h e  a l t e rna t ive  projects (see Appendix 
Costs can e i the r  b e  cap i ta l  outlays o r  operating expenses. The former  re fe r s  t o  
t h e  ac tua l  expenditure on plant and equipment, t h e  l a t t e r  on t h e  c o n t i n u e d  c o s t  of 
operation. For convenience, these  a r e  o f ten  combined over  t h e  period of evaluation. 
Usually c o s t s  t e n d  t o  b e  high in  c u r r e n t  p e r i o d s  a n d  d e c l i n e  rap id ly  o v e r t i m e .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  b e n e f i t s  r e f e r  t o  b o t h  d i r e c t  benef i ts  col lected by and indirect  benefits  
a t t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  project .  These tend t o  b e  low at t h e  ea r ly  s t ages  of t h e  project  
and rise over t ime. To make a meaningful comparison at a given point in t ime,  both 
t h e  benef i t  and cos t  s t r e a m s  a r e  discounted at some "social discount rate1' t o  arr ive  
a t  a p r e s e n t  v a l u e  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  Th i s  m e t h o d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  can be  used in t h e  
determinat ion of r a t e  s t ructures  of public projects  as various proposed r a t e s  genera te  
d i f f e r e n t  r e v e n u e  s t r e a m s  (making appropriate assumptions about  market  prices and 
demand elastici t ies)  t o  see what  m i n i m u m  r a t e  is n e c e s s a r y  t o  g u a r e n t e e  a non-  
negative n e t  present  value of t h e  project. Likewise, one  c a n  calcula te  internal  r a t e s  
of re turn  by se t t ing  t h e  to ta l  b e n e f i t  a n d  c o s t  s t r e a m s  e q u a l  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  a n d  
determining what  t h e  discount r a t e  would have t o  be. 
Any b e n e f i t - c o s t  c a l c u l a t i o n  v a r i a n t  m a k e s  s o m e  i m p l i c i t  a n d  e x p l i c i t  
a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  problem.  The most obvious is t h a t  a l l  relevent benef i t  and 
cos t s  a r e  both understood and obtainable (cf., Fischoff, 1977; Haveman and Weisbrod, 
1975). Clearly t h e  omission of significant cos t s  or  benef i ts  will ul t imately dis tor t  t h e  
assessment.  Secondly, if a l l  t h e  benef i ts  and cos t s  a r e  simply summed t o  determine 
t h e  t o t a l  net  benefits ,  then these  a r e  implicitly given equal  weight in t h e  calculation 
(weights fo r  d i f ferent  components sum t o  one, so equal  w e i g h t  m e a n s  0.5 f o r  e a c h  
community type,  cf., Hett ich,  1976). For  example,  if t h e  construction of a highway 
branch through a low income neighborhood results  in cos t s  t o  t h e  neigborhood which 
a r e  l e s s  t h e n  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  executives living in weal thier  suburbs whose lives 
a r e  made  eas ier  by t h e  shor ter  route,  a n d  t h e  p r o j e c t  r e p a y s  i t s e l f  t h r o u g h  t o l l s  
c o l l e c t e d  a n d  o t h e r  d i r e c t  a n d  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s ,  then simply adding t h e  cos t s  and 
benef i ts  would result  in approving t h e  project. If, on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w e  d e c i d e d  
t h a t  each  c o s t  o r  benefit  t o  a low income community was t o  have g rea te r  weight in 
t h e  calculation (i.e., 0.25 for u p p e r  i n c o m e  c o s t s  o r  b e n e f i t s  a n d  0.75 f o r  l o w e r  
income c o s t s  and benefits), d i f ferent  result  may b e  generated.  
T h i s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  l a s t  m a j o r  a s s u m p t i o n .  S o c i a l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  is 
predicated on t h e  abil i ty of t h e  analyst  t o  ca lcu la te  t h e  n e t  social benefit  (assuming 
t h e r e  is one) and then compute  t h e  consumer surplus associated with t h a t  benefit.  In 
t h e  example  above,  how much of a toll would t h e  execut ive  b e  willing t o  pay before  
he fee l s  t h e r e  is no gain t o  him f rom t h e  proposed highway? This would represent  
t h e  s o c i a l  s u r p l u s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  p r o j e c t .  In s o c i a l '  cos t -benef i t  analysis the  
assumption is made t h a t  th is  surplus will and c a n  b e  used t o  o f f se t  t h e  costs. Again, 
in  t h e  e x a m p l e  a b o v e ,  if a l l  (o r  a s u f f i c i e n t  amount) of t h e  tolls  collected were  
reinvested in t h e  lower income neighborhood in t h e  form of increased services, b e t t e r  
f a c i l i t i e s  o r  e v e n  d i rec t  t ransfer  payments,  then conceivably t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  may b e  
t h a t  both communities benefit.  But in reali ty,  t h e r e  a r e  political, administrat ive and 
t e m p o r a l  p r o b l e m s  assoc ia ted  with th is  t ransfer  -- benef i ts  don't c o m e  in t h e  s a m e  
period as t h e  costs,  bureaucracies can' t  b e  set up t o  handle t h e  necessa ry  t r a n s f e r s  
a n d  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  m a y  r e q u i r e  a d i f f e r e n t  r e f e r e n d u m  f r o m  t h e  public at large. 
Without some weighting scheme t o  account  fo r  these  differences,  cost-benefit analysis 
may genera te  misinformation as of ten  as information regarding t h e  desirability of one 
or  another  of t h e  projects  in question (Graaff ,  1975). 
In con t ras t  t o  t h e  discussion above,  t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial Park  project  is n o t  a 
"public" p r o j e c t  d i r e c t l y  p rov id ing  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n s u m p t i o n  g o o d s  (e .g  ., w a t e r  
purification) with t h e  investment of public funds, but  r a the r  it is designed t o  promote  
t h e  pr ivate  use of a facil i ty with t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  directly measurable 
"public" b e n e f i t s  t o  a c c r u e  as a result.  One obvious di f ference,  then,  i s  t h a t  t h e  
public sec to r  has l i t t l e  if any control  of t h e  project  once t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  h a s  b e e n  
m a d e  ( in  t h i s  case o n c e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  is t ransfered t o  GM). Benefits  a r e  at best  
e s t imates  of expected re turns  cont igent  on m a n y  m o r e  f a c t o r s  t h a n ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
a c c u r a t e  calculations of demand e las t ic i t ies  fo r  public service  r a t e  structures.  
The f i rs t  problem c i t e d  above, ca re fu l  and meaningful  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  
a n d  c o s t s ,  b e c o m e s  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  s i n c e  t h e  benef i t  s t r e a m  is not  directly under 
"public" control. Secondly, weighting schemes  must  b e  more  expl ic i t ly  s t a t e d .  B u t  
a g a i n ,  a p r i v a t e  provider will be  under less d i rec t  control  by t h e  "public" sec to r  so 
t h a t  desired redistr ibutive goals may not  t r a n s l a t e  as a c t u a l  po l i cy  (e.g., a p u b l i c  
c o m m i t m e n t  t o  hire minorities or  economically disadvantaged may be  disregarded or  
diluted according t o  overall  co rpora te  employment needs). Finally, t h e r e  is virtually 
no control  over  any  "consumer surplus" if it a l l  acc rues  t o  t h e  pr ivate  f irm, or at t h e  
leas t  is under t h a t  firm's explici t  control .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n e  o b j e c t i v e  r e f l e c t i n g  
distributional concerns  can  be  t h a t  new c a r s  manufactured in t h e  plant  be  targeted t o  
- 
low income consumers -- i.e., build cheap sub-compact c a r s  -- as is o f t e n  d o n e  in 
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  t h e  new plant is a joint public-private venture. In t h e  
cur ren t  si tuation,  CM may begin with th is  as a s t a t e d  p o l i c y ,  b u t  c a n  c h a n g e  i t s  
o u t p u t  l i n e  t o  a more  profi table model without "public" approval and with changing 
social consequences. Any consumer surplus originally redistr ibuted may be  lost, and a 
calculation dependent upon this redistribution will no longer b e  valid. 
. Each of t h e  t h r e e  sets of theories outl ine t h e  pa ramete rs  f o r  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  
vis-a-vis t h e  distribution of cos t s  and benef i ts  t o  various identif iable in teres ts  within 
t h e  poli t ical  arena.  I t  is not  unreasonable t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  o n e  set of t h e o r i e s  m a y  
opera te  as t h e  basis fo r  policy s t a t e m e n t s  regarding t h e  intended distribution of costs  
and benefits ,  but  t h a t  another  shed light on t h e  a c t u a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o b t a i n e d .  T h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  c o m p a r i s o n  wi l l  p r o v i d e  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  a eva lua t ing  t h e  predicted 
distribution of benef i ts  and cos t s  derived f r o m  e a c h  of t h e  t h e o r i e s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
which o f fe r s  a. b e t t e r  understanding of t h e  a c t u a l  mechanism involved. 
Variables and Measurement 
S o c i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  t a k e s  t h e  f o r m  of s o c i a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  ca lcu la t ions  which 
measure t h e  n e t  income s t r e a m s  of part icular programs o r  projects  against  t h e  initial 
o u t l a y  f o r  t h a t  p r o j e c t  i n  t h e  f o r m  of d i r e c t  a n d  i n d i r e c t  expenses, or  forgone 
revenues f rom o ther  possible uses of available monies. In th is  situation, the re  a r e  no 
readily available a l ternat ives  t o  t h e  project  with which t o  make  a comparison. T h e  
on ly  a l t e r n a t i v e s  p r e s e n t e d  a r e  t h e  poss ib le  s i t e s  for  t h e  project ,  or  whether t h e  
p r o j e c t  shou ld  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  a t  a l l .  W h a t  f o l l o w s  is a l i s t  of  t h e  v a r i o u s  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which  m a y  o r  m a y  n o t  e n t e r  into t h e  calculation depending on t h e  
objectives of t h e  analyst. The range of f a c t o r s  t o  consider is contrained by t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  h a s  no  c o n r o l  o v e r  t h e  end use. Many tradit ional  considerations 
(e.g., t h e  f o r m  a n d  i m p a c t  of t h e  o u t p u t )  d o  n o t  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  
c a l c u l a t i o n .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  on ly  t h o s e  f a c t o r s  which have a d i rec t  bearing on t h e  
project ,  and benef i ts  which a r e  used t o  justify t h e  costs,  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  d i scuss ion .  
E a c h  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  will be  considered in n e t  form (i.e., cos t s  and benefits  will be  
added together)  so  t h a t  negative benefits  a r e  n o t h i n g  m o r e  t h a n  t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  
f a c t o r  outweighing t h e  benefits. 
A. Di rec t  Benefits  
- E m p l o y m e n t :  T h e  p roposed  p r o j e c t  will potential ly genera te  new jobs and 
maintain jobs exist ing at t h e  p l a n t s  t o  b e  p h a s e d  o u t .  T h e s e  m u s t  b e  m e a s u r e d  
against  t h e  cur ren t  level  of employment exist ing in t h e  community. For t h e  purposes 
of d i rec t  benef i ts  a t t r ibutable  t o  t h e  project ,  t h e  n e t  increase  in revenues t o  t h e  c i t y  
d u e  t o  t h e  addi t ional  employment will be  calcula ted (this t akes  the  form of income 
tax paid on earned income). In addition, t h e r e  will b e  some shor t  t e r m  increase in 
e m p l o y m e n t  d u e  t o  plant construction. Presumably these  should be positive for  t h e  
project  as a whole. 
- T a x e s :  Th is  wi l l  consist of a l l  t a x  revenues o ther  than income taxes  which 
t h e  c i t y  will r e c e i v e  a n d  l o s e  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  p r o j e c t .  T h e s e  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  
p r o p e r t y  t a x e s  a c c r u i n g  f r o m  t h e  n e w  p l a n t  a n d  t a x  revenues lost from existing 
s t ruc tu res  paying taxes. In addition, t h e  s h a r e  of S t a t e  t axes  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  c i t y  
will r ise as t h e  S t a t e  receives more t a x  revenues f rom t h e  project. Presumably this 
f igure should b e  positive for  t h e  project  overall.  
- P r o j e c t  S i t e :  T h e  c o s t  of a c q u i s i t i o n  a n d  preparation of t h e  s i t e  will b e  
o f f se t  by monies generated by t h e  sa le  of t h e  site t o  CM. This will be  negative fo r  
t h e  project .  
- R e l o c a t i o n :  E a c h  of t h e  ex i s t ing  occupants  and businesses in t h e  site will 
have t o  b e  relocated.  The relocation cos t s  will b e  o f f se t  by any g ran t s  available fo r  
t h a t  purpose. This f igure will be  negative f o r  t h e  project .  
- Financing: The  project  will require p r iva te  and governmental  loans on t h e  p a r t  
o f  D e t r o i t  which  w i l l  i n v o l v e  in te res t  r epayment  over  t h e  t e r m  of t h e  loan. This 
may b e  o f f se t  by g ran t s  for  t h e  in te res t  payments. I t  i s  u n c l e a r  w h a t  s ign t h e s e  
benf i t s  will have. 
B. Indirect  Benefits  
- E m p l o y m e n t :  T h e  i n c r e a s e  in  s h o r t  a n d  long t e r m  employment will have 
income e f f e c t s  on local  merchants.  In addition, increased m a n u f a c t u r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  
will genera te  in termediate  good demand which will genera te  secondary employment in 
sec to rs  supplying t h e  project. This will result  in increased income tax  and sales t a x  
revenues f o r  t h e  c i t y  based on some multiplier e f f e c t  dependent upon t h e  proportion 
of income spent  in t h e  local  economy. This f igure  will be  adjusted for  lost income 
expedi ture  lost  due t o  lost employment. 
- T a x e s :  T h e  i n c r e a s e  in  i n c o m e  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  i m p r o v e m e n t  and  g r e a t e r  
uti l ization of local  housing stock,  increasing t h e  value of p r o p e r t y  a n d  t h e r e b y  t h e  
property t a x  rolls. This f igure  will b e  positive. 
C. Intangible Benefits: 
- C o m m u n i t i e s :  T h e r e  is l i t t l e  t h a t  c a n  b e  done t o  measure t h e  cos t  t o  t h e  
c i t y  of t h e  loss of a n  i m p o r t a n t  c u l t u r a l  c e n t e r  of t h e  c i t y ' s  Po l i sh  c o m m u n i t y .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  is h a r d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  c o s t s  o r  b e n e f i t s  a c c r u i n g  t o  o t h e r  
communit ies  which receive  t h e  re located businesses and families. 
- Taxes: I t  is hard, if not  a l together  impossible in this analysis, t o  measure t h e  
impac t  of businesses which may have been successful  prior t o  t h e  m o v e  b u t  c a n n o t  
withstand t h e  loss of continuity a move causes.  I t  is assumed t h a t  more businesses 
will fai l ,  o r  not reopen, a f t e r  t h e  move. This r e p r e s e n t s  a n e t  l o s s  t o  t h e  c i t y ' s  
revenue base. 
- Diverted Grants: Many of t h e  city's d i r e c t  cos t s  of t h e  project  will be  paid 
for  by divert ing existing (and mortgaging future)  g ran t s  f rom HUD and EDA designed 
t o  promote  community development. I t  is a lmos t  impossible t o  assess t h e  'loss t o  t h e  
c i t y  of p o t e n t i a l  i m p r o v e m e n t s  a n d  r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  which  t h e s e  g r a n t s  m a y  h a v e  
e f f e c t e d  at s o m e  f u t u r e  date.  I t  i s  an  implicit  assumption t h a t  revenues f rom t h e  
CIP will provide needed funds for community projects.  
- Business Community: I t  is hard t o  assess t h e  impact  t h e  project  would have 
if i t  did not occur. Clearly many s e c o n d a r y ,  s u p p l i e r  f i r m s  m a y  f a i l  d u e  t o  t h e  
continued erosion of t h e  manufacturing base  of t h e  local economy. 
Calculations 
T h e  a n a l y s i s  w a s  b a s e d  f i r s t  and fo remos t  on t h e  assumption t h a t  if t h e  c i t y  
fai led t o  act, GM would st i l l  build (or intend t o  build) i t s  p lant  elsewhere causing a 
l ike ly  l o s s  t o  D e t r o i t  of  jobs at  a t i m e  w h e n  it is  a l r e a d y  suffering f rom high 
unemployment rates. Information concerning t h e  genera l  l e v e l  of e m p l o y m e n t ,  t h e  
c o s t  o f  l iv ing ,  a n d  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  m e a s u r e s  f o r  t h e  Detroi t  a r e a  is provided in 
Appendix D. To calcula te  t h e  e f f e c t  of a )  t h e  depar ture  of GM f r o m  t h e  c i t y ,  b) 
t h e  loss of jobs in place on t h e  proposed s i t e  and c )  t h e  impac t  of various options, a 
number of assumptions had t o  b e  made or  accep ted .  The basis fo r  t h e  es t imat ion of 
t h e  e c o n o m i c  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  employment  was t h e  Environmental 
I m p a c t  S t a t e m e n t  (EIS) p r e p a r e d  by D e t r o i t ' s  C E D D .  F i g u r e s  c i t e d  o n  t h e  
r e s i d e n t i n o n - r e s i d e n t  distr ibution of various categor ies  of workers, t h e  t a x  r a t e  for  
residents (2%) and non-residents (.5%), t h e  t a x  base  f o r  both t h e  project  and existing 
s t r u c t u r e s  i n  P o l e t o w n  and  t h e  levels of employment  in various categor ies  of GM's 
options a r e  used. 
First ,  I considered t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  on employment if GM moved elsewhere. The 
c i ty  would lose many of t h e  jobs at t h e  Clark and Fisher p l a n t s  as t h e y  moved  t o  
t h e  new plant (probably not  t h e  s a m e  people, thus  adding t o  t h e  unemployment rolls), 
but  would re ta in  those  people working in t h e  Poletown area .  Furthermore,  it would 
n o t  b e  t o o  unreasonab le  t o  expec t  a high likelihood of t h e  backfill operation where 
GM uti l izes t h e  vacated a r e a s  of its Clark and  Fisher ( C / F )  p l a n t s  r e t u r n i n g  s o m e  
p o r t i o n  of t h e  l o s t  jobs, a l b e i t  a t  l o w e r  w a g e s  ( s e e  Appendix  E f o r  a l i s t  of  
a l t e rna t ive  outcomes). Table 4 summarizes  t h e  various employment si tuations for t h e  
project. The wors t  case would resul t  in a n e t  loss of 3800 jobs with a probable loss 
of only 1900 jobs. On t h e  other  hand, even if t h e  project  proceeds t h e r e  would st i l l  
b e  a n e t  loss  of 1 7 0 0  jobs  if GM d o e s  n o t  backfill i t s  C / F  facilities. Under t h e  
t h r e e  more  favorable situations, t h e  project  would n e t  200, 5 5 0  a n d  2550  n e w  jobs 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e s e  n e t  f igures  were  subsequently used t o  project  both d i rec t  and 
indirect  benef i ts  accruing t o  t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial Park project  (CIP) proposed by t h e  
city. In a l l  cases in which t h e  project  proceeds,  t h e  c i t y  will r eap  some shor t  run 
benef i ts  f rom t h e  site preparation a n d  p l a n t  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  T h e s e  p r o j e c t i o n s  a r e  
b a s e d  on  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h e  cons t ruc t ion  employment will c o m e  from the  Detroit  
area.  Table 5 provides a summary of t h e  economic gains identified with each of t h e  
various employment conditions separable in t h e  overall project .  
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about  he re  
Table 4. Employment Figures for Some Alternative Situations 
Site - Situation 
Pre-1980* No Action GM Plant: A GM Plant: B 
Clark/ Fisher 
Plant 7 ,500 3,700 3,700 3,700 







TOTAL 9,200 7,300 9,400 11,750 
* Figures fo; t he  ClarkfFisher plants from t h e  D e t r o i t  News, 6/24/80:Al; f o r  t h e  
employment level prior to  the  CIP the from Detroi t  Free Press, 7/18/82:Magizine/l9; 
for the  ClarkfFisher backfill with new functions and the  two GM shift f igures  f r o m  
the  City of Detroit ,  Environmental Impact Statement ,  1980:V-71. 
Table 5. Direct  Revenue Benefits from Employment and Property by Source 
YEAR 
Employment Source 1981 1982 - .  1983 1984 1985" 
ClarkIFisher: 
1. -Base employment 1100.6 1210.6 1331.7 1464.9 1611.3 
2. -Marginal 1130.6 1243.3 1025.7 752.2 827.4 
3. Poletown 561.0 617.1 678.8 746.7 821.4 
4. construct ion 861.1 1098.2 430.9 - - 
New GM Plant: 
5. -Base employment - - 459.6 991.1 1090.2 
6. -Second Shift - - 303.7 607.5 668.2 
Property Source 
7. ClarkeIFisher Plant 4291.7 4291.7 3218.8 2145.9 2145.9 
8. Poletown Properties 2750.1 2750.1 2750.1 2750.1 2750.1 
9. New GM Plant ** - - 4569.0 9137.9 9137.9 
* Each subsequent year for employment tax revenues a r e  projected a t  a 10% increase 
p e r  y e a r  f o r  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  p ro j ec t ;  property t ax  revenues a r e  projected a s  held 
constant for  t he  life of t he  project. 
** Projections based on a 12 year, 50% t ax  abatement  
NB: All figures a r e  in thousands 
Projections a r e  discussed in the  text.  
Source: Ci ty  of Detroit, Environmental Impact Statement ,  1980:V78-V81 
The projection for the  construction employment levels ,  and  r evenues  a c c r u i n g  
f r o m  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t a x e s ,  a r e  taken from the  €IS (Detroit, 1980e:V78-81). Each of 
t he  possible outcomes generates separate  calculations adding and subtracting different 
l i ne s  f r o m  Tab le s  5 and  6. I nd i r ec t  e f f ec t s  were more difficult t o  project. The 
Michigan S t a t e  Department of Commerce projected direct and indirect g ros s  e f f e c t s  
of t h e  "added" employment  at t h e  proposed GM facility (Detroit, 1980e:L4). From 
these calculations, I calculated t he  implicit mulitpliers used to  generate  these indirect 
effects.  Accordingly, each dollar of disposable income (Michigan Statist ical  Abstract 
reports t ha t  84% of income return t o  the  economy in one form or another) generates 
$2.61 of additional sales in the  surrounding community -- for an  implicit multiplier of 
2.61 -- and generates income and property tax revenues for the  local economy. The 
imp l i c i t  p rope r ty  t a x  i n c r e m e n t  i s  0.0501 and income tax increment is 0.0082 for 
each indirect dollar. The indirect e f fec t s  where subsequently calculated by taking the  
number of net jobs created by each alternative,  multiplying by the 1980 mean income 
of $16000 (rounding for ease of calculation), multiplying again by 2.61 and calculating 
the  indirect income, property and income taxes generated. 
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T h e  o t h e r  d i rec t  net benefits (in this case negative, i.e., costs) a r e  relocation, 
s i t e  p r e p a r a t i o n  and f inanc ing  c o s t s  t o  t h e  c i t y .  These  a r e  a l l  included,  and  
i t e m i z e d ,  in t h e  f i nanc i a l  plan for the  CIP (as outlined in Table 7). Some of the 
financing costs  a r e  accounted for within t h e  $300 million plus  budge t  by way of 
grants  set aside. This explains reduction t o  t h e  net figure of just under $200 million 
financing available t o  cover t he  project cos t s .  To be  c o m p l e t e ,  I would have  t o  
assess the  impact of diverting over $100 million in future and current grants t o  repay 
loans and count the full $300 million as the  cost  of the  project. I have placed this 
Table  6. Ne t  Indirect  Benefits  At t r ibutable  t o  Al ternat ive  Actions 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  
d i rec t  income 
indirect  income 
1. property t axes  
2. income taxes  
A c t i o n  A 
d i rec t  income 
indirect  income 
3. property taxes  
4. income taxes  
A c t i o n  B 
d i rec t  income 
indirect  income 
5. property taxes  
6. income taxes  
A c t i o n  C 
di rec t  income 
indirect  income 
7. property t axes  
8. income taxes  
A c t i o n  D 
d i rec t  income 
indirect  income 
9. property taxes  
10. income taxes  
A c t i o n  E 
d i rec t  income 
indirect  income 
11. property taxes  
12. income taxes  
A c t i o n  F 
d i rec t  income 
indirect  income 
13. property taxes  
14. income taxes  
A c t i o n  G 
di rec t  income 
indirect  income 
15. property t axes  
16. income taxes  
* Figures a r e  projected forward at a 10% a n n u a l  g r o w t h  r a t e  f o r  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  
project. All f igures a r e  in thousands of dollars. 
under t h e  heading of intangibles since t h e  original t a r g e t  of t h e  redirected funds was  
no t  made available t o  t h e  Ci ty  Council be fore  they approved t h e  redirection (Detroit  
News, 22-30 October  1980). Another example of t h e  f u t u r e  mortgaging of Community 
D e v e l o p m e n t  Block Gran t s  t o  pay for  cur ren t  loans appears  in t h e  ci ty 's  application 
and subsequent award of a n  additional $39.5 million l o a n  f r o m  H U D  u n d e r  S e c t i o n  
108. To repay th is  12% loan, t h e  c i ty  has t o  c o m m i t  over $24.5 million CDBCs over 
t h e  nex t  six years,  t o  b e  m a t c h e d  by t h e  s a m e  a m o u n t  f r o m  t h e  S t a t e  ( C i t y  of 
D e t r o i t ,  A p p l i c a t i o n  t o  HUD, 24 November 1980). Undoubtedly these  monies would 
have been earmarked fo r  o the r  projects in t h e  c i t y  t o  develop economically depressed 
c o m m u n i t i e s .  T h e r e  i s  n o  s i m p l e  c a l c u l a t i o n  which  can  "value" t h e  cos t  of this 
diversion. 
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T a b l e  8 p r e s e n t s  t h e  a c c u m u l a t e d  n e t  b e n e f i t s  u n d e r  v a r y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  
associated with t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial Project .  Fi rs t ,  t h e  s t r e a m  of ne t  benefits  were  
totaled over a twenty year  period t o  compare  it with t h e  level  of expenditure for t h e  
p r o j e c t  as p r o p o s e d  ($200 mill ion).  Then, this s t r e a m  of income was recalculated 
under t h r e e  d i f fe ren t  assumptions about  t h e  discount r a t e  over  time. I used a figure 
o f  6% to r e f l e c t  a "h i s to r ica l "  r e t u r n  o n  investments  over  t h e  pas t  two  decades. 
Next I used a 10% figure t o  ref lect  t h e  ci ty 's  own projections a b o u t  t h e  g r o w t h  of 
income and revenue in t h e  calculations they presented in the i r  EIS. Lastly, I applied 
a 12% figure t o  re f l ec t  higher d iscount  r a t e s  in  e f f e c t  a t  t h e  t i m e ,  a n d  a l s o  t o  
I 
r e f l e c t  a l i k e l y  s h i f t  i n  t h e  long run "historical" r a t e  over  t h e  nex t  two  decades. 
Clearly, these  figures provide a range within which t h e  t r u e  social discount r a t e  lies. 
T h e s e  f i g u r e s  w e r e  a l l  p resen ted  here  t o  o f fe r  a wide comparison from relaxed t o  
more  res t r ic t ive  assumptions. 
Table 7. Financial  Plan of t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial P ro jec t  
P ro jec t  Cos t s  
Acquisition of Land 
Relocation of Occupants  
Demolition of St ructures  
Road Preparat ion 
Rail  Preparation 
Other  S i t e  Preparation 
Professional Services 
TOTAL COST 199,700,000.00 
Pro jec t  Revenues 
HUD Section 108 Loan 
HUD UDAG 
ED A 
E P  A 
S t a t e  Road Funds 
S t a t e  Rail  Funds 
S t a t e  Land Bank Loan 
Urban Mass Trans. Admin. 
CDBG 
Other  Gran t s  and  Land Sale 
Funding Sources Total  
Less Funds f o r  Repayment  of Loans 
TOTAL FINANCING 
Source: C i ty  of Detroit ,  Cen t ra l  Industrial Park Pro jec t  Plan, C o m m u n i t y  E c o n o m i c  
Development Corporation,  September 30, 1980, p. 11. 
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T h e  i n t a n g i b l e  f a c t o r s  a r e  hardest  t o  account  for. One merchant,  claiming it 
took him 20 years  t o  build up his business only t o  have t h e  c i ty  o f f e r  h i m  $50,000 
filed sui t  for  irreparable damages resulting form t h e  forced dislocation (Detroit  News, 
12 Nov 1980:BDW8). On t h e  other  hand, many businesses and residents welcomed t h e  
opportunity t o  sell the i r  property o r  business, o r  b e  re located with some recompense, 
since they f e l t  t h e  community was a l ready dying and they  h a d  n o  o t h e r  c h a n c e  t o  
leave (see  for  example,  Detroi t  News: 2 Sep t  1980; 17 Feb 1981; 14 Mar 1981). To 
them,  t h e  proposed project  w a s  a n  un looked  f o r  b e n e f i t .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  a b o v e  of 
indirect  benef i ts  measures t h e  probable impac t  of added income on businesses in t h e  
overall  c o m m u n i t y  (of D e t r o i t ) .  I t  would b e  i m p o s s i b l e ,  w i t h o u t  a bus iness  by 
b u s i n e s s  s u r v e y ,  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  t a x  e f f e c t  of a business clsoing e i ther  because it 
failed a f t e r  relocation, it decided t o  c lose  ra the r  than move,. o r  some other  business 
f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  a r e l o c a t e d  business enter ing its community undermined i t s  marginal 
existence.  
Finally, how can one "measure" t h e  impac t  of a community's disruption, even if 
it was  on shaky economic grounds, when some c o r e  of it was  viable? Many of t h e  
people in t h e  Poletown a r e a  were  re t i r ees  who had spent  virtually thei r  ent i re  lives 
in t h e  community. Their fr iends and neighbors were  lifelong; o f ten  th ree  generations 
of t h e  s a m e  family lived within moments  of each  other.  No neighborhood is without 
s o m e  e l e m e n t  of c o n t i n u i t y ,  a n d  e v e r y  c i t y  h a s  t o  m a k e  h a r d  c h o i c e s .  I t  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e ,  if t h e  c h o i c e s  a r e  made  on c o s t  e f fec t ive  cr i ter ia ,  t o  assess accurate ly  
t h e  "cost" of this disruption, or  of t h e  potent ia l  disruption in t h e  receiving community 
if many of t h e  t h e  residents move toge ther  t o  maintain thei r  cohesive relationships. 
T h e  c o m m u n i t y  h a s  t o  we igh  t h e s e  c o n c e r n s  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e r n s  o f  a d d e d ,  o r  
Table 8. Value of t h e  Total Stream of Benefits and Cost 
Present Present Present 
Total Value Value Value 
Outcome * (raw data)  (d=0.06) (d=O. 10) .(d=O. 12) 
* See economic benefit calculation list. 
All figues a r e  in thousands of dollars. 
Project life of 20 years 
maintained,  levels of employment and t h e  t h e  poss ib le  h u m a n  "cost1' of  long t e r m  
u n e m p l o y m e n t .  D i v e r t e d  CDBGs a n d  UDAGs could have been used t o  res tore  t h e  
housing s tock,  encourage local  business pat ronage w i t h  c o m  m u n i t y  bus iness  d i s t r i c t  
r e s t o r a t i o n s  o r  o t h e r w i s e  i m p r o v e d  t h e  q u a l i t y  of s e r v i c e s  a n d  l i f e  in a given 
community. These  counter  f a c t u a l  e v e n t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c a n n o t  b e  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  
i m m e d i a t e  c o s t  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  benefit  of a project  like t h e  CIP. If these  a r e  rea l  
concerns,  then qu i te  possibly cos t  e f fec t ive  methods  wi l l  n e v e r  b e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
tools for  assessment.  
In terpreta t ion of Resul ts  
T h e  C E D D  p r o j e c t e d  t h e  t o t a l  n e t  c o s t  of t h e  project  t o  b e  $199.7 million, 
including t h e  revenue f rom t h e  sa le  of t h e  developed s i t e  t o  GM. The c i ty  reported 
t h a t  GM would " p u r c h a s e  ( t h e )  3 3 5  ac res ,  at $18,000 a n  ac re ,  from Detroit  for a 
t o t a l  of $6,830,000 (Detroi t  News, 11 O c t  1980:Al)," -- although it should b e  n o t e d  
t h a t  multiplying t h e  figures yields only $6,030,000. Adding t h e  s t r e a m  of net  benefits  
presented,  t h e  CEDD ult imately concludes t h a t  t h e  project  wi l l  y i e l d  $228 t o  $305  
mi l l ion  o v e r  t h e  t w e n t y  y e a r s  i n  d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  and another  approximately $191 
million in indirect  benef i ts  (Detroit ,  1980e:V82-V83). Consequently, t h e  CEDD states 
t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  is profi table t o  t h e  c i t y  and warrants  t h e  investment of over $300 
million in g ran t s  and loans. This c o s t  should b e  increased by another  $34 million in 
UDAGs which  h a v e n ' t  b e e n  g r a n t e d ,  b u t  which  h a v e  b e e n  a l ready  commit ted t o  
repaying p a r t  of t h e  HUD loans, raising t h e  t o t a l  "social" c o s t  of t h e  project  t o  $335 
million. This resembles t h e  es t imates  of n e t  benef i ts  under a l ternat ives  D, E and F 
in Table 8, but t h e  ci ty 's  e s t imates  a r e  in undiscounted dollars. Even a conservative 
discount r a t e  of only 6% lowers t h e  ne t  benef i t  s t r eams  of a l l  bu t  a l ternat ive  F ( t h e  
most  opt imis t ic  one) t o  levels below t h e  init ial  o u t l a y  of a l m o s t  $200 mil l ion.  A 
discount r a t e  of 10% makes  t h e  project  only marginally worthwhile, while a discount 
r a t e  of 12% makes  a l l  t h e  a l ternat ives  unreasonable agains t  t h e  initial investment. 
The no act ion a l ternat ive  (A) would result  in a long t e r m  l o s s  t o  t h e  C i t y  of 
D e t r o i t ,  a n d  e v e n  t h e  b e n e f i t  s t r e a m  f r o m  t h e  p r o j e c t  s t a l l i n g  in  m i d s t r e a m  
(a l ternat ive  G) seems  more  a t t ract ive .  I t  should b e  n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  w e  s t i l l  
n e e d  t o  a d d  t h e  i n i t i a l  $199 mil l ion o u t l a y  t o  t h e  overa l l  c o s t  of a l ternat ive  G 
yielding a minumum n e t  loss of over $225 million. In light of this, no act ion would 
st i l l  b e  b e t t e r  than a project  which, once in t i ta ted,  eventually goes awry. I t  would 
appear  f r o m  t h e s e  projections t h a t  t h e  CIP was not  a project  well designed t o  m e e t  
t h e  needs  of t h e  ci ty.  One of t h e  city's s t a t e d  goals was t o  develop a c lea r  plan t o  
hire t h e  unemployed, and t o  commi t  25% of t h e  new jobs c r e a t e d  by any project  t o  
C E T A  e l i g i b l e  u n e m p l o y e d  w o r k e r s  ( C i t y  o f  D e t r o i t ,  1981a) .  A s  c o n c e i v e d ,  
employment levels would not g o  up a s  a result  of th is  project .  A t  bes t  t h e  workers 
los ing  jobs  d u e  t o  t h e  reduction of t h e  Clark and Fisher plant  operations would b e  
able  t o  find a l t e rna t ive  employment ,  b u t  m a n y  p e o p l e  c u r r e n t l y  e m p l o y e d  i n  t h e  
Poletown a r e a  would no longer have thei r  jobs. With t h e  high r a t e  of unemployment 
in t h e  c i ty ,  it is unlikely they would easily find o ther  work, t h e r e b y  a d d i n g  t o  t h e  
c i t y ' s  p r o b l e m s .  But inaction was also no t  a n  option, assuming t h a t  GM would st i l l  
choose t o  reduce i t s  operations and move t o  more  modern f a c i l i t i e s  e l s e w h e r e .  A 
GM s p o k e s p e r s o n  r e p o r t e d l y  s a i d  t h a t  GM would r a t h e r  renovate  than g o  t o  t h e  
trouble of moving, if it weren't fo r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t a x  laws and incentives made it 
m o r e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  a d v a n t a g e o u s  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a b r a n d  n e w  f a c i l i t y  r a t h e r  than 
renovate  a n  old one (Detroit  News, 28 June  1980:Al). How was t h e  decision made,  
i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  n e t  benef i t  figures, t o  in i t ia te  t h e  CIP? The only conditions under 
which t h e  project  made sense were  t h a t  GM would build its plant, have two  shif ts  on 
l i n e  in  t h e  v e r y  n e a r  future  and backfill operations at t h e  Clark and Fisher plants. 
Nowhere  in t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  a p p l y i n g  f o r  f u n d s ,  h o w e v e r ,  d o e s  t h e  c i t y  p r o p o s e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  c o n s t r a i n t s  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  n e t  benef i t s  before  t h e  project  is actually 
undertaken. 
T h e  o r i g i n a l  p u r p o s e  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  w a s  t o  t ry ,  through t h e  assignment of 
benef i ts  and costs,  t o  ascer ta in  which underlying in te res t s  were  cen t ra l  t o  a project  
of t h i s  n a t u r e .  Under  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  it appears  t h a t  the re  a r e  no conditions 
u n d e r  which  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o j e c t  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  n e e d s  of t h e  c i t y  ( w i t h  t h e  
e x c e p t i o n  o f  a v e r y  u n r e a s o n a b l e  o p t i m i s t i c  s i t u a t i o n ,  g i v e n  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  
economy at t h e  t i m e  of t h e  project). Something needed t o  b e  done, as indicated by 
t h e  long range projection of losses. But t h e  urgency ar ises  because t h e  ground rules 
calling for  action,  CM's decision t o  move, were  d e t e r m i n e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  "po l i t i ca l "  
arena.  A pluralist assumes tha t ,  facing a part icular problem, t h e  collective in teres t  
of t h e  community wi l l  b e  a d d r e s s e d  w i t h i n  t h e  C i t y  Counc i l .  In t h i s  e x a m p l e ,  
however, t h e  , Council decision focused on se lect ing t h e  leas t  c o s t  option, r a the r  than 
t h a t  which maximized t h e  benef i ts  t o  t h e  c i ty  (mathemat ical ly  t h e  s a m e  concept,  bu t  
g e n e r a t i n g  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  consequences). All which remains t o  b e  discussed, within 
t h e  framework of a pluralist analysis, is t h e  distr ibution of t h e  costs. Benefits  in t h e  
GM p l a n t  l o c a t i o n  decision clearly flow elsewhere.  Even t h e  question of equity or  
in te res t  cannot  be addressed, since t h e  distr ibution of cos t s  remains obscured -- t h e  
cos t  t o  Poletown is obvious, but  t h e  cos t  t o  o ther  communities v ia  diverted g ran t s  t o  
pay fo r  t h e  project  remains t o  b e  seen. A sea rch  for  a working definition of power 
c o m e s  u p  s h o r t  s i n c e  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r y  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  r emained  outside t h e  over t  
poli t ical  arena.  
The reformist  analysis of power looks t o  external ,  e l i t e  s t r a t u m  machinations t o  
explain t h e  application of power through some distribution of cos t s  and benefits. If 
GM were  not  ab le  to move elsewhere o r  found renovation of t h e  plant economically 
beneficial ,  then t h e  a rena  would b e  defined differently.  Of concern t o  reformis ts  i s  
t h e  question of how GMts options constrained those  of t h e  Ci ty  Council and exercised 
control  over t h e  poli t ical  agenda. Set t ing as ide  t h e  cos t  t o  De t ro i t  for  t h e  moment,  
t h e  on ly  p a r t y  t o  g a i n  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  GM. For l i t t l e  more  t h e  $6 million 
dollars, GM has  been able  t o  acquire a s i t e  in t h e  cen te r  of a major (albeit  declining) 
industrial ci ty.  Had GM been required t o  t r y  t o  assemble this package on t h e  
market ,  it is unlikely it would have been forthcoming (witnesss t h e  opposition of t h e  
P o l e t o w n  Neighborhood  Counc i l ,  a s m a l l  b u t  a d a m a n t  portion of t h e  community). 
Apar t  f rom t h e  added cos t s  due t o  a )  higher pr ices  for  t h e  lo t s  as a result  of rising 
m a r k e t  d e m a n d  a n d  l a n d  s p e c u l a t i n g  and b) a c t u a l  site demolition and preparation 
costs,  GM would have had t o  consider site plan alterations.  We can  on ly  s p e c u l a t e  
t h a t  GM would n o t  have undertaken this task,  preferring instead t o  move t o  a site 
similar t o  e i the r  i t s  Oklahoma Ci ty  o r  Orion p lan t s  (prototypes of t h e  p r o p o s e d  GM 
p l a n t  in  Poletown).  The Ci ty  of Detroi t  noted,  in detailing GM's site requirements, 
t h a t  t h e  plant design "is standard fo r  t h e  new generation of p lants  being developed by 
General  Motors in several  locations. To redesign fo r  only one location would probably 
result  if additional engineering cos t s  of more  t h a n  $13 mi l l ion  a n d  would i n c r e a s e  
o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s  ( C i t y  of D e t r o i t ,  1980a:8)." From t h e  s t a r t ,  GM's cos t s  were  an  
in tegral  but implicit const ra int  on t h e  project. By shifting t h e  question at hand f rom 
What c a n  we allow GM t o  do in t h e  Detroi t  a r e a ?  t o  What c a n  we do now t h a t  GM 
may leave? has, according t o  t h e  reformist  analysis, c o n c e d e d  t h e  o u t c o m e .  GMts  
economic in teres ts  have been safeguarded,  t h e  leas t  cos t  option is made available t o  
t h e  company, and t h e  c i t y  has  only t o  decide how i t  distr ibutes those  costs. To t h a t  
end t h e  influence of GM on t h e  scope of poli t ical  action guarantees  its interes ts  at 
t h e  onset. Those communi t i es  m o s t  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d ,  t h e  a c t u a l  site a n d  t h e  
communites  losing future  community based grants ,  have l i t t l e  t o  say about  e i the r  t h e  
' form o r  t h e  con ten t  of t h e  decision t o  build t h e  plant. 
In t h e  f i r s t  a n a l y s i s ,  p o w e r  w a s  s i m p l y  a m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  t h e  decision t o  
prepare  a site for  a n  eventual  GM plant in t h e  community  known as Poletown based 
on  a n  a n a l y s i s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  s i t e s  t o  determine which represented t h e  g rea tes t  ne t  
benef i t  t o  t h e  ci ty.  Pluralists  maintain t h a t  t h e  c i t y  made t h e  bes t  d e c i s i o n  u n d e r  
t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a n d  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  c o m m u n i t i e s  overall. Reformists, 
however, argue t h a t  power res ts  w i t h  GM s i n c e  "under  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s "  a r e  a 
b y p r o d u c t  of CM1s d e c i s i o n  t o  move.  A r a d i c a l  analysis ca l ls  both of these two  
interpreta t ions  in to  question, noting t h a t  both a r e  pos t  hoc descriptions of outcomes. 
N e i t h e r  a n a l y s i s  o f f e r s  a n y  ins igh t  i n t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  is r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  
outcome. Clearly t h e  Ci ty  of Detroi t  undertook a program aimed at addressing rea l  
p rob lems:  u n e m p l o y m e n t  , a shrinking t a x  base, a declining industrial  infrastructure.  
Similarly, CM a c t e d  t o  increase  i t s  profitability: why r e n o v a t e  a n  o l d e r  p r o d u c t i o n  
facil i ty when t h e  option of a newer, more  productive plant  is less costly in t h e  end? 
Tha t  a part icular communi ty ,  o r  g r o u p  of c o m m u n i t i e s  s u f f e r e d  f o r  t h e  poss ib le  
benefit  of t h e  others ,  o r  t h a t  GM managed t o  const ra in  t h e  range of political options 
t o  ensure its benefits ,  a r e  not  denied. Currently GM dominates  De t ro i t  politics (GM 
standing for  business in te res t s  in general), but  under a static understanding of power 
t h a t  can change. What is c r i t i ca l  t o  a radical  analysis is t h a t  t h e  o u t c o m e  in  t h e  
P o l e t o w n  d e c i s i o n  r e f l e c t s  GM1s abil i ty t o  ensure fu tu re  ou tcomes  in i t s  favor,  and 
t h a t  th is  power unfolds as a n  historical process. 
T h e  p e o p l e  o f  t h e  C i t y  of Detroi t  assumed a l l  t h e  expenses and took all  t h e  
risks. GM has  managed t o  maintain t h e  option of when and u n d e r  w h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  
t h e  p roposed  p l a n t  will b e  completed and t o  de te rmine  t h e  level  of employment at 
t h e  plant when it begins operating. The c i ty  was  f o r c e d  t o  d e c i d e  on  i t s  a c t i o n s  
w i t h o u t  l ink ing  t h e  a s s e m b l y  a n d  p r e p a r a t i o n  of a sui table  site t o  production and 
employment  levels. The process of t h e  whole project  po in ted  t o  t h e  c i t y  u t i l i z i n g  
"public" f u n d s  to advance t h e  range of options available in t h e  in teres t  of GM, and 
not  t o  t h e  city. T h e  d a t a  show t h a t  a c t i o n  w a s  c l e a r l y  n e c e s s a r y ,  b u t  f a i l  t o  
mot iva te  an  understanding of why t h a t  par t icular  course  of ac t ion emerged f rom t h e  
city 's  deliberations. 
Summary 
An a n a l y s i s  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  v a l i d a t e  t h e  mer i t  of one  approach t o  community 
power over  another  through a distribution of benef i ts  is hard pressed when t h e r e  a r e  
no  t a n g i b l e  b e n e f i t s  t o  b e  distr ibuted.  We cannot  even make t h e  assumption t h a t  
benef i ts  accrued t o  CM, although i t  would b e  s a f e  t o  say t h a t  at t h e  very leas t  they 
r e c e i v e d  a b a r g a i n  in  t h e  f o r m  of  land c lea red  of exist ing dwellings and prepared 
with roadworks and uti l i t ies for  l i t t le  more  than  $18,000 per  a c r e  -- but receiving a 
b a r g a i n  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m e a n  t h a t  GM e x e r t e d  i n f l u e n c e .  However ,  it is 
r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  C i t y  C o u n c i l  a c t e d  w i t h o u t  a d e q u a t e  o r  a c c u r a t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  and  t h a t  t h e  CEDC prepared a n  analysis of the  project 's mer i t  without 
considering a l l  t h e  relevant material. Fur thermore,  t h e  c o s t  of t h e  project  will have 
long t e r m  a f f e c t s  on  communi t i es  unable t o  draw on UDAGs and CDBGs for some 
t i m e  in to  t h e  fu tu re  as Detroit  repays loans and  fulfills obligations undertaken t o  see 
t h e  project  t o  completion. 
A benef i t  c o s t  analysis of this s o r t  suffers  f rom some of the  classic problems of 
n o t  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a l l  t h e  b e n e f i t s  a n d  c o s t s ,  a n d  o f  m a k i n g  v a g u e  
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  b e s t  of circumstances.  Even if t h e  project  
generated a positive present  value, t h e r e  was  nothing in t h e  planning documents which 
s p o k e  o f  t h e  m a n n e r  in  which  t h e s e  b e n e f i t s  w e r e  t o  b e  distr ibuted.  The only 
mention of benef i t  distribution besides t h e  general  c la ims t h a t  t h e  c i ty  economy will 
prosper is a s ta tement  t o  the  e f f ec t  t ha t  laid off au to  workers wil l  b e  r eca l l ed  t o  
work, and 25% of any new jobs will be  allocated for CETA eligible unemployed and 
poor people (Detroit, 1980a). What does emerge  a r e  complaints t h a t  t h e  i m p a c t  of 
t h e  funding  p roces s  has  n o t  been  adequately determined and tha t  the  ci ty  will be  
unable t o  collect tax revenues in any case  fo r  as long a s  i t  takes t o  repay the  loans 
incurred, with estimates of 15 t o  20 years (Detroit  News, 30 April 1981:Bl), removing 
any possibility t ha t  selected communit ies  may  b e  e a r m a r k e d  f o r  s o m e  of t h e  t a x  
revenue generated by the  CIP as compensation. 
It has been shown tha t  t h e  City of Detroit  would genera te  a pos i t ive  p r e s e n t  
va lue  of t h e  s t r e a m  of n e t  b e n e f i t s  from the Central  Industrial Park project only 
under t he  most restrictive assumptions. I t  is, therefore,  easy t o  dismiss the  pluralist 
c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  ou t come  was in the  best interest  of the majority as represented on 
the  City Council. There was no benefit, unless t he  City Council made the  best of a 
bad  s i t u a t i o n ,  and so in theory the  Council should not have acted. The city's best  
interests  lay in finding an a l t e r n a t i v e  p lan  wi th  m o r e  p romise  of bene f i t s ,  o r  in 
redefining the relationship between GM and the  city. The reformist claims a r e  more 
substantive, t o  wit t ha t  GM was able t o  control  t h e  agenda  f o r  discussion and t o  
l im i t  any  publ ic  discussion t o  only t h o s e  i t e m s  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  c o s t s  of s i t e  
preparation and the  eventual tax abatement.  The major flaw with this perspective is 
t ha t  i t  fails t o  provide more of an understanding of t he  outcome power relationships 
than a description of the  events. A description is not t he  same as an  analysis. The 
r a d i c a l  c o n c e r n  -for objective versus subjective interests a r e  difficult t o  evaluate in 
this situation. The most obvious answer is t h a t  monopoly capital, in t he  form of GM, 
dictated te rms  t o  labor, in all i t s  forms in the  city. But this simplification fails t o  
adequately address the  ques t i on  of power  as a process .  The conc luding  s e c t i o n  
assesses t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  of t h e s e  f ind ings  f o r  p lu ra l i s t  and reformist  models of 
community politics and power ,  and  o f f e r s  a n  app roach  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  a r a d i c a l  
perspective. 
CONCLUSION 
Any a n a l y s i s  o f  c o m m u n i t y  p o w e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  depends  upon t h e  underlying 
definit ion of both t h e  poli t ical  a rena  of d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  a n d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  
a c t o r s  in  t h a t  a r e n a .  Lukes '  t h r e e  d i m e n s i o n s  of p o w e r  d e t a i l s  a spectrum of 
i n t e r e s t s  a n d  i s s u e s  which  a r e  m o s t  n a r r o w l y  d e f i n e d  f o r  a p l u r a l i s t  a n a l y s i s  
( n e o c l a s s i c a l  l i b e r a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s ) ,  b r o a d e n  f o r  a r e f o r m i s t  analysis (antipluralist,  
s t ra t i f ica t ion theories), and finally a r e  broadest  f o r  a radical  analysis (marxist, c lass  
c o n f l i c t  t h e o r i e s ) .  T h e  r a d i c a l  analys is ,  however, depar t s  f rom t h e  others  in two  
c r i t i ca l  ways. Rooted in an  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  s o c i e t y  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  of t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  m e a n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h i s  approach t o  community power t r i e s  t o  
understand how poli t ical  outcomes reproduce those  social  relations. 
Fi rs t ,  t h e  l iberal  and reformist  analysis l imit  thei r  understanding of in teres t  t o  
subjective views defined by those  engaged in poli t ical  practice.  A radical  analysis, on 
t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  e x a m i n e s  b o t h  s u b j e c t i v e  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s .  I d e o l o g i c a l  
pract ices  may d i s to r t  subjective in teres t  so t h a t  shor t  t e r m  behavior may undermine 
long t e r m  (and shor t  t e rm)  gains. Broadly defined, ac t ions  consistent  with objective 
in teres ts  a r e  those  which expand t h e  range of possible o u t c o m e s .  In a n  e c o n o m i c  
s e n s e ,  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  in teres ts  of workers a r e  served by act ions  which increase thei r  
control  over  t h e  t e r m s  of production relations. S u b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  m a y  b e  m o r e  
n a r r o w l y  d e f i n e d  by g a i n s  in  w a g e s  and  condition of employment.  Subjective and 
objective in te res t s  d o  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  d i f f e r ,  b u t  a c t i n g  o n  t h e  f o r m e r  d o e s  n o t  
guaran tee  gains toward t h e  l a t t e r .  Therefore,  nonconflictual si tuations in a liberal o r  
reformist  a rena  (reflecting no differences in  s u b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s )  m a y  n o n e t h e l e s s  
involve power relationships within a radical  analysis. 
The second major depar ture  of a radical  analysis c e n t e r s  around t h e  boundaries 
of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a .  The reformist  definit ion of poli t ics differs f rom t h e  l iberal  
only in t h e  range of a c t o r s  in t h e  arena.  A l iberal  account  of community politics is 
l i m i t e d  t o  i n t e r a c t  ions  b e t  ween  legi t imate  representa t ives  of a l l  community groups 
within t h e  forum of local  government. Reformis ts  identify c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  which  d o  
no t  have specif ic  representation; some at t h e  c o s t  of thei r  concerns being ignored (or 
turned in to  nonissues) and others  b e c a u s e  t h e y  e x e r c i s e  u n d u e  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  
poli t ical  process. Both approaches limit the i r  analysis t o  a c t o r s  within t h e  con tex t  of 
an  arena,  however it may c o m e  t o  be  defined. In contras t ,  t h e  radical approach t o  
power examines  t h e  role of t h e  a rena  itself in community  politics. Poli t ical  s t ruc tu re  
is defined in p a r t  by t h e  relat ions of production fo r  t h e  purpose of maintaining those  
r e l a t i o n s .  L o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  any tradit ionally defined objective o r  
subjective in te res t  in t h e  outcome per  se. But  t h e  a c t i o n s  of l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t a l  
units  a r e  no t  neu t ra l  in t h e  process of conf l ic t  resolution -- in a radical  analysis t h e  
a rena  must  also b e  considered a n  actor.  
This paper examined t h e  various c la ims abou t  community power in light of t h e  
decision by t h e  Ci ty  of Detroi t  t o  prepare  a n  industrial  site within i t s  boundaries f o r  
a proposed GM automotive  plant. The f i r s t  p a r t  of t h e  analysis evaluated t h e  meri t  
of t h e  radical  c la im t h a t  power is exercised as a dynamic process, and t h a t  t h e  a r e n a  
of public deba te  is also a n  a c t o r  in t h a t  debate .  A ser ies  of a r t i c les  appearing over 
a period of abou t  18 months were  used t o  descr ibe  t h e  sequence of e v e n t s  as t h e y  
were  reported.  The scenario presented in th is  account  c a n  only b e  explained through 
a radical  in terpreta t ion which maintains t h a t  t h e  p r i m a r y  f u n c t i o n  of l e g i t i m a t i n g  
agencies of socie ty  is t o  ensure t h e  perpetuation of t h e  socia l  relations t o  t h e  means  
of production. T o  begin with, t o  draw t h e  f i r s t  a n d  l a s t  i s s u e  i n t o  t h e  r e a l m  of 
"appropriate" act ion on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  Ci ty  Council in t h e  in te res t  of t h e  people of 
Detroit  calls into question property and ownership rights. The City Counci l  l im i t ed  
their  actions t o  situations presented by GM and t h e  CEDD. Little, if any, meaningful 
discussion or debate  occured at t he  Council level. The most t ha t  can be  said for t he  
Council was t ha t  i t  was maneuvered into positions of having t o  legitimate an ongoing 
events  a f t e r  they were already in process. If t h e  p lu ra l i s t  no t ion  of po l i t i cs  was  
valid, then at any point the Council f e l t  i t  was just being manipulated i t  would have 
been able t o  asser t  control. In spite of t h e  f a c t  t ha t  i t  was  being t r e a t e d  l ike  a 
rubber stamp, t he  Council never actively challenged the  course of events (the notable 
exception being Ken Cockerel who was t h e  only consistent no vote in opposition t o  8 
consistent yes votes). 
The rest  of the  analysis was a reconstruction of the costs and benefits of the 
proposed project with the anticipation t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  a s s ignmen t s  of b e n e f i t s  and  
c o s t s ,  and  d i f f e r e n t  weighting schemes for their  distribution, would lend support t o  
one or another of t he  approaches. If a pro jec t  was  soc ia l ly  p ro f i t ab l e  under  o n e  
r e g i m e  b u t  n o t  under  another, or if the  benefits generally accrue t o  one particular 
group, then the  underlying rational used t o  promote t he  project could be  ascertained. 
This project was significantly different from most "public" projects. The purpose of 
t he  CIP, and t h e  source of all  potential  benefits, centered around a GM plant which 
was not directly par t  of the project. All t he  costs were borne by the  community but 
a l l  t he  benefits were dependent upon the  actions of GM a f t e r  the  completion of the  
p r o j e c t .  As a r e su l t ,  t h e  "reasonableness" of the  project depended on a series of 
counterfactual propositions. The Central  Industrial Park project was only p r o f i t a b l e  
t o  t h e  community overall under t he  most restrictive of circumstances. 
An ana lys i s  of t h e  b e n e f i t s  and  c o s t s  f o r  t h e  purposes  of eva lua t ing  t h e  
distribution of those benefits in the  community showed tha t  in reality there  were no 
benefits t o  distribute. The pluralist model of community politics cannot explain t he  
course  of even t s  and t h e  react ion of t h e  C i t y  Counc i l .  T h e r e  w e r e  no  g a i n s  t o  
divide and community poli t ics was no longer t h e  disagreement  over  t h e  distribution of 
public goods. The community a c t e d  on a m a t t e r  a b o u t  which  t h e  on ly  t h i n g  t h e y  
c o u l d  s a y  w i t h  a n y  c e r t a i n t y  w a s  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o s t  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  long t e r m  
commitment  of fu tu re  federa l  g ran t s  needed fo r  t h e  project .  Benefits  might emerge ,  
bu t  only under t h e  bes t  of circumstances.  The  reformis t  model of community politics 
at l eas t  informs us t o  look t o  GM as a n  impor tan t  a c t o r  since th is  analysis broadens 
t h e  scope of issues t o  b e  examined. But th is  analysis can  only show us which a c t o r  
potential ly gained, not how t h e  even t s  transpired t o  provide GM with t h e  opportunity. 
The reformist  approach points o u t  t h a t  GM should be  considered an  a c t o r  in t h e  
process, but  cannot  explain why and how GM e x e r t s  influence on outcomes. Simply 
presenting a case for interlocking ownership s t ruc tu res  in Detroi t  cannot  account  for  
t h e  act ions  of t h e  Mayor or  t h e  di rector  of t h e  CEDD. Also, t h e i r  s t a t i c  v i e w  of 
power fa i ls  t o  show how t h e  process toward t h e  ou tcome is a n  in tergral  component of 
t h a t  power. The v a r i o u s  a c t o r s  in  t h e  d r a m a  n e v e r  r e c e i v e d  a n  a .nswer  t o  t h e  
c r i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n ,  w h e r e  was  t h e  wri t ten  commi tment  t o  build t h e  plant if t h e  c i t y  
spends all t h e  money t o  prepare  a site fo r  t h e  plant  and then sells it t o  GM? The 
f r a m e w o r k  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p r o c e s s  w a s  t h e  n e e d  t o  provide t h e  bes t  c l imate  for 
industry. Whether industry avails  itself of t h e  oppor tun i t i e s  o f f e r e d  is beyond  t h e  
control  of t h e  "public" sector.  
Any benefit  t o  GM was a lso  coun te r fac tua l  since t h e  plant was not in operation. 
All t h e  company c a m e  away with was  t h e  potent ia l  f o r  p r o f i t .  Th i s  is c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  r a d i c a l  a n a l y s i s t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  locus of power within a dynamic 
framework is t h e  ability t o  maximize t h e  potent ia l  for promoting objective in teres ts  
as a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  relat ions t o  t h e  means  of production. In this case i t  mean t  
t h a t  GM, by vi r tue  of limiting t h e  range of decisions within t h e  p u b l i c  r e a l m  (i.e., 
t h e  plant closings and t h e  new construction), was  ab le  t o  benef i t  f r o m  t h e  p r o c e s s .  
Furthermore,  t h e  c i t y  government a c t e d  in a way t h a t  legi t imated these  relationships. 
A revealing f a c t  is t h a t  one of t h e  ear ly  possible op t ions  i n v e s t i g a t e d  by t h e  
c i t y  w a s  t o  a c t u a l l y  bui ld  t h e  plant at an  addit ional  $500 million in public monies 
(for a t o t a l  project  social  cos t  of over $800 million) and then lease  t h e  plant t o  GM. 
This ult imately failed because t h e  loans and g ran t s  were  no t  forthcoming, in addition 
. . 
t o  t h e  tradit ional  (and legal) barr iers  t o  production by t h e  "state1'. I t  would h a v e  
been too  difficult  t o  ra t ional ize  transfering control  over t h e  output  and t h e  s t ream of 
prof i t  of a plant built by public funds t o  t h e  p r iva te  sector .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  c i t y  
c o u l d  a l w a y s  c h o o s e  t o  o p e r a t e  t h e  p l a n t  a t  a b r e a k  e v e n  l e v e l  t o  m a i n t a i n  
emplayment  had they technically been t h e  "owners" of t h e  plant. Tha t  would c o m e  
into d i rec t  conf l ic t  with t h e  relationship be tween  public and pr ivate  sec to r  production. 
. Almost all tradit ional  accounts  of public f inance theory presents  t h e  position t h a t  if a 
product is profi table it will b e  privately produced. A good i s  publicly produced only 
if t h e  amount  col lectable  f rom t h e  di rect  consumers does not  c o v e r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
cos t s  (c.f., Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980). In o ther  words, unprofitable but  necessary 
goods and services a r e  l e f t  t o  t h e  public domain; p r o f i t a b i l i t y  is r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  
pr ivate  sector.  
A Research Agenda 
The only conclusion which c a n  be  drawn from this  analysis is t h a t  conventional 
means by which we evaluate  community poli t ics fa i l  t o  uncover t h e  a c t u a l  process of 
d e c i s i o n  making  on  t h e  local  level. The pluralist model of consensus act ion within 
local  government e lec ted  t o  represent  t h e  community at large  has  l i t t l e  b e a r i n g  o n  
reality. In this example  t h e  Ci ty  of Detroi t  undertook a project  which brought t h e  
c i ty  n o t h i n g  in  r e t u r n .  T h e  a r e n a  of p l u r a l i s t  p o l i t i c s ,  t h e  C i t y  Counc i l ,  w a s  
ineffectual  and unimportant  by its own admission. On t h e  o ther  hand, t h e  reformis t  
m o d e l  o f f e r e d  m o r e  i n s i g h t  in to  t h e  form of poli t ical  ac t ion and t h e  shape of t h e  
outcome. By b r o a d e n i n g  t h e  r a n g e  of i s sues ,  r e f o r m i s t s  t h r o w  a w i d e r  n e t  t o  
d i s c o v e r  i m p o r t a n t  a c t o r s  outside and inside t h e  poli t ical  arena.  In this case, any 
analysis of power which l imited itself t o  community  po l i t i c s  f a i l e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
one a c t o r  a lways present,  namely GM. The whole problem was as a result  of GM's 
actions,  and a l l  benef i ts  were  dependent upon f u t u r e  GM decisions. But t h e  reformist  
m o d e l  s u f f e r s  f rom t h e  s a m e  faul ts  of any purely descriptive model. Focusing only 
on t h e  ou tcome of t h e  even t s  t h e  model fai ls  t o  provide any u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of h o w  
t h e s e  e v e n t s  c a m e  t o  pass .  Why d id  a l l  t h e  decisions r e s t  with GM in t h e  final  
a n a l y s i s ?  How d o e s  GM a n d  t h e  C E D D  m a n a g e  t o  b y p a s s  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  people  of Detroi t  and t o  convince everyone t h a t  t h e  c i t y  is 
under control  while at t h e  s a m e  t ime  (in t h e  words of Mayor Young) GM is doing it 
a favor by staying? 
We a r e  l e f t  with t h e  radical  approach t o  community  politics, in teres t  and power 
by default .  I t  is t h e  only approach which begins t o  o f fe r  a n  answer t o  t h e  questions 
of Why? and How? since it focuses on t h e  dynamic process of power politics and t h e  
need t o  maximize potent ia l  gain over t ime. Going back t o  Dunleavy 's  a n a l y s i s  w e  
c a n  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  C I P  s i t u a t i o n  m u s t  b e  v i e w e d  as ano ther  s t e p  in a n  ongoing 
historical  process. GM did not suddenly decide  t o  phase o u t  two  plants and look for 
a site t o  build another.  The Ci ty  Council and t h e  CEDD did no t  t a k e  on t h e  roles 
which emerged specifically in response t o  th is  situation. As mentioned earl ier  in t h e  
a n a l y s i s ,  w h a t  is needed in pa r t  is a n  investigation in to  t h e  role  of t h e  local  state 
and of state format ion as a p r o d u c t  of t h e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  of p roduc t ion .  T h e  
mechanism which d rew t h e  objective in te res t s  of General  Motors Corporation together  
with t h e  Administrat ion of t h e  City of De t ro i t  is embedded in t h e  legal  pa ramete rs  
and jurisdictions of t h e  state apparatus.  I t  is exemplified by t h e  l imitations on t h e  
state t o  a c t u a l l y  e n g a g e  in  p r o d u c t i o n  u n l e s s  it i s  d e f i n e d  as u n p r o f i t a b l e  but  
necessary and so  renamed a "publict1 good. Had t h e  CEDD actually considered di rect ,  
public ownership in abandoned fac to r ies  fo r  t h e  purpose of producing inexpensive c a r s  
and put t ing unemployed a u t o  workers t o  work GM would h a v e  u n d o u b t e d l y  g o n e  t o  
higher jurisdictional author i t ies  t o  put  a s top  t o  th is  (an example  can  be  found around 
a t t e m p t s  by c i t izens  of Youngstown a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t e e l  Workers  t o  k e e p  m i l l s  
p r o d u c t i v e  -- but  cour t  rulings found t h a t  labor unions o r  municipalities engaging in 
production represents  "unfair" competition). 
T o  fully analyze t h e  decision t o  c lea r  Poletown and give i t  t o  GM, one has t o  
begin with a study of t h e  relationship be tween  GM and t h e  CEDD. Clearly, as shown 
by t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  p r e s s  r e p o r t s ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  a n n o u n c e m e n t s  fo l lowed  many 
discussions and interactions between GM and t h e  city.  This is not  t o  impugn e i the r  
p a r t y  w i t h  n e c e s s a r i l y  h a r m f u l  a n d / o r  p r e c o n c e i v e d  in ten t ions .  The relationship 
between GM and t h e  c i t y  re f l ec t s  t h e  relationship b e t w e e n  c a p i t a l  a n d  labor .  T o  
r e a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d  why a n d  how D e t r o i t  c a m e  t o  b e  in i t s  present  economic state 
requires a n  analysis into t h e  causes  and course  of t h e  present  economic crises in t h e  
United S ta tes ,  and t h e  res t  of t h e  capi ta l is t  world. Local government,  like state and 
federa l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  is o r g a n i z e d  a r o u n d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of m a i n t a i n i n g  o r d e r  a n d  
continuity. Rhetor ic  maintains t h a t  this  is done in t h e  in te res t  of t h e  community at 
large, bu t  reali ty shows t h a t  this only pe rpe tua tes  opportunit ies and options for those  
already possessing them. 
APPENDIX A 
Table A-1. Chronology of t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial Project* 
24 June  1980 
G e n e r a l  M o t o r s  (GM) a n n o u n c e s  t h a t  t w o  of i t s  D e t r o i t  p l a n t s  (Fisher and 
Cadillac) wi l l  b e  s h u t  down a n d  t h a t  i t  is look ing  f o r  a s i t e  f o r  a n e w  p l a n t ,  
preferably within t h e  Detroi t  Ci ty  limits. Much is wri t ten  about  t h e  importance t o  
t h e  c i ty  of finding a "su i t ab le"  site t o  k e e p  GM i n  D e t r o i t ,  a n d  a U n i t e d  A u t o  
W o r k e r s  (UAW) spokesperson states t h a t  a new plant would be  good for  local  labor, 
provided t h a t  it will no t  b e  too  highly au tomated  reducing t h e  n u m b e r  of long  r u n  
jobs in t h e  area .  
In addition, GM announces a long t e rm,  $40 billion cap i ta l  expenditure project  of 
which at leas t  a quar te r  will b e  s p e n t  i n  Mich igan  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  of u p d a t i n g  
exist ing plants and building new plants. 
25 June  1980 
T h e  P o l e t o w n  a r e a  ( o n e  t h i r d  i n  H a m t r a m a c k  a n d  t h e  r e s t  in  D e t r o i t )  i s  
identified a s  t h e  leading candidate  for  a site conforming t o  GM1s r e q u i r e m e n t .  GM 
r e a f f i r m s  i s  d e s i r e  t o  r e m a i n  in  D e t r o i t  f o r  a number  of reasons re la ted t o  t h e  
exist ing infras t ructure  and t h e  skilled labor available. 
1 July 1980 
Poletown is selected as t h e  s i t e  for  t h e  proposed plant. Gm needs 465 a c r e s  on . . 
which t o  place  i t s  new plant,  and t h e  chosen site cont 'ains t h e  c l o s e d  Dodge  Main 
f a c i l i t y ,  which Chrysler will sell t o  De t ro i t  for  one dollar. GM announces t h a t  t h e  
City's progress toward acquiring t h e  required a r e a  will b e  r e v i e w e d  o n  1 O c t  1 9 8 0  
before  construction plans and o ther  ar rangements  a r e  t o  b e  made. 
16 July 1980 
The Detroi t  Economic Growth Corporation, backed by a group of 14 major local  
businesses (including t h e  Big Three  Auto, J.L. Hudson and seven Detroi t  a r e a  banks), 
announces a $3 million loan made t o  t h e  Ci ty  of Detroi t  t o  cover  "front end" cos t s  
of project  planning and feasibility studies. 
18 July 1980 
The Detroi t  Ci ty  Council is asked t o  approve out lays  f rom HUD Block g r a n t s  t o  
proceed with t h e  init ial  s tages  of t h e  project  in spi te  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Emmet  Moten, 
D i r e c t o r  of t h e  C o m m u n i t y  E c o n o m i c  Deve lopment  Depar tment  (CEDD), conceeds 
t o t a l  f inanc ing  of t h e  s i t e  p r e p a r a t i o n  i s  n o t  s e c u r e  a n d  t h a t  GM h a s  n o t  y e t  
commi t ted  itself in writing t o  build t h e  plant  if t h e  site is aqcuired and prepared by 
t h e  City. 
7 August 1980 
C i t y  C o u n c i l  a p p r o v e s  t h e  preparation of a loan application t o  HUD for  $60.5 - - 
million even though they have y e t  t o  see any d e t a i l s  o f -  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  
CEDD. Moten  a s s u r e s  t h e  Ci ty  Council t h a t  a l l  deta i ls  will b e  forthcoming during 
public h e a r i n g s ,  a n d  d e n i e s  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  t h e  t o t a l  p r o j e c t  ( s i t e  
preparation) totaling sum $130 million a r e  underestimated.  Once again t h e  absence of 
a wri t ten  commi t tment  f rom GM is questioned, but  a s s u r a n c e s  a r e  g i v e n  by M o t e n  
t h a t  i t  will be  forthcoming a f t e r  plans proceed further.  
30 September  1980 
On t h e  e v e  of GM's review, Moten concedes  t o  t h e  Ci ty  Council t h a t  t h e  f inal  
cos t  of t h e  site p r e p a r a t i o n  wi l l  a c t u a l l y  b e  a b o u t  6 0 %  -h igher  t h a n  o r ig ina l ly  
es t imated (closer t o  $200 million) and t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  "public sector"  cos t s  may reach 
$300 million. The Ci ty  st i l l  has not received a w r i t t e n  c o m m i t m e n t  f r o m  GM t o  
build a plant. 
11 October  1980 
GM signs a n  agreement  with CEDD t o  purchase t h e  prepared site from t h e  Ci ty  
for  a t o t a l  of $6.8 million contingent upon c l e a r  t i t l e  t o  a l l  lots, c o m p l e t i o n  of a l l  
site p r e p a r a t i o n  a n d  a t a x  a b a t e m e n - t  f o r  t h e  e v e n t u a l  p r o j e c t .  - C i t y  Counc i l  
complains t h a t  it is t r e a t e d  like a rubber s tamp,  and t h a t  t h e  dea l  seems  t o  ignore 
recen t  announcements t h a t  t h e  Ci ty  is facing c r i t i ca l  cash flow problems as par t  of a 
general  f iscal  cr ises  brought on by rising unemployment and t h e  worsening economy. 
25 October 1980 
Ci ty  Council approves t h e  use o f .  $60.5 million in already a l located HUD Block 
Gran t s  t o  b e  diver ted t o  t h e  aquisition and preparation of t h e  GM plant site. Prior 
t o  t h e  a p p r o v a l ,  GM announces t h a t  new plant  automat ion may eventually t r im t h e  
s ize  of any potent ia l  labor fo rce  t o  be  hired, and Mayor Young conceeds  t h a t  no new 
jobs will b e  c r e a t e d  by t h e  proposed plant. In addition, s o m e  $25.8 million in S t a t e  
a id  which was included in t h e  t o t a l  calculation of monies fo r  t h e  project  a r e  not  in 
f a c t  s e c u r e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a S t a t e  s p o k e s p e r s o n .  Young a lso  concedes t h a t  t h e  
project  payback period of 15 y e a r s  f o r  t h e  t o t a l  $300 mi l l ion  c o s t  to D e t r o i t  i s  
u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  s i n c e  it does no t  include t h e  proposed t a x  aba tement  t o  GM. Ci ty  
C o u n c i l  d o e s  n o t  h e e d  its o w n  s t a f f ' s  a d v i c e  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  C E D D  t o  p r o v i d e  
information regarding which communities will be  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  redirection of money 
from t h e  HUD Gran ts  and not  a c c e p t  Moten ' s  a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  no  c o m m u n i t y  w i l l  
s u f f e r ,  a n d  t o  l ink a n y  fu r the r  discussion of t a x  a b a t e m e n t s  t o  gurantees  from GM 
for t h e  level  of employment in t h e  plant over  t h e  l ife of t h e  abatement .  
In r e l a t e d  m a t t e r s ,  t h e  C i t y  Council votes  t o  approve $51.5 million in fu tu re  
Block Gran t s  b e  diverted t o  repay $130 million in  H U D  l o a n s  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  a n d  
must v o t e  on t h e  "merit" and "need" for  t h e  project  before  t h e  c i t y  c a n  invoke new 
"quick take" laws (Public A c t  8 7 )  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of p r o p e r t y  u n d e r  e m i n e n t  
domain powers granted t h e  City. 
31 October  1980 
Mayor Young pressures t h e  Council t o  a f f i rm t h e  necessity of t h e  project, and 
GM's Board c h a i r m a n  Murphy announces t h a t  many o ther  communities a r e  in teres ted 
in  b e i n g  a site f o r  t h e  GM p l a n t .  In a d d i t i o n ,  Council had not  y e t  received a n  
accounting fo r  t h e  source of a l l  t h e  $200 million necessary fo r  t h e  preparation of t h e  
site while GM conf i rms it plans t o  ask fo r  more  t h a n  t h e  standard 12 year,  50% tax  
aba tement  even though t h e  aba tement  is admit tedly  only a s m a l l  p a r t  of t h e  t o t a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  T h e  C i t y  Council votes  8-1 t o  a f f i rm t h e  need t o  t h e  City so t h a t  
property aquisition c a n  proceed. 
4 November 1980 
Mayor  Young i n s i s t s  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  benef i t  t o  t h e  c i t y  in f u t u r e  jobs and t a x  
revenues outweighs cos t s  as t h e  Poletown Neighborhood Counci l  ( P N C )  f i l e s  s u i t  t o  - 
s top  t h e  taking o f  property in t h e  Poletown a rea .  
9 December  1980 
D u r i n g  c o u r t  t e s t i m o n y ,  Young states t h a t  t h e  GM project  will solve much of 
Detroit 's  unemployment problems but conceeds  t h a t  GM has  been inflexible regarding 
its plans fo r  t h e  si te.  Moten states t h e  Ci ty  s t i l l  needs t o  g e t  another $30 million 
each  f rom HUD's Urban Development Action Gran t s  (UDAG) and t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  of 
C o m m e r c e ' s  E c o n o m i c  ~ e v e l o ~ m e n t  A g e n c y  (EDA) o r  t h e  t o t a l  project  will be  in 
jeopardy; GM has  st i l l  no t  commit ted itself in writ ing t o  building a plant. Archi tects  
test ifying fo r  t h e  P N C  cla im t h a t  a slight plan modification in t h e  proposed GM plant 
will resul t  in saving 9 o u t  of 10 homes s l a t e d  f o r  d e m o l i t i o n ,  y e t  t h e  c o u r t  s t i l l  
denies t h e  P N C  peti t ion t o  hal t  t h e  project. 
12 December  1980 
A c o n t r a c t  t o t a l l i n g  $45 mi l l ion  f o r  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  of t h e  site offered t o  
Turner Construction of ~ e i  York w i t h o u t  l o c a l  b idding f o r  t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  f i r s t  
r e j e c t e d  by C E D D  (9 D e c )  b e c a u s e  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  w e r e  not  made 
available t o  t h e  di rectors  of CEDD. Since Turner  is t o  b e  paid as a percentage of 
t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  (which a r e  only es t imated and open ended), CEDD would not g ran t  a 
c o n t r a c t  with no upper bound on cos t  t o  t h e  City. Moten assures  t h e  CEDD t h a t  no 
b i d s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  s i n c e  T u r n e r  wi l l  only b e  a "consultant" t o  t h e  City, and t h a t  
t h e r e  is no way t o  e s t i m a t e  t o t a l  cos t  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  C E D D  f i n a l l y  a p p r o v e s  t h e  
c o n t r a c t  with Turner (even though a local  con t rac to r  waiting t o  address t h e  Board is 
not pe rmi t t ed  t o  speak unti l  a f t e r  t h e  approval). 
The P N C  appeals  to t h e  S t a t e  Supreme Cour t  t o  ha l t  t h e  project .  
21 February 1981 
Nader's group e n t e r s  on behalf of t h e  P N C  and i s  assailed by Young as a n  anti-  
GM opportunist. The Supreme Court  issues a restraining order  halting demolition t o  
p r o t e c t  t h e  cur ren t  dwellings until they rule  on t h e  appeal  before  t h e  Court. 
14 March 1981 \ 
GM publ ic ly  states t h a t  c lea r  t i t l e  mus t  b e  in t h e  City's hand by May 1 s t  fo r  
t h e  p ro jec t  t o  proceed, t h e  Ci ty  points o u t  t h a t  it will own much "useless" property 
if t h e  p r o j e c t  is h a l t e d ,  whi le  Young c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  a t  hand  is more  
important  to Detroi t  than  t h e  Renaissance Cen te r  in i t s  bid for  revitalization. The 
Court  rules t h a t  t h e  project  can  proceed s ince  it is in t h e  bes t  public interest .  
16 April 1981 
S t a t i n n  t h a t  it w i l l  h a v e  t o  reconsider  its plans t o  loca te  a plant in Detroi t  
without a t a x  aba tement ,  GM agrees  t o  a c c e p t  "oniyt1 a 12 y e a r  5 0 %  a b a t e m e n t  in  
lieu of its original request  t o  keep i t s  t a x  liability at t h e  level  it now carr ies  for  t h e  
existing plants t o  b e  phased ou t  by t h e  new plant. I t  c la ims t h a t  t h i s  c h a n g e  w a s  
due t o  GM's concern f o r  t h e  f iscal  condition of t h e  Ci ty  at  th is  t ime. Moten fa i ls  t o  
provide t h e  Ci ty  Council with requested information on t h e  t a x  aba tement  or  a copy 
of t h e  development agreement  between GM and t h e  CEDD, bu t  h e  points ou t  t h a t  t h e  
Ci ty  has  commi t ted  itself t o  a tax  break t h e  previous October  t o  t h e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  
has l i t t l e  option but  t o  approve one. The UAW, through a spokesperson, states t h a t  
t h e  a b a t e m e n t  is c r i t i ca l  if D e t r o i t  i s  t o  k e e p  i n d u s t r i a l  jobs  in  t h e  a r e a .  T h e  
Council's s taf f  recommends t h a t  t h e  a b a t e m e n t  no t  b e  given, and again suggests t h a t  
any a b a t e m e n t  b e  t ied t o  employment levels in t h e  plant. Young a s s u r e s  e v e r y o n e  
t h a t  a l l  wi l l  t u r n  o u t  alr ight,  even though GM is s t i l l  not  commit ted in writing t o  
building a plant on t h e  site. The C i t y  C o u n c i l  f i r s t  r e z o n e s  t h e  a r e a  f o r  h e a v y  
i n d u s t r i a l  u s e  a n d  t h e n  votes 8-1 t o  approve t h e  t a x  a b a t e m e n t  (50% for  12 years) 
requiring t h a t  GM provide "no fewer" than  3000 jobs within four  years. 
1 May 1981 
T h e  prepared s i t e  is sold t o  GM, while it is noted t h a t  t h e  (now named) Cen t ra l  
Industrial P ro jec t  is t o  be  turned in to  a "tax increment  financing d i s t r i c t t 1  in  w h i c h  
t a x e s  wi l l  b e  used  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  repay t h e  $200 million c o s t  t o  the  c i ty  fo r  t h e  
project .  Consequently t h e r e  will be  no d i r e c t  revenues t o  t h e  c i t y  for  15-20 years. 
17  May 1981 
GM announces t h a t  t h e  cur ren t  economic c l imate  reauires t h a t  i t  reconsider i t s  
$40 bi l l ion c a p i t a l  spend ing  p r o g r a m  as w e l l  as look t o  c o s t  c u t t i n g  m e a s u r e s  
throughout its organization. Spending will proceed on automat ion re la ted research and 
its push towards robotics. 
31 May 1981 
Mayor  Young states t h a t ,  while t h e r e  st i l l  is no wri t ten  commi t tment  on t h e  
p a r t  of GM t o  build t h e  plant, "if w e  wai ted fo r  a l l  t h e  s i l ly  g u a r a n t e e s ,  n o t h i n g  - - 
would g e t  built." 
Assess ing  t h e  r o l e  p l a y e d  by C i t y  C o u n c i l ,  K e n  C o c k r e l  (on t h e  C o u n c i l )  
maintains t h a t  it a c t e d  with no way t o  accura te ly  assess t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  p r o j e c t  
agains t  possible long t e r m  benefits. He  goes  on t o  say t h a t  Young manipulated t h e  
Council, t h e  financing for  t h e  $200 million c o s t  of t h e  project  was never outlined t o  
t h e  Council, and t h e  nature  of t h e  "partnership" between GM and t h e  Ci ty  was never 
made  clear.  Finally, t h e  City has  y e t  t o  make  c lea r  how i t  plans t o  avoid divert ing 
g r a n t s  t o  low i n c o m e  neighborhoods t o  b e  used t o  pay t h e  in teres t  on $100 million 
loans acquired fo r  t h e  project  and who will benef i t  at what  cos t  t o  whom. 
3 November 1981 
GM announces i t  plans t o  delay t h e  construction of i t s  plant  in Poletown fo r  at 
l eas t  a year  because of t h e  economic c l imate .  A p a n e l  c r e a t e d  by Mayor Young  
finds t h a t  t h e  Ci ty  a c t e d  inappropriately and abused its powers of eminent  domain t o  
pu t  together  t h e  Cen t ra l  Industrial Project .  
* NB: T h e  d a t e s  g i v e n  r e p r e s e n t  b o t h  a c t u a l  d a t e s  of C o u n c i l  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  
convenient d a t e s  summarizing some s t a g e  in t h e  ongoing process. A c t u a l  d a t e s  f o r  
some of t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  and c la ims may differ .  
Table  A-2. List of Detroi t  News Articles* 
1980 
Apr 16 ( A l )  
Jun 1 (L l )  
J u n  24 (Al )  
Jun 25 (Al )  
Jun  27 (A6) 
Jun  27 (E5) 
Jun 28 (Al )  
J u l  1 (Al )  
J u l  1 (A4) 
J u l  2 (Bl)  
J u l  7 (A3) 
Ju l  10 (Bl)  
J u l  13 (F1) 
J u l  16 (Bl)  
J u l  18 (Al )  
J u l  22 (Al )  
J u l  27 (A14) 
Ju l  31 ( A l l  
Aug 1 (BDW4) 
Aug 5 (C3) 
Aug 6 (BDE2) 
Aug 7 (Al )  
Aug 11 (Al )  
Aug 17 (A18) 
Aug 19 (B1) 
Aug 31 (BN8) 
Sep  2 (A31 
Sep 2 (A71 
Sep 2 (D10) 
Sep 30 (BD2) 
O c t  1 (BD2) 
O c t  5 (B1) 
O c t  6 (BD2) 
O c t  7 (81) 
O c t  11 ( A l l  
O c t  17 (Al )  
O c t  17  (A8) 
O c t  18 (A4) 
O c t  1 9  (A14) 
O c t  21 (BD2) 
O c t  22 (Al )  
O c t  24 (Bl)  
O c t  25 (A8) 
O c t  30 (Al )  
O c t  31 (A9) 
O c t  31 (Bl)  
O c t  31 (D7) 
Nov 1 ( A l l  
Nov 2 (Al )  
Nov 4 (Bl)  
Nov 12 (BDW8) 
Nov 18 (BD2) 
Nov 20 (B3) 
Nov 21 (BD4) 
Nov 22 (C2) 
Nov 25 (BD2) 
Nov 28  (B3) 
Nov 29 (87) 
Dec 2 (Bl)  
Dec 6 (C1) 
Dec 9 (Bl)  
Dec 10 (BDW2) 
Dec 11 (B12) 
Dec 16 (BDW2) 
Dec 17 (BN2) 
1981 
J a n  6 (Bl)  
J a n  22 (BDW12) 
J a n  30 (B4) 
F e b  2 (Bl)  
F e b  3 (A16) 
F e b  8 (Bl) 
F e b  10 (BE2) 
F e b  11 (A7) 
F e b  11 (Bl)  
F e b  12 (B1) 
F e b  1 3  (B4) 
F e b  17 (Bl)  
Feb  21 (Al )  
F e b  23 (BD4) 
Feb  24 (Bl)  
F e b  26 (Bl)  
Mar 3 (Al )  
Mar 4 (A6) 
Mar 4 (B1) 
Mar 5 (A18) 
Mar 6 (C12) 
Mar 9 (BD2) 
Mar 10 (B1) 
Mar 11 (Al )  
Mar 12 (Al )  
Mar 1 3  (Al )  
Mar 13 (B6) 
Mar 14 (Al )  
Mar 14 (A3) 
Mar 15 (Al )  
Mar 15 (A12) 
Mar 15 ( C l )  
Mar 16 (Bl)  
Mar 17 ( A l )  
Mar 18 (Bl)  
Mar 20 (Bl)  
Mar 21 (A12) 
Mar 23 (BDW2) 
Apr 2 (BD6) 
Apr 3 (Bl)  
Apr 14 (BDW2) 
Apr 16 (B1) 
Apr 21 (B4) 
Apr 23 (Bl)  
Apr 24 (A13) 
Apr 28 (A12) 
Apr 28 (BDW2) 
Apr 30 (Bl)  
May 1 (Bl)  
May 1 (Bl)  
May 1 (BDW6) 
May 5 (BDW2) 
May 7 (BD2) 
May 8 (B1) 
May 14 ( A l )  
May 15 ( A l )  
May 15 (A131 
May 17 (Hl )  
May 21 (BDE2) 
May 28 (BDW2) 
May 31 (B8) 
O c t  16 (BD3) 
Nov 3 (A31 
-- - - -- 
* NB: Each d a t e  is followed by t h e  page of t h e  a r t i c le  in parenthesis 
APPENDIX B 
Table  B-1. Al ternat ive  Si tes  fo r  t h e  GM Plan t  
A. Dodge Main 
The site is bounded on t h e  east by ~ o r t i o n s  of Conant  and Mt. Elliott,  on t h e  
south by t h e  Edsel Ford Freeway, on t h e  L e s t  generally by t h e  Widman a n d  G r a n d  
Trunk Western Railroad, on t h e  north by Denton. The site is part ial ly in t h e  Ci ty  of 
Hamtramck and t h e  res t  in t h e  Ci ty  of Detroit .  
B. Huber South 
T h e  s i t e  is l o c a t e d  in t h e  e a s t - c e n t r a l  p o r t i o n  of D e t r o i t .  I t  i s  bounded 
generally by Huber Avenue on t h e  north,  Mt. ~ l i i o t t  Avenue on t h e  west ,  t h e  Edsel 
Ford Freeway on t h e  south and Van Dyke Avenue on t h e  east. 
C. Airport  South 
T h e  site is l o c a t e d  in  eas t -centra l  Detroi t ,  south and adjacent  t o  the  Detroi t  
Ci ty  Airport. I t  is generally bounded by Van D y k e  A v e n u e  on  t h e  w e s t ,  G r i n n e l l  
Avenue on t h e  north, Grat io t  Avenue on  t h e  east and t h e  Edsel Ford Freeway on t h e  
south. 
D. Ci ty  Airport  
The s i t e  is located in t h e  eas t -centra l  pa r t  of Detroit .  I t  is generally bounded 
by Van Dyke on t h e  west, Almont Avenue on t h e  north,  Conner Avenue on t h e  east 
and Grinnell Avenue on t h e  south. 
E. Lynch Road Complex 
The site is in t h e  eas t -centra l  p a r t  of Detroit ,  just east of Hamtramck. I t  is 
generally bounded by Mt. Ell iott  on t h e  west ,  Grand Trunk Western and Fores t  Lawn 
Cemete ry  on t h e  north, Van Dyke on t h e  east and Huber on t h e  south. 
F. Riverside Industrial Park 
This site is located in Detroit 's  f a r  east side. on t h e  Detroi t  River at t h e  end 
of St. Jean  Avenue. I t  is generally bound by ~ r e u d  Avenue t o  t h e  north, Lemay on 
t h e  west, Lycaste  on t h e  east and t h e  De t ro i t  River t o  t h e  south. 
G. Fores t  Park 
The s i t e  is in t h e  near east side of Detroi t  between . the  Chrysler Freeway and 
t h e  Grand Trunk Western Railroad. T o  t h e  north is E. W a r r e n  A v e n u e  a n d  t h e  t o  
south is Mack Avenue. 
H. River Rouge Park 
On t h e  f a r  w e s t  s i d e  o f  D e t r o i t ,  i t  is generally bound by Fullerton Avenue, 
Outer  Drive, W, Warren Avenue and ~ r i n i t ~   venue. 
I. Southwest Detroi t  Industrial Por jec t  
In t h e  southwest p a r t  of Detroi t ,  it is generally bound by W. F o r t  on t h e  north, 
Dragoon Avenue on t h e  eas t ,  W. Jefferson on t h e  south and Westend Avenue on t h e  
west  . 
Table B-2. Site  Selection Criteria 
The CEDD identifies two separate  criterion sets, both of which mus t  b e  m e t ,  
f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  s i t e .  The  f i rs t  ref lect  the  requirements GM 
presented f o r  i t s  s i t e  t o  c o n t a i n  t h e  CM p lan t ;  t h e  s econd  r e l f e c t s  t h e  C i ty ' s  
c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e  i m p a c t  of t h e  s i t e  s e l e c t i o n  on the  community and the City 
overall. 
I. GM Standards for an Appropriate Site: 
- 450 t o  500 Acres; 
- Rectangular in shape (approx. 314 X 1 mile); 
- Access t o  long haul rail transport facilities; 
- Readily available for use without undue delay. 
11. City Standards for an Appropriate Site: 
- The  number  of homes ,  business  and  inst i tut ions t o  be  relocated kept  t o  a 
practicable minimum; 
- T h e  a g e ,  v i t a l i t y  and  condi t ion  of t h e  housing and  building s tock t o  be  
affected be  of lower quality overall; 
- The potential  environmental harm of choosing a particular site; 
- The exis tance of Na t iona l  R e g i s t e r  o r  Na t iona l  R e g i s t e r  El igible  homes ,  
buildings or institutions in a site; 
- The potential for disrupting existing, viable commercial  and industrial corridors 
by a s i te  selection. 
Table B-3. Site Comparisons 
A - B - C - D - E - F - 5 H - I - 
Costs(a): 
Acquisition 4 2 38 7 0 30 4 0 3 0 10 - 3 1 
Relocation 16 18 33 18 16 2 5 5 9 
Demolition 7 6 10 5 10 1 3 1 8 
Site Improvement 32 29 5 0 23 3 0 10 10 30 6 
Total Cost 112 105 187 88 96 42 2 8 36 65 * 
Other: 
No.of Parcels 2100 3000 3900 1400 1100 15 25 1 600 
No. of Families 1500 1300 2500 1200 800 0 390 0 500 
No. Commercial/ 
Industrial 120 80 200 60 100 10 0 0 100 
(a) in Millions of Dollars 
Source: Scoping Document for the Proposed Central Industrial Park Project, City of 
Detroit, CEDD, August 29, 1980, pp. 20-21 
APPENDIX C 
Table C-I. Alternative Investment Criteria 
I. Cutoff Period 
An a r b i t r a r y  cu tof f  da te  selected by which funds invested into a ~ r o i e c t  must . . 
be recouped. ~ h &  method assumes tha t  beyond this point in t i m e ,  no  i nc reases  in 
n e t  b e n e f i t s  will  a c c r u e  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  (e.g., if t h e  s c a l e  of t h e  p ro j ec t ed  is  
unwarranted for too long a t ime period and beyond tha t  period excess c a p a c i t y  will  
b e c o m e  a problem).  This i s  an unrealistic investment criterion prone to  excluding 
long run benefits. 
11. Payoff Period 
This  c r i t e r i o n  r anks  t h e  p r o j e c t s  in order of the t ime  required t o  repay the  
initial investment. More forgiving than the  f i rs t  method regarding long term benefits, 
i t  s t i l l  makes  t w o  c r i t i c a l  (and  cons t r a in ing )  assumpt ions :  tha t  there will be no 
further project outlays at some future date;  t ha t  there  is no  u n c e r t a i n t y  regard ing  
the  benefit stream. 
111. Average Ra te  of Return 
All benefits and outlays (costs) predicted for t he  l ife of the  project a r e  summed 
and divided by t h e  number of years of t he  project's life. Then, average return per 
y e a r  i s  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  ou t l ay  t o  generate  the average ra te  of return on 
investment. The explicit assumption is t ha t  t he  highest r a t e  of r e tu rn  on investments 
translates a s  t he  best project. 
IV. Net Average Ra te  of Return 
This  me thod  is  s imi la r  t o  I11 above ,  w i th  t h e  exception tha t  all  (initial and 
subsequent) outlays and costs a r e  e n t e r e d  i n t o  t h e  ca l cu l a t i on  t o  g e n e r a t e  a p e r  
a n n u m  a v e r a g e  bene f i t .  This figure i s  also compared t o  the  initial cost  outlay t o  
generate  t he  net  average return. While a be t te r  overall measure than t h e  prev ious  
cr i ter ia ,  i t  still depends on the number of years assigned t o  the project life. More 
critically, however, is t ha t  neither of t he  two previous methods make any adjustment 
for the  timing (or pattern) of t he  benefit  stream. Consequently, a project generating 
20 units per year for ten years will produce the  same net  average f igure  (assuming 
identical costs  and initial outlays) as a project with a f i rs t  and last year benefit of 
100 units and no benefits accruing for t he  intervening eight years. 
V. Net Present Value 
This  method  s u m s  a l l  t h e  annua l  net  benefits (benefits less costs) a f t e r  first  
"discounting" t he  ne t  benefit from each period t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  va lue  a b e n e f i t  
a c c r u e d  in per iod  t in t he  present. For example, if one has t o  wait five years t o  
receive a net  benefit  of $100, discounting will calculate  the  "value" of tha t  money a t  
t h e  p re sen t .  Assuming tha t  interest  ra tes  do not  change over the t ime period, and 
tha t  t he  r a t e  is lo%, then an investment of $62.09 today will yield $100 ove r  f i v e  
years compounding the  interest  each year. Therefore, $62.09 is the  net present value 
of a net  benefit  of $100 in five years. Summing each discounted b e n e f i t  ove r  t h e  
l i f e  of t h e  p r o j e c t  yields  t h e  t o t a l  n e t  present value of the project's net benefit 
stream. 
The process assumes tha t  a )  a social discount r a t e  (d) is calculated which will 
remain c o n s t a n t  ove r  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  p r o j e c t  and  b) t h i s  d i scount  r a t e  c a n  b e  
d e t e r m i n e d  cons i s t an t ly  fo r  a l l  projects  evaluated. A social discount ra te  is used 
raher simply t he  market ra te  of interest  on investment funds since t h e r e  a r e  o f t e n  
s o c i a l  cons ide ra t i ons  beyond maximizing net profitability against the availablity of 
investment funds (e.g., distributional e f f ec t s  of public investments). The ca l cu l a t i on  
can be  done allowing the  discount r a t e  to vary, but this becomes more cumbersome 
(and expensive) and i t  does not remove t h e  problem of accurately e s t ima t ing  f u t u r e  
ra tes  under present conditions. 
VI. Internal Rates  of Return 
S i m i l a r  in f o r m  t o  n e t  a v e r a g e  r a t e  of r e t u r n ,  b u t  conce rned  wi th  t i m e  
discounting of net  benefits, t he  internal r a t e  of return (r) calculates the  discount r a t e  
which when used will yield a zero  ne t  benefit. This method separates the discounted 
benefit  s t ream and cost  s t ream and sets them equal t o  each other. The result is t o  
compute an equation similar t o  the  ne t  present value (PV), but this t ime, ra ther  than 
calculate  the  PV given d and  t h e  number  of per iod ,  you set t h e  s t r e a m  of n e t  
b e n e f i t s  e q u a l  t o  z e r o  and  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  va lue  f o r  r f o r  e a c h  p r o j e c t  under  
consideration. 
Comments: 
1. Methods V and  VI a r e  b e t t e r ,  and  usually applied, in all cases since both 
address t he  question of uncertainty and t h e  dis t r ibut ion of t h e  n e t  b e n e f i t  s t r e a m  
over time. 
2. Methods V and VI both yield identical results for a two period example, but 
diverge otherwise dependent upon the  explicit value for d used in method calculating 
t h e  n e t  p r e s e n t  value.  Depending on t h e  method selected, projects will be  ranked 
differently in many cases. 
3. A common practice combining these two methods involves the determination 
of a social discount r a t e  t o  be  used as a cutoff point f o r  var ious  p r o j e c t  i n t e r n a l  
r a t e s  of r e tu rn .  If r is greater  than or  equal t o  d then the  project is acceptable,  
otherwise not. Other cr i ter ia  will be  used f o r  t h e  f i na l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  s i nce  t h e  
highest internal r a t e  of return does not necessarily correspond t o  the "best" project. 
Table C-2. Calculation of Presen t  Value and Internal  R a t e  of Return 
Presen t  Value: 
T o  account  f o r  t h e  distribution over  t i m e  of ne t  benef i ts  (benefits  minus cos t s  
pe r  period), and  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  a g i v e n  n e t  b e n e f i t  
acc rued  in two  d i f fe ren t  periods, t h e  benef i t  s t r e a m  is discounted. The present value 
(PV) fo r  a n e t  benef i t  received in t periods in t h e  fu tu re  is calcula ted by 
in which t h e  "value" of B(t) r e f l ec t s  t h e  t i m e  preference fo r  some ne t  benefit  in t h e  
f u t u r e  (or i t s  p r e s e n t  value) .  In t h i s  m a n n e r ,  a s t r e a m  of s u c h  d i s c o u n t e d  n e t  
benef i ts  can  be  summed t o  genera te  t h e  PV of t h a t  s t ream,  as follows: 
pv B = B(O) + B(1) + B(2) + . . . + B(T) 
(1 +i) ( l+i )  2 ( l+i )  T 
over  T periods. 
For t h e  purpose of calculating t h e  PV of a public project ,  we substi tute d, t h e  
social  discount ra te ,  for  i, t h e  pr ivate  r a t e  of re turn  on investment  -- o r  simply t h e  
i n v e s t m e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  If t h e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  e a c h  p e r i o d  a r e  t h e  same, i.e., 
B(0) =B(l) =...=B(T), then t h e  present  value c a n  b e  shown t o  equal  
Internal  R a t e  of Return: 
If t h e  s o c i a l  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  is not  easily determinable,  o r  if break even is t h e  
only cri terion,  then o f ten  t h e  in ternal  r a t e  of return,  r, is c a l c u l a t e d .  Th is  i s  t h e  
r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t  such  t h a t  t h e  present  value  of t h e  benefit  s t r e a m  is just equal  t o  
t h e  cos t  stream. This can b e  found by solving 
f o r  r.  Then  e a c h  p r o j e c t ' s  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  may b e  compared t o  various 
e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  social  r a t e  of t i m e  pre fe rence  (or social discount ra te)  t o  assess o r  
rank t h e  various projects. 
APPENDIX D 
Area Stat is t ics  
Table D-1. Employment in t he  Detroit  and Surrounding Counties 
Total 
Year Labor Gov't Man. Other UnEmp. UE Rate  
NB: -All figures a r e  thousands 
-Other  cons i s t s  of c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  transportation, communication, public utilities, 
wholesale trade, re ta i l  trade, insurance, real estate, services and mining. 
Source: Michigan Statist ical  Abstract,  Table V-16, p.169 
Table D-2. Trends in Annual Total Budget Costs 
Family of Four Retired Couples 
Year HIGH LOW 
Source: Table VI-24, Michigan Statist ical  Abstracts, 1981:236 
Table D-3. Mean and Median Incomes in t h e  Detroit  Areas 
Mean Median 
Inside Outside Inside Outside 
Year Detroit  Detroit  Total Detroit  Detroit  Total 
Source: Table VI-15, Michigan Statist ical  Abstracts, 1981:227 
APPENDIX E 
Table E-1. Alternat ive  Actions o r  Outcomes 
A. No Project la :  
U n d e r  t h i s  s i tua t ion ,  no project  will b e  undertaken,  with t h e  added assumption 
t h e  GM w i l l  s t i l l  bu i ld  i t s  p l a n t  e l s e w h e r e  ( n o t  in  t h e  D e t r o i t  a r e a ) .  In t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  GM wil l  a l s o  e n d  up not l'backfilling'l if t ransfered operations f rom t h e  
Clark and Fisher plants so t h a t  a l l  those  jobs a r e  lost  t o  t h e  ci ty.  
B. No Projectlb:  
I d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  a b o v e  a s s u m ~ t i o n .  w i t h  t h e  e x c e ~ t i o n  t h a t  it will s t i l l  b e  
advantageous fo r  GM t o  uti l ize t h e  iaci~iths at  t h e  c la rk lk i sher  plants (i.e., backfil l  
with new jobs). The loss t o  Detroi t  is reduced. 
C. Project la :  
This is t h e  simplist assumption. GM will under take t o  build t h e  plant a f t e r  t h e  
Ci ty  c lea r s  t h e  s i te ,  but  only adds one shi f t  t o  t h e  plant and  does no t  need t o  uti l ize 
t h e  ClarkIFisher plants. All t h e  construction and c lea rance  a f f e c t s  a r e  fe l t ,  as well 
a s  t h e  loss of t h e  jobs and property on t h e  site prior t o  t h e  project. There is s t i l l  a 
n e t  loss of jobs t o  t h e  City. 
D. Projectlb:  
I d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  ~ r e v i o u s  case. w i t h  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  t h e  ClarkfFisher ~ l a n t  
backfil l  operation.  ~ h i s ' r e s u l t s  in a sbght  n e t  gain of employment t o  t h e  City. ' 
E. Project lc :  
Identical  t o  Project la ,  with t h e  exception t h a t  GM produces with both projected 
shi f ts  on line (note  t h a t  the re  is no backfill at ClarkIFisher). The employment gain 
t o  t h e  Ci ty  is larger.  
F. Projectld:  
This is t h e  culmination of a l l  t h e  possibilities, i.e., both  shi f ts  in t h e  new plant 
a r e  in operat ion and t h e  ClarkIFisher s i t e  is fully utilized with t h e  b a c k f i l l  o p t i o n .  
This is t h e  largest  potent ia l  gain t o  t h e  City. 
G .  Project le :  
Th i s  is a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  e v e n t  ( o n e  of m a n y )  w h e r e b y  GM d e c i d e s  no t  t o  
cons t ruc t  t h e  plant  due t o  changing c i rcumstances  a f t e r  t h e  s i t e  had been prepared.  
There  will b e  no reduction in t h e  ClarkIFisher plants employment  levels, but  t h e  jobs 
exist ing on t h e  s i t e  location have been eliminated.  No backfil l  is necessary because  
t h e  cur ren t  level  of utilization will remain in force.  




(add line numbers) 
Direct  Indirect 
(Table 5) (Table 6) . 
A. No GM plant,  C / F  not  backfilled 1+3-2 -3 -4 
B. No GM plant, C / F  backfilled 1 +2+3 -5 -6 
C. Project ,  C / F  not backfilled, 1 shif t  1 -3+4+5 1+2-7-8 
D. Project ,  C / F  backfilled, 1 shif t  1 +2 -3+4+5 1+2+9+10 
E. Project ,  C / F  not  backfilled, 2 shi f ts  1 -3+4+5+6 1+2+11+12 
F. P ro jec t ,  C / F  backfilled, 2 shi f ts  
G. Project ,  no plant,  C / F  unchanged 
Property NET Benefit  
(add lines in Table 5) 
I. CIP not undertaken 7+8 
11. CIP undertaken 7-8+9 
111. CIP undertaken, no plant built 7 -8 
* 1981 Construction c o s t s  f o r  t h i s  o u t c o m e  wi l l  b e  i n c l u d e d  in t h e  n e t  b e n e f i t  
calculation (lines 1 and 2), reflecting building demolition and site preparation for t h e  
plant. 
(NB: Indirect  benef i ts  f rom property t a x  revenues included above.) 
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